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Introduction
What drives mineral commodity markets in the long run? What causes large fluctu-
ations in mineral commodity prices? What determines supply? Why do we observe
increasing production, but stable trends in the prices of mineral commodities? This
dissertation provides fresh empirical and theoretical perspectives on these issues by
exploring a new data set on five widely used mineral commodities, namely aluminum,
copper, lead, tin, and zinc, over a far longer period than previous work on mineral
commodity markets.
The main messages are: first, major fluctuations in prices are driven mainly by de-
mand shocks; second, demand is determined by industrialization rather than prices;
third, on the supply side, economic growth triggers innovation in extraction tech-
nology, which makes long-run supply elastic and explains increasing extraction and
stable prices in the long term.
Mineral commodities are ultimately produced from mineral resources. They in-
clude such fuel minerals as coal, petroleum, and natural gas, metallic minerals,
and industrial and construction minerals.1 According to Black, Hashimzade, and
Myles (2009) commodities are homogeneous and interchangeable goods. They can
be traded as bulk goods on international markets. These characteristics make their
prices volatile in comparison to the sticky nominal prices of many other goods in the
economy (Ito and Rose, 2011).
Mineral commodities have been important to human civilization since the Bronze
Age. Copper, iron, lead, tin, zinc, and their alloys have been used in a wide variety
of applications, such as coinage, construction, tooling, and warfare, which has led
to flourishing metallurgy and long-distance trade since early times (Radetzki, 2009;
Krebs, 2006; De Callatay, 2005). In today’s world economy mineral commodities are
1See the definition employed by the U.S. Federal Government (2009, p. 8).
1
used as inputs in many production processes. As Table 1 shows, the value of the world
production of mineral commodities totalled some US-$ 4.8 trillion in 2010, which is
equivalent to about 7.5 percent of world GDP.2 Mineral commodities and other ma-
terials account for up to 47.5 percent (2008) of input costs in German manufacturing
(Flechtner, Mohr, and Rockholz, 2012).
Scarcity of supply and price fluctuations are not only recurrent problems for
policy-makers and businesses, but also the two main academic issues. Fear of short-
ages in the wake of the recent price boom have had widespread political implications
and has led to competition for resources. The U.S., Japan, Germany, the E.U., and
China have established “raw materials” strategies, bundling domestic and external
policies to secure access to mineral commodities (Stu¨rmer and von Hagen, 2012a;
U.K. Government, 2012). Chinese export taxes and export restrictions in several
mineral commodity markets are a prominent case at the World Trade Organization.
Price fluctuations affect the macroeconomic conditions of developing and industri-
alised countries (Bernanke, 2006; World Trade Organization, 2010; IMF, 2012b).
There is a large body of literature on the scarcity of mineral commodities and
fluctuations in their prices. The scarcity of non-renewable resources and the implica-
tions of a given finite resource stock have been a focus of economic theory since “The
Coal Question” by Jevons (1866) and the seminal model constructed by Hotelling
(1931). After a wide range of literature developed in the 1970s and 1980s, of which
Krautkraemer (1998) provides a good overview, the subject has recently been taken
up again. Acemoglu et al. (2012), for example, examine the incentives for resource
wars based on the assumption of a finite stock.
The determinants and impact of the boom-and-bust periods in mineral commodity
prices have fuelled theoretical and empirical papers, of which Carter, Rausser, and
Smith (2011) provide a survey. While many empirical studies focus on the oil market,
examples being Hamilton (2009a) and Kilian (2009), theoretical contributions often
build on the competitive rational storage model by Williams (1936) and Gustafson
(1958a), which were basically developed for agricultural commodities.
The aim of my thesis is to provide a theoretical and empirical long-run perspective
on these two subjects with some data reaching back to the 17th century. The core
2Own computation based on world GDP data from the World Bank (2011).
2
Commodity World Production Value of Production
in 1000 mt (content) in Mio. US-$
Crude oil1a 28,687,070 2,280,622
Natural gasa 2,880,877 538,172
Coal2a 7,273,298 672,777
Cementb 3,310,000 304,520
Steel b 1,410,000 270,720
Copperb 19,100 146,688
Goldb 2.7 101,120
Aluminum3b 40,800 93,840
Nitrogen4b 131,000 57,247
Nickelb 1,590 34,662
Limeb 311,000 32,779
Zincb 12,700 28,575
Manganeseb 14,000 21,000
Chromiumb 7,290 19,319
Potashb 33,700 18,670
Siliconb 7,290 16,184
Silverb 23 14,853
Phosphate rockb 181,000 14,371
Leadb 9,290 22,296
Platinum-group metalsb 0.5 8,640
Molybdenumb 242 8,445
Tinb 350 7,350
Sum of 70 mineral 44,645,208 4,759,886
commoditiesb
Notes: 1Includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands, and NGLs. 2Includes bituminous coal, hard coal, and
sub-bituminous coal. 3Only primary aluminum production. 4Ammonia produced. The production
of metals also includes recycling. Sources: aBritish Petroleum (2011), bU.S. Geological Survey
(2011a).
Table 1: Quantity and value of the world production of major mineral commodities
in 2010.
3
idea is to look far beyond the two commodity booms of the 1970s and 2000s to put
them into historical perspective and better understand the long-run determinants of
these markets.
However, most mineral commodities traded on world markets today, such as crude
oil and iron ore, were either not widely used in former times or their markets were
highly fragmented, owing to trade policies and high transportation costs. I therefore
construct and explore a data set on mineral commodities which have long been widely
used in industry and traded on the London Metal Exchange and its predecessors as
fungible and homogeneous goods in an integrated world market: aluminum, copper,
lead, tin, and zinc, all still among the top twenty-five in terms of value of world
production. Overall, these five mineral commodity markets have long exhibited char-
acteristics that most other markets of mineral commodities, such as iron ore, crude
oil, and coal have only recently acquired.
My thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, my co-author Gregor
Schwerhoff and I consider the issue of scarcity. We add an extractive sector to a stan-
dard endogenous growth model by Acemoglu (2002, 2009) such that aggregate output
is produced from a non-renewable resource and intermediate goods. We replace the
assumption of a finite stock, on which the seminal Hotelling (1931) model and sub-
sequent literature rely. In the extractive sector, firms can draw down resource stocks
through extraction, but also renew stocks through investment in new extractive tech-
nology. Given technological change, the non-renewable resource is inexhaustible and
there is no scarcity rent. This assumption is in line with evidence that technological
change has offset the depletion of the stock of non-renewable resources in the past
(Simpson, 1999, and others) and that non-renewable resources are highly abundant
in the Earth’s crust given technological change (Nordhaus, 1974, p. 23).
Our model points out the main differences between the two sectors. First, the
extractive sector needs to invest in new technologies as the resources is extracted from
mineral occurrences of decreasing grades. Second, non-renewable resources are traded
as homogeneous goods such that monopolistic competition is not taking place as in
the intermediate goods sector, where the variety of intermediate goods increases. As
a consequence, the resource sector is fully competitive in the market for extraction
technologies. Third, the resource stock increases linearly with R&D in extraction
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technology as two effects offset each other. Fourth, there are different evolutions of
technology due to the necessity of innovation in the extractive sector. The growth rate
of technology in the extractive sector needs to increase over time in order to keep the
level of production of the non-renewable resource proportionate to aggregate output.
This is in contrast to the constant growth rate of technology in the intermediate
goods sector.
Our model contributes to resolving a contradiction between theoretical predic-
tions and empirical evidence regarding non-renewable resources. According to the-
ory, economic growth is not limited by non-renewable resources because of three
factors: technological change in the use of resources, substitution of non-renewable
resources by capital, and returns to scale. Given these factors, growth models with a
non-renewable resource typically predict growth in output, decreased non-renewable
resource production, and an increase in resource price (see Groth, 2007; Aghion and
Howitt, 1998). However, it is a well-established fact that these predictions are not in
line with the empirical evidence (see Krautkraemer, 1998; Livernois, 2009; Von Ha-
gen, 1989). We present data for the period from 1792 to 2010 which shows that the
extraction of non-renewable resources increase exponentially whereas its prices stay
constant over the long-term. Our model is able to replicate these historical trends.
Nordhaus (1974), Simon (1981), and others stress technological change in the
extraction of non-renewable resources as an argument against limits to growth. There
are several efforts to model this aspect (see Heal, 1976; Slade, 1982; Cynthia-Lin and
Wagner, 2007; Fourgeaud, Lenclud, and Michel, 1982; Hart, 2012). However, our
model is, to our knowledge, the first to combine technological change in the extractive
sector and mineral occurrences of different grades in an endogenous growth model
that explicitly models the R&D investment in the extraction technology. It also
contributes to the literature by being the first to point out the necessity of innovation
in the extractive sector due to its specific characteristics, and their effects on R&D
development in comparison to other economic sectors.
Our results suggest that the increasing demand for non-renewable resources in
industrializing countries like China is neutralized by R&D investment in extraction
technology. This makes extraction from mineral occurrences of lower grades possible.
If historical trends continue, resource prices might stay constant in the long term,
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even if non-renewable resource use and production increase exponentially.
The second chapter considers the determinants of price fluctuations from a long-
run perspective. I examine the dynamic effects of supply and demand shocks on
mineral commodity prices, using annual data on the copper, lead, tin, and zinc mar-
kets from 1840 to 2010. This allows me to capture more than a dozen periods of
boom and bust. I am the first to provide long-term evidence on demand and supply
shocks in mineral commodity markets. I identify shocks in a vector autoregressive
model based on long-run restrictions, which allows me to leave short-run relations
unrestricted. I provide a historical account for each mineral commodity market to
better understand the dynamics of the markets and to give the identified shocks a
proper interpretation. The main conclusion drawn in this chapter is that fluctuations
in the prices of the four mineral commodities examined are mainly driven by demand
shocks rather than supply shocks.
I provide long-run evidence for a body of literature that is far from conclusive
on the driving forces behind these long-run fluctuations. My analysis suggests that
extensions of the seminal Hotelling (1931) model such as those by Arrow and Chang
(1982), Fourgeaud, Lenclud, and Michel (1982), and Cairns and Lasserre (1986) which
explain price fluctuations by supply shocks must be rethought. It also questions the
usual interpretation of shocks in competitive storage models (Gustafson, 1958a,b;
Wright and Williams, 1982), which views supply shocks as a key to explaining com-
modity price fluctuations. Supply shocks are only of some importance in explain-
ing fluctuations of tin and copper prices. Such shocks appear to increase with the
importance of concentrated industry structures and government intervention in the
markets. This evidence is in contrast to industrial organization models which predict
that higher product market concentration will reduce price volatility (see Slade and
Thille, 2006).
In contrast to the classical competitive storage models, my findings point to in-
ventories as a source of fluctuations rather than a calming agent. My results provide
long-term evidence in support of Alquist and Kilian (2010) and others who maintain
that storage in the presence of expected supply shortfalls explains price fluctuations.
Narrative evidence in this paper, however suggests that shocks due to changes in
inventories are rather driven by producer cartels and government stockpiling, and
6
only in recent times by “precautionary” behaviour of consumers or investors in the
markets examined here.
My findings have important policy implications for both commodity-exporting
and commodity-importing countries. They suggest that the current price boom is
temporary, not permanent. This is a key insight for the design of optimal fiscal and
macroeconomic policy responses in commodity-exporting developing countries (see
IMF, 2012b). Long-term trends are mainly statistically insignificant for the com-
modities examined in the estimated models. Hence, commodity exporters should
take a countercyclical policy stand rather than increase long-term public investment
based on the assumption of a permanent price increase. For countries which import
mineral commodities, my findings indicate that apprehensions about security of sup-
ply are exaggerated in the light of historical evidence concerning widely-used mineral
commodities. Various forms of subsidies for overseas mining and the reduction of im-
port dependencies as well as “resource diplomacy” are questionable given that these
mineral commodities are traded on world markets, while prices react only moderately
to supply restrictions in the short run.
In the third chapter, I provide empirical evidence on the long-run elasticities of
demand with respect to manufacturing output and prices for several mineral com-
modities based on a long panel. To cover the main periods of industrialization, I
employ a newly constructed data set for twelve major economies which for some
parts spans back to 1840. I focus on the demand for aluminum, copper, lead, tin,
and zinc. My study contributes to a rich body of empirical studies of the elastic-
ity of demand for mineral commodities with respect to economic activity and prices
(see Hamilton, 2009b; Pei and Tilton, 1999; Kilian and Murphy, 2012, for surveys of
the current literature). This literature mainly focusses on energy and only provides
empirical evidence for relatively short periods.
My estimation strategy relies on an extension of the partial adjustment model,
the standard approach in empirical energy demand analysis, to ensure comparability
with the results of previous studies. Derived demand is regressed on some measure
of economic activity, the relative price of the respective mineral commodity, and
lagged values of derived demand. I introduce a common linear time trend and finally
time fixed effects following Pesaran, Smith, and Akiyama (1998). This allows me to
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take advantage of the panel structure of the data as it makes it possible to control
for ommitted common technological trends and spillover effects Pesaran, Smith, and
Akiyama (1998).
I find that the estimated long-run manufacturing output elasticities of demand
vary significantly between the five examined mineral commodities. An one percent
increase in manufacturing output leads to an approximately 1.5 percent increase in the
demand for aluminum. This means that its demand increases more than proportional
to manufacturing output over time. The estimated manufacturing output elasticity
of copper demand is close to one which implies a stable intensity of use over time.
The estimates are far below one for lead, tin, and zinc demand. This causes the
intensity of use of these mineral commodities to decline over time. The estimated
long-run manufacturing output elasticities of the demand for all examined mineral
commodities, except tin, are higher or equal to the income elasticity of oil demand
(which is 0.55 according to Gately and Huntington (2002) for twenty-five OECD
countries over 1971 to 1997). The ones for copper and aluminum are also higher
than estimates of the income elasticity of aggregate energy demand (0.8 according to
Adeyemi and Hunt (2007) for fifteen OECD countries from 1962 to 2003).
The estimated manufacturing output elasticities of demand suggest that the in-
dustrialization in China will cause aluminum to increase relative to manufacturing
output, while the demand for copper will grow in proportion to manufacturing output.
The demand for lead, tin, and zinc decreases relative to manufacturing output in the
long-term. My results are important for developing long-term production strategies
and allowing for smooth markets, as mining firms face high upfront costs and long
lead times to open up new mines. Moreover, countries dependent on the exports of
their mineral commodities may better judge the long-term perspective of the respec-
tive markets and adjust their macroeconomic and fiscal policies accordingly. Finally,
my results suggest that demand is a larger contributor to the volatility of aluminum
and copper prices than to that of lead, tin, zinc, and energy since manufacturing
output fluctuations lead to larger fluctuations in the cases of aluminum and copper
demand (see Slade, 1991).
The estimated long-run price elasticities of demand are rather low for the ex-
amined mineral commodities. Again, there are pronounced differences across the
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examined mineral commodities. While it is about -0.7 and -0.8 in the case of alu-
minum demand, it is about -0.4 for copper demand, and below or equal to about -0.2
for lead, tin, and zinc demand. This shows that with the exception of aluminum and
copper, the aforementioned mineral commodities are rather essential to manufactur-
ing output as the processing industry changes its use slowly in response to price. The
estimates of the price elasticity are in contrast to the literature on oil and energy,
where the long-run price elasticity is estimated to be significant (-1.25 for energy de-
mand according to Heal and Chichilnisky (1991) and -0.64 for oil demand in OECD
countries according to Gately and Huntington (2002)). These results are important,
because according to models of commodity price speculation a low price elasticity of
demand makes these markets prone to speculation (see Hamilton, 2009a; Kilian and
Murphy, 2012). Moreover, the low price elasticity is a key parameter in shaping the
incentives of war over resources as Acemoglu et al. (2012) claim.
My estimation results show that the relationship between per capita manufac-
turing output, relative prices, and the per capita demand for mineral commodities is
rather driven by technological change and consumer preferences that are country spe-
cific. Effects that are common to all countries over time play only a role in decreasing
aluminum and lead demand over time. The model for tin seems to be misspecified. I
find strong evidence for the existence of long-run relationships in all regressions. The
estimated speed of demand adjustment is rather slow for all commodities and it takes
more than ten years in the cases of lead, tin, and zinc to revert back to equilibrium.
This is reasonable, given that adjustments in manufacturing capital are rather slow
and that inventories play an important role in these markets. Overall, my empirical
results are plausible given narrative evidence on the use of the mineral commodities
over time.
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Chapter 1
Non-renewable but inexhaustible:
Resources in an endogenous
growth model1
1.1 Introduction
Our model contributes to resolving a contradiction between theoretical predictions
and empirical evidence regarding non-renewable resources. According to theory, eco-
nomic growth is not limited by non-renewable resources because of three factors:
technological change in the use of resources, substitution of non-renewable resources
by capital, and returns to scale. Given these factors, growth models with a non-
renewable resource typically predict growth in output, decreased non-renewable re-
source production, and an increase in resource price (see Groth, 2007; Aghion and
Howitt, 1998).
However, it is a well-established fact that these predictions are not in line with
the empirical evidence from the historical evolution of prices and production of non-
renewable resources. Over time, real prices have either lacked a trend or remained
stationary around deterministic trends with infrequent structural breaks, while the
1This chapter is based on joint work with Gregor Schwerhoff. Special thanks go to him. An ear-
lier version has been published as a Preprint of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective
Goods (see Stu¨rmer and Schwerhoff, 2012).
10
extraction of non-renewable resources increased (see Krautkraemer, 1998; Livernois,
2009; Von Hagen, 1989).
We modify the standard endogenous growth model of expanding varieties and di-
rected technological change by Acemoglu (2002, 2009). We add an extractive sector
to the model such that aggregate output is produced from a non-renewable resource
and intermediate goods. In the extractive sector, firms can draw down resource stocks
through extraction, but also renew stocks through investment in new extractive tech-
nology. Given technological change, the non-renewable resource is inexhaustible and
there is no scarcity rent. This assumption is in line with evidence that technological
change has offset the depletion of the stock of non-renewable resources in the past
(Simpson, 1999, and others) and that non-renewable resources are so abundant in
the Earth’s crust that given technological change, “the future will not be limited by
sheer availability of important materials”(Nordhaus, 1974, p. 23).
We point out the main differences between the extractive sector and the interme-
diate goods sector in our model. First, it is necessary to innovate in the extractive
sector as resources are extracted from mineral occurrences of decreasing grades. Once
the resource stock is depleted, investment in new extraction technology is necessary to
make mineral occurrences of lower grades extractable thus continuing production. As
a consequence, a specific extraction technology is only applicable for extraction from
a mineral occurrence of a specific grade, whereas technologies in the intermediate
goods sector have the potential to keep production going.
Second, the resource stock increases linearly with R&D in extraction technology
as two effects offset each other. On the one hand, R&D expenditure has to increase
exponentially in order to make mineral occurrences of lower grades extractable. On
the other hand, the non-renewable mineral resource is distributed in the Earth’s
crust such that its quantity increases exponentially as the grade of its occurrences
decreases.
Third, non-renewable resources are traded as homogeneous goods such that mo-
nopolistic competition is not taking place as in the intermediate goods sector, where
the variety of intermediate goods increases. As a consequence, the resource sector is
fully competitive in the market for extraction technologies.
We illustrate the different evolutions of technology due to the characteristics of
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the two sectors. In order to keep the level of production of the non-renewable resource
proportionate to aggregate output, the growth rate of technology in the extractive
sector needs to increase over time. This is in contrast to the intermediate sector,
where the growth rate of technology is constant. This difference is due to the necessity
of innovation in the extractive sector as extraction from lower grades requires new
technology.
Finally, we compare the decentralized solution of our model to the central planner
solution. For the social planner R&D investment is endogenous and the aggregate
production function exhibits increasing returns to scale instead of constant returns to
scale. As a result, aggregate R&D investment increases proportionately with output.
Aggregate output increases explosively and there is no balanced growth path.
Our model replicates historical trends in the prices and production of major non-
renewable resources as well as world output for which we present data for the period
from 1792 to 2010. Exponential aggregate output growth triggers R&D investment in
extraction technology. The extraction and use of the non-renewable resource increases
exponentially whereas its prices stays constant over the long term.
Our results suggest that the increasing demand for non-renewable resources in
industrializing countries like China is neutralized by R&D investment in extraction
technology. This makes extraction from mineral occurrences of lower grades possible.
If historical trends continue, R&D in extraction technology might offset the depletion
of today’s resources. Even if non-renewable resource use and production increase
exponentially, resource prices might stay constant in the long term.
Nordhaus (1974), Simon (1981), Simon (1998), Tilton (2002), and others stress
technological change in the extraction and processing of non-renewable resources as
an argument against limits to growth. However, efforts to model this aspect take tech-
nological change in the extraction technology as a given and do not include growth
of aggregate output. Heal (1976) introduces a non-renewable resource, which is in-
exhaustible, but extractable at different grades and costs in the seminal Hotelling
(1931) optimal depletion model. Extraction costs increase with cumulative extrac-
tion, but then remain constant as a “backstop technology” (Heal, 1976, p. 371) is
reached. Slade (1982) adds exogenous technological change in extraction technology
to the Hotelling (1931) model and predicts a U-shaped relative price curve. Cynthia-
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Lin and Wagner (2007) use a similar model with an inexhaustible non-renewable
resource and exogenous technological change. They obtain a constant relative price
with increasing extraction.
There are three papers, to our knowledge, that are similar to ours in that they in-
clude technological change in the extraction of a non-renewable resource in an endoge-
nous growth model. Fourgeaud, Lenclud, and Michel (1982) focuses on explaining
sudden fluctuations in the development of non-renewable resource prices by allow-
ing the resource stock to grow in a stepwise manner through technological change.
Tahvonen and Salo (2001) model the transition from a non-renewable energy resource
to a renewable energy resource. Their model follows a learning-by-doing approach
as technical change is linearly related to the level of extraction and the level of pro-
ductive capital. It explains decreasing prices and increasing use of a non-renewable
energy resource over a particular time period before prices increase in the long term.
Hart (2012) models resource extraction and demand in a growth model with directed
technological change built up from scratch. The key element in his model is the depth
of the resource. After a temporary “frontier phase” with a constant resource price
and consumption rising at a rate only close to aggregate output, the economy needs
to extract resource from greater depths and a long-run balanced growth path with
constant resource consumption and prices that rise in line with wages is reached.
Our model is, to our knowledge, the first to combine technological change in the
extractive sector and mineral occurrences of different grades in an endogenous growth
model that explicitly models the R&D investment in the extraction technology. It
also contributes to the literature by pointing out the necessity of innovation in the
extractive sector due to its specific characteristics, and their effects on R&D devel-
opment in comparison to other economic sectors in an endogenous growth model.
To focus on the main argument, we do not take into account externalities, uncer-
tainty, recycling, substitution, short run price fluctuations, population growth, and
exploration in our model. In particular recycling will probably become more impor-
tant for non-fuel non-renewable resources in the future due to an increasing stock of
recyclable materials and its comparatively low energy requirements (see Steinbach
and Wellmer, 2010; Wellmer and Dalheimer, 2012). As recycling adds to the resource
stock, this would further strengthen our argument.
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In Section 1.2, we document stylized facts on the long-term development of non-
renewable resource prices, production, and world GDP. We provide geological evi-
dence for the major assumptions of our model. Section 1.3 describes how we model
technological change in the extractive sector. Section 1.4 presents the setup of the
growth model and discusses its theoretical results. Section 1.5 is where we will draw
conclusions.
1.2 Stylized facts
1.2.1 Prices, production, and output over the long term
Annual data for major non-renewable resource markets from 1792 to 2010 indicates
that real prices are roughly trendless and that worldwide primary production as well
as world GDP grow roughly exponentially.
Figure 1.1 presents data on the real prices of five major base metals and crude
oil. Real prices exhibit strong short-term fluctuations. At the same time, the growth
rates of all prices are not significantly different from zero (see Table 1.2 in the Ap-
pendix). The real prices are hence trendless from 1792 to 2010. This is in line with
evidence over shorter time periods provided by Krautkraemer (1998), Von Hagen
(1989), Cynthia-Lin and Wagner (2007), and references therein. The real price for
crude oil exhibits structural breaks, as Dvir and Rogoff (2010) point out. Overall,
the literature is certainly not conclusive (see Pindyck, 1999; Lee, List, and Strazi-
cich, 2006; Slade, 1982), but we believe the evidence is sufficient to take trendless
long-term prices as a motivation for our model.
Figure 1.2 shows that the world primary production of the examined non-renewable
resources and world GDP approximately exhibit exponential growth since 1792. A
closer statistical examination reveals that the production of the non-renewable re-
sources exhibits significantly positive growth rates in the long term. The growth
rates of the production of copper, lead, tin, and zinc do not exhibit a statistically
significant trend over the long term. Hence, the levels of production of these non-
renewable resources grow exponentially over time.
14
Notes: All prices, except for the price of crude oil, are prices of the London Metal Exchange and its predecessors. The oil price time series is the international oil price as assembled by
British Petroleum (2011). As price at the London Metal Exchange used to be denominated in Sterling in earlier times, we have converted these prices to US-Dollar by using historical
exchange rates. We make use of the US-Consumer Price Index for deflating these prices. The secondary y-axis relates to the price of crude oil. For more details, see the chapter on data
sources and description.
Figure 1.1: Real prices of major mineral commodities from 1790 to 2009 in natural logs.
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Figure 1.2: World primary production of non-renewable resources and world GDP from 1790 to 2009 in logs.
16
The level of crude oil production follows this exponential pattern up to 1975.
Including the time period from 1975 until 2009 reveals a statistically significant neg-
ative trend and therefore declining growth rates over time, due to a structural break
in the oil market (Dvir and Rogoff, 2010; Hamilton, 2009b). In the case of primary
aluminum production, we also find declining growth rates over time and hence no
exponential growth of the production level. This might be due to the fact that re-
cycling has become important in the aluminum production over time (see data by
U.S. Geological Survey, 2011a). Recycling is not included in our model nor is it in
the data. The growth rates of world GDP exhibit an increasing trend over the long
term, hinting at an underlying explosive growth process.
As our model does not include population growth, we run the same tests for
the per capita data of the respective time series and find slightly weaker results as
Table 1.4 in the Appendix shows. There is strong evidence that the growth rates
of the production of copper and zinc are positive and without a trend in the long
term. Hence, their levels of production grow exponentially over time. We find the
same result for tin but only over the long time period of 1792 to 2009, but not for
selected shorter time periods. Growth rates of lead production exhibit a statistically
significant negative trend for long time periods and no statistically significant trend
for the shorter time periods. The results for per capita aluminum and crude oil
production as well as per capita GDP do not change significantly compared to the
data in absolute values.
Overall, we take these stylized facts as motivation to build a model that exhibits
trendless resource prices and exponentially increasing worldwide production of non-
renewable resources as well as exponentially increasing aggregate output.
1.2.2 Technological change in the extractive sector
Technological change offsets the depletion of the stock of a non-renewable resource
(Simpson, 1999, and others). Hence, the resource stock is on the one hand drawn
down by extraction and use, on the other hand it is renewed by technological change
in extraction technology. The reason for this phenomenon is that non-renewable
resources such as copper, aluminum, or, hydrocarbons are extractable at different
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costs from the Earth’s crust due to varying grades, thickness, depths, and other char-
acteristics of mineral occurrences. Technological change makes mineral occurrences
extractable that due to high costs have not been extractable before (see Simpson,
1999; Nordhaus, 1974, and others).
The definition of resources by the US-Geological Survey reflects this fact. It de-
fines resources as “a concentration of naturally occurring solid, liquid, or gaseous
material in or on the Earth‘s crust in such form and amount that economic ex-
traction (...) is currently or potentially feasible.” (U.S. Geological Survey, 2011b,
p. 193). The term economic “implies that profitable extraction (...) under defined
investment assumptions has been established.” (U.S. Geological Survey, 2011b, p.
194). The “boundary” between resources and “other occurrences is obviously uncer-
tain, but limits may be specified in terms of grade, quality, thickness, depth, percent
extractable, or other economic-feasibility variables.” (U.S. Geological Survey, 2011b,
p. 194).
Source: Scholz and Wellmer (2012).
Figure 1.3: The historical development of mining of various grades of copper in the
U.S.
Over time, R&D in extraction technology, namely in prospection and mining
equipment as well as metallurgy and processing, have renewed the stock of the re-
source by material from occurrences of lower grade or deeper deposits (see Wellmer,
2008; Mudd, 2007). For example, Radetzki (2009) describes how technological change
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has gradually made possible the extraction of copper from mineral occurrences of de-
creasing grades. 7000 years ago, human beings used copper in a pure nugget form.
Today, humanity extracts copper from mineral occurences of a low 0.2 to 0.3 per-
cent grade.2 In line with this narrative evidence, Figure 1.3 illustrates that the ore
grades of U.S. copper mines have constantly decreased over the long term. Mudd
(2007) presents similar evidence for the mining of different base-metals in Australia.
Overall, history suggests that the R&D costs in the extractive sector have increased
exponentially in pushing the boundary between mineral occurences and resources
in terms of grades. Developing technologies to make occurrences of 49 percent in-
stead of 50 percent extractable, has probably required a far smaller investment than
developing technologies to make occurrences of 0.2 percent instead of 1.2 percent
extractable.
As a consequence, technological change has more than offset the higher cost from
obtaining resources from occurrences of lower grade. Figure 1.4 shows that the re-
serves3 of copper have increased by more than 600 percent over the last 60 years. One
reason is the introduction of the solvent extraction and electrowinning technology.
This two stage process has made the extraction of copper from mineral occurences of
lower grades economically feasible (Bartos, 2002). There are also the strong effects
of innovation on returns-to-scale as larger equipment in mining operations become
feasible.4 Case studies for other minerals also find that technological change has off-
set cost increasing degradation of resources (see for example Lasserre and Ouellette,
1991; Mudd, 2007; Simpson, 1999).
2The Aitik copper mine in Sweden is the mine that extracts copper from the lowest deposits of
0.27 percent in the world (personal communication with F.-W. Wellmer).
3Reserves are those resources for which extraction is considered economically feasible (U.S.
Geological Survey, 2011c).
4Personal communication with F.-W. Wellmer.
19
Sources: Tilton and Lagos C.C. (2007), U.S. Geological Survey (2011b).
Figure 1.4: Historical evolution of world copper reserves from 1950 to 2010.
We observe similar developments in the case of hydrocarbons. Using the example
of the offshore oil industry, Managi et al. (2004) show that technological change has
offset the cost-increasing degradation of resources. Crude oil has been extracted
from ever deeper sources in the Gulf of Mexico as Figure 1.8 in the Appendix shows.
Furthermore, technological change and high prices have made it profitable to also
extract liquid hydrocarbons from unconventional sources such as light tight oil, oil
sands, and liquid natural gas (International Energy Agency, 2012). As a consequence,
oil reserves have doubled since the 1980s (see Figure 1.7 in the Appendix).
Overall, empirical evidence suggests that technological change offsets resource
depletion by renewing the resource stock from mineral occurrences that had been
considered impossible to extract. Furthermore, it is a reasonable assumption that
R&D costs in the extractive sector have increased exponentially in terms of mak-
ing mineral occurences from lower grades extractable and turn them into accessible
resources.
1.2.3 Geological distribution in the Earth’s crust
Computing the total abundance (or quantity) of each of the elements in the Earth’s
crust leads to enormous quantities (see Nordhaus, 1974; Perman et al., 2003). Table
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1.1 shows the respective ratios of quantities of reserves, resources, and abundance in
the Earth’s crust with respect to annual mine production for several important non-
renewable resources. It provides evidence that even non-renewable resources such
as gold, which are commonly thought to be the most scarce, are abundant in the
Earth’s crust, and that there is evidence “that the future will not be limited by sheer
availability of important materials”(Nordhaus, 1974, p. 23). In addition, most metals
are recyclable which means that the extractable stock in the technosphere increases
(Wellmer and Dalheimer, 2012). The sediments of the Earth’s crust are also rich in
hydrocarbons. Even though conventional oil resources may be exhausted someday,
resources of unconventional oil, natural gas, and coal are abundant. Aguilera et al.
(2012) conclude that conventional and unconventional resources “are likely to last far
longer than many now expect” (p. 59). Overall, Rogner (1997) states about world
hydrocarbon resources that “fossil energy appears almost unlimited” (p. 249) given
a continuation of historical technological trends.
Reserves/ Resources/ Crustal abundance/
Annual production Annual production Annual production
(Years) (Years) (Years)
Aluminum 1391a 263,0001a 48,800,000,000bc
Copper 43a 189a 95,000,000ab
Iron 78a 223a 1,350,000,000ab
Lead 21a 362a 70.000.000ab
Tin 17a “Sufficient”a 144.000ab
Zinc 21a 158a 187.500.000ab
Gold 20d 13d 27,160,000ef
Rare earth elements2 827a “Very large”a n.a.
Coal3 129g 2,900g
} 1,400,0006iOil4 55g 76g
Gas5 59g 410g
Notes: Reserves include all material which can currently be extracted. The definition of resources can be found in
section 1.2.2. Sources: aU.S. Geological Survey (2012a), bPerman et al. (2003), cU.S. Geological Survey (2011c),dU.S.
Geological Survey (2011b),eNordhaus (1974),fU.S. Geological Survey (2010a), gBGR, 2011b giLittke and Welte
(1992). Notes: 1 data for bauxite, 2 rare earth oxide, 3 includes lignite and hard coal, 4 includes conventional and
unconventional oil, 5 includes conventional and unconventional gas, 6 all organic carbon in the Earth’s crust.
Table 1.1: Availability of selected non-renewable resources in years of production left
in the reserve, resource and crustal mass at the current mine production rate.
The elements of the Earth’s crust are not uniformly distributed. Geochemical
processes have decreased or increased their local abundance throughout history. Un-
fortunately, geologists do not agree on the distribution of the elements in the Earth’s
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crust. Ahrens (1953, 1954) states in his fundamental law of geochemistry that the
elements in the Earth’s crust exhibit a lognormal grade-quantity distribution. Skin-
ner (1979) and Gordon, Bertram, and Graedel (2007) propose a discontinuity in this
distribution due to the so-called “mineralogical barrier”(Skinner, 1979), the approx-
imate point below which metal atoms are trapped by atomic substitution. Due to
a lack of geological data, both parties acknowledge that an empirical proof is still
needed. In a recent empirical study, Gerst (2008) concludes that he can neither con-
firm nor refute these two hypotheses. Based on worldwide data on copper deposits
over the past 200 years, he finds evidence for a lognormal relationship between copper
production and average ore grades. Mudd (2007) analyses the historical evolution of
extraction and grades of mineral occurrences for different base metals in Australia.
He comes to the conclusion that production has been continually increasing, partly
verging on exponentially, while grades have consistently declined.
The distribution of hydrocarbons in the Earth’s crust might also differ from the
fundamental laws of geochemistry by Ahrens (1953, 1954) due to the distinct for-
mation processes. For example, oil begins to form in the source rock due to the
thermogenic breakdown of organic matter (kerogen) at about 60 to 120 degrees Cel-
sius, which is found at approximately two to four kilometer of depth. However, Farrell
and Brandt (2006) and Aguilera et al. (2012) suggest that a log-normal relationship
is also true for liquid hydrocarbon production. Aguilera et al. (2012) also point out
that there is no huge break between the average total production costs of conventional
and unconventional oil resources.
To conclude, with respect to inference about future supply, we acknowledge that
there is uncertainty about the distribution of the elements in the Earth’s crust. How-
ever, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that the elements are distributed
according to a lognormal relationship between the grade of its mineral occurrences
and its quantity in the Earth’s crust.
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1.3 Modeling technological change in the extrac-
tive sector
The first part of the theoretical analysis determines the return to R&D investment
in the extractive sector in terms of the extractable quantity of the resource. Two
functions are combined for this. The first function describes the mineral occurences
that are extractable for a given state of technology. The second function shows
the distribution of the quantity of the resource over grades. Combining these two
functions gives the quantity of the resource that becomes extractable from one unit
of R&D investment in the extraction technology.
Let NRt be the accumulated extraction technology at time t. We drop the time
index to simplify notation. Let d be the grade of the respective mineral occurrences.
We define the extraction cost function as a function mapping grades into extraction
costs depending on the state of technology:
φNR : [0, 1]× R+ → R¯+, (d,NR) 7→ φNR(d) . (1.1)
At technology level NR ∈ R+ the cost of extracting the non-renewable resource from
occurrences of grade d ∈ [0, 1] is φNR(d) ∈ R¯+ = R+∪∞. For a given R&D investment
in extraction technology the progress in terms of grades decreases. This implies that
for a given level of technology NR, φNR is non-increasing in d:
∀NR : d > d′ ⇒ φNR(d) ≤ φNR(d′) . (1.2)
We assume that R&D increases the productivity of the extraction technology for
mineral occurrences of all grades. Therefore, an increase in NR decreases extraction
costs for any given grade:
∀d : ∂φNR(d)
∂NR
≤ 0 . (1.3)
At time t, the extraction technology increases by ∂NRt
∂t
and reduces extraction costs.
The resource owner determines the R&D expenditure as an optimization between ex-
traction costs and investment in extraction technology. To simplify this optimization
problem we assume a simple functional form of the technology function.
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Figure 1.5 panel (a) shows the general form of the extraction cost function. The
extraction of the resource from mineral occurrences of lower grades generates higher
costs, but with increasing R&D the function moves downward.
ĭNR(d)=E
ĭNR(d)=
dd
(a) (b)
dN
ĭNR(d)
Figure 1.5: Extraction costs φNR as a function of deposits of different grades d.
General and simplified form.
Figure 1.5 panel (b) illustrates a simplified version of the extraction cost function,
which we use in the following. A certain grade dN is associated with a unique level of
R&D investment, above which the resource can be extracted at cost φNR = E. The
function h maps the state of the extraction technology into a value for the grade of
the mineral occurrence, which is extractable at cost φNR :
h : R+ → [0, 1], NR 7→ dNR . (1.4)
At grades lower than dN extraction is impossible, because the cost is infinite. The
technology function takes the degenerate form of
φNR(d) =

E, if d ≥ dNR ,
∞, if d < dNR .
(1.5)
This simplifies the optimization. If occurrences with a grade larger than dNR exist,
they are extractable without any additional R&D. Otherwise, R&D is needed to in-
crease the resource stock and to make extraction possible.
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In order to determine the cost of R&D we specify a functional form for the ex-
traction technology function h:
h(NR) = e
−δ1NRt , δ1 ∈ R+ , (1.6)
with δ1 denoting a parameter that determines the shape of the function. Panel (a)
in Figure 1.6 illustrates the shape of h(NR). The marginal effect of the extraction
technology on the extractable occurrences declines as the grade decreases. This picks
up the suggestion in the stylized facts that R&D costs have increased exponentially in
pushing the boundary between mineral occurrences and resources in terms of grades.
d
D(d)
1
NR(a) (b)
H(NR)
Figure 1.6: (a) Extractable mineral occurrences of grade h(NR) as a function of the
state of technology NR. (b) The extractable amount of the non-renewable resource
in the Earth’s crust D(d) at a given grade d of the mineral occurrences.
Panel (b) in Figure 1.6 shows the distribution of the non-renewable resource in the
Earth’s crust. It maps a certain grade into the total quantity of extractable resources
at different grades of the occurrences between d and one, where one corresponds to
a 100 percent ore grade or pure metal.
D : (0, 1]→ R+, d 7→ D(d) (1.7)
Note that D(1) = 0 means that the resource is not found in 100 percent pure form.
Figure 1.6 panel (b) illustrates the relationship between the two variables. The total
quantity of the non-renewable resource is inversely proportional to the grade: As the
grade decreases, the extractable quantity of the non-renewable resource increases.
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We formulate the relationship in a general way:
D(d) = −δ2 ln(d), δ2 ∈ R+ , (1.8)
where δ2 determines the steepness of the function.
We combine the two functions and obtain the following proposition. A dot over
a variable denotes the time derivative.
Proposition 1. The total quantity of the resource, which has been made extractable
over time due to technological change, is proportional to NRt:
D(h(NRt)) = δ1δ2NRt . (1.9)
Consequently, the newly extractable resource from a marginal investment into R&D
is
Xt =
∂D(h(NRt))
∂t
= δ1δ2N˙Rt . (1.10)
According to this result, the quantity of the resource, which is made extractable by
a given R&D investment in extraction technology, is independent of past investments
or time. An extractive firm invests an amount of N˙Rt into R&D. This gives her
a smaller return on investment in terms of making resources from occurrences of
lower grade extractable. However, this smaller advancement in terms of grade makes
the same quantity of the resource extractable as she reaches a grade with a higher
extractable amount of resources than before.
1.4 The growth model
To illustrate the macroeconomic effect of the analysis in Section 1.3 we extend the
standard decentralized endogenous growth model of Acemoglu (2002). One of the
two sectors in this model is replaced by an extractive sector. The economy can thus
allocate R&D expenditure optimally between the two sectors.
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1.4.1 The setup
The basic structure of the model is taken from Acemoglu (2002). We consider an
economy with a representative consumer that has constant relative risk aversion pref-
erences: ∫ ∞
0
C1−θt − 1
1− θ e
−ρtdt . (1.11)
Ct is consumption of aggregate output at time t, ρ is the discount rate, and θ is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. Her budget constraint is
Ct + It +Mt ≤ Yt ≡
[
γZ
ε−1
ε
t + (1− γ)R
ε−1
ε
t
] ε
ε−1
, (1.12)
where It is aggregate investment in machines by the two sectors and Mt denotes
aggregate R&D investment in developing new varieties of machines. For illustrative
purposes and to stay in line with the literature we label “technology” as “machines”
in the following. The usual no-Ponzi game condition applies. Aggregate output
production uses, according to the right hand side of Equation 1.12 two inputs, inter-
mediate goods Zt and the non-renewable resource Rt. There are two sectors in the
economy that produce the inputs to aggregate output production: the intermediate
goods sector and the non-renewable resource sector. The distribution parameter γ
indicates the respective importance in producing aggregate output Yt. The R&D
expenditure is the sum of R&D expenditure in the intermediate sector and in the
extractive sector: Mt = MZt +MRt.
ε > 0 is the elasticity of substitution. Inputs Zt and Rt are substitutes for ε > 1.
In this case the resource is inessential for aggregate production (see Dasgupta and
Heal, 1980). ε = 1 is the Cobb-Douglas case. For 0 < ε < 1 the two inputs are
complements.
The production function of the intermediate goods sector
The intermediate goods sector follows the basic setup of Acemoglu (2002). It
produces intermediate goods Zt according to the following production function
5:
5Like Acemoglu (2002) we assume that the firm level production functions of the two sectors
exhibit constant returns to scale, so there is no loss of generality in focusing on the aggregate
production functions.
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Zt =
1
1− β
(∫ Nzt
0
xzt(j)
1−βdj
)
Lβ , (1.13)
where β ∈ (0, 1). The goods of the intermediate goods sector are produced from
aggregate labor Lt, which is in fixed supply, and from machines. xZt(j) refers to the
number of machines that are used of each machine variety j at time t. Machines
depreciate fully after use within one period. Nzt denotes the number of varieties of
machines.
Sector specific technology firms invent and produce machines. They hold fully
enforceable patents on the machines and are able to set monopolistic prices χZt(j).
Machines depreciate fully after use and the marginal cost of production in terms of
the final good ψ is the same for all machines.
The range of machines expands through R&D expenditure by
N˙Zt = ηZMZt , (1.14)
where MZt is R&D investment by the technology firms for machines in the intermedi-
ate goods sector in terms of the final product and ηZ is a cost parameter. One unit of
the final good spent for R&D will generate ηZ new varietes of machines. A technol-
ogy firm that discovers a new machine receives a patent and becomes its sole supplier.
The production function of the extractive sector
The extractive sector differs from the intermediate goods sector in the production
function and in the way technological change takes place.
The extractive sector faces stock constraints which the intermediate goods sector
does not. The stock of the non-renewable resource at time t is noted St ≥ 0. Rt
notifies the quantity of the non-renewable resource that is sold for aggregate output
production. Investing in new machines makes occurrences of lower grades extractable
and expands the resource stock by Xt. The evolution of the stock follows:
S˙t = Xt −Rt , St ≥ 0, Xt ≥ 0, Rt ≥ 0 , (1.15)
where S˙t is the change in the stock in period t, Xt is the inflow through investment in
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new machines, and Rt the outflow by extracting and selling the resource. Note that
for Xt = 0 this formulation is the standard Hotelling (1931) setup.
Extractive firms increase the resource stock by
Xt = δ1δ2N˙RtxR(j) , (1.16)
which is equal to Equation 1.10 in Proposition 1 with the number of machines xR(j)
that extractive firms purchase from sector specific technology firms added. Each
machine xR(j) makes a specific additional mineral occurrence with a lower grade
extractable. In contrast to the intermediate goods sector, the use of the machine
variety j is bound to a specific deposit. Each mineral occurrence has the same
quantity of the resource but each at a different grade. Once a firm has extracted
the resource from a specific mineral occurrence by use of machine variety j, the next
deposit - with a lower grade - is not extractable any more by machine variety j. A
new machine variety needs to be bought from the sector specific technology firms.
As a consequence, each variety of machines in the extractive sector can only be used
once, whereas in the intermediate goods sector each variety of machines is used in
finitely often. We normalize the size of R&D investment to one, xR(j) = 1. This
is mathematically not exactly the same as in the intermediate goods sector, but it
provides a comparable micro-foundation by subdividing the growth in technology into
units. In the intermediate goods sector a machine is an infinitesimally small variety,
whereas in the extractive sector it is a normalized fraction of R&D investment.
The term N˙Rt denotes the range of the new machine varieties invented by the
sector specific technology firms. The extractive sector is constantly under constraint
to buy newly developed machines as once developed machines are not capable to
extract the resource from declining grades. This is in contrast to the intermediate
goods sector (see Equation 1.13) which produces from all machine varieties that have
ever been developed.
The sector specific technology firms develop N˙Rt new patents for machines of the
extractive sector in analogy to the intermediate goods sector according to:
N˙Rt = ηRMRt , (1.17)
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where MRt is spending on R&D in the extractive sector in terms of the final product
and ηR is a cost parameter.
Once the patent has been developed, the technology firms produce the new ma-
chine variety j at a unit cost of Ψ in terms of the final good. Technology firms can
only produce one machine for each patent. They sell machines to the extractive sector
in perfect competition, because the machines are perfect substitutes for producing
the resource. This implies that the firm which buys the machines from the technology
firms is entirely indifferent between the machines. Since sector specific technology
firms have no market power, they obtain a price of the machine above marginal cost:
As each machine variety can only be used once in the extractive sector (see above),
χR(j) =
1
ηR
+ Ψ , (1.18)
.
The marginal cost on the right hand side consists of two components. The first
term, 1
ηR
, is the marginal R&D expenditure for developing one patent. This results
from the equation ηRMR = N˙R. Setting N˙R = 1 and solving for MR yields MR =
1
ηR
.
The second term, Ψ, notifies the cost of producing the machine.
The production function of the extractive sector is equal to the outflows from the
resource stock Rt:
Rt = δ1δ2N˙RtxR(j)− S˙t . (1.19)
It illustrates the fundamental difference between the intermediate goods sector
and the extractive sector in the relationship between technological change and the
respective production. If technology firms stop investing in R&D in the intermediate
goods sector, the intermediate goods sector will still be able to produce the good Zt
by buying machines based on the existing patents. However, if investment in R&D
of the extraction technology stops at time T , the quantity of the resource that will
still be extractable with the machines from the existing technology is limited to the
existing stock
ST = S0 +
∫ T
0
Xtdt−
∫ T
0
Rtdt . (1.20)
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This stock imposes an upper bound on the amount of the extractable non-renewable
resource for the entire future given that there is no technological change in the ex-
traction technology:
ST =
∫ ∞
T
Rtdt . (1.21)
Patents in the intermediate goods sector can be used infinitely to produce machines
once they are created. In contrast, in the extractive sector patents can only be used
once since any new machine will lose its usefulness after the initial use. The reason
is that each machine is linked to extracting the resource from a specific grade of the
occurrences. As the extractable grade of occurrences declines, new R&D in extraction
technology is required to access further resources.
1.4.2 Results
We begin the formal analysis with the optimization of the extractive firms. They have
full control over inflows and outflows from their resource stock. Inflows Xt depend on
R&D investment in the extractive sector and outflows Rt are the sales of the resource
to the final good producer. Since the marginal cost for R&D is constant, we obtain
the typical result of stock management: inflows and outflows have to balance over
time. Proofs for this section can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. The quantity of the resource used in aggregate production equals the
quantity of newly acquired resources through R&D: Rt = Xt.
When the resource stock is zero, St = 0, it is not possible to extract the non-
renewable resource without additional R&D in the extractive sector. An extractive
firm needs to buy a new machine and hence trigger investment in R&D by the tech-
nology firms. The resulting resource stock can then be extracted and sold to the final
good producer. However, another extractive firm may also invest in R&D and also
extract and sell the resulting resource. This situation of perfect competition means
that resource prices are equal to marginal costs, which is the cost of extraction. This
also highlights why the case St > 0 never occurs under the assumption of no uncer-
tainty: An extractive firm investing in R&D will always extract and sell the newly
available resource stock, because the selling price will remain constant.
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The result is of course affected by the assumption of no uncertainty. Following
the standard in growth models, we have assumed in Equation 1.17 that patents for
new machines result in a deterministic way from the respective R&D investments.
This reflects a long-term perspective. The model could be made more sophisticated
by assuming that R&D is stochastic. Extractive firms would then keep a positive
stock of the resource St to be on the safe side in the case of a series of bad draws in
R&D. This stock would grow over time as the economy grows. But in essence, the
result above would remain the same: In the long term, resources used in aggregate
production equal those added to the resource stock through R&D.
We turn to the solution of the model:
Proposition 3. The growth rate of the economy is constant and given by
g = θ−1
βηZL[1− (1− γ
γ
) ε
1−ε 1 + ψηR
ηrδ1δ2
] 1
β
− ρ
 .
A higher rate of return to R&D investment in new machines of the labor sector,
ηZ , increases the growth rate of the economy. We discuss the effects of parameters
ηR, δ1, and δ2 on the growth rate in Proposition 5.
In order to understand the role of the non-renewable resource in the economy, we
determine its relative importance:
Proposition 4. The resource intensity of the economy is given by
R
Y
=
[
(1− γ) ηRδ1δ2
1 + ψηR
]ε
. (1.22)
It depends positively on the distribution parameter for the resource, γ.
The distribution parameter γ indicates the importance of the resource for the
economy as shown in the production function in Equation 1.12.
Extractive firms face constant marginal cost of extracting the non-renewable re-
source, since the resource stock can be expanded due to R&D in extraction technology.
The price thus remains constant over time as well:
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Proposition 5. The resource price is
pRt =
1 + ψηR
ηrδ1δ2
.
A higher resource price has the following effects: (i) The resource intensity of the
economy is lower. (ii) The growth rate of the economy is lower.
This proposition shows that the resource price plays a central role in the model.
To understand it we consider first its determinants and then focus on its effects.
The determinants of the price are given by the parameters ηR, δ1, and δ2. The
productivity of R&D in the extractive sector, defined in Equation 1.17, and given by
ηR, determines the number of new machine varieties that are developed by the sector
specific technology firms per unit of aggregate output. The higher this parameter,
the higher the resource use in the economy. δ1, defined in Equation 1.6, is a produc-
tivity parameter for the marginal effect of R&D investment on the extractability of
occurrences of lower grades. δ2, defined in Equation 1.8, determines the steepness of
the distribution of elements over mineral occurrences of various grades in the Earth’s
crust. If the quantity of the extractable resource increases strongly as the grade of
occurrences decreases, the return on investments in R&D for the extraction technol-
ogy increases, and the economy uses a larger quantity of the resource in proportion
to aggregate output.
The resource price is constant, but Proposition 5 shows that the resource price
is high when the productivity parameters are low and vice versa. It states quite
intuitively that the selling price of the resource is low, if the productivity parameters
are high.
Moreover, Proposition 5 in combination with Propositions 3 and 4 shows the ef-
fect of a lower resource price on the growth rate and the resource intensity of the
economy. Both depend negatively on the resource price. When the price is low, the
non-renewable resource is used intensively and the resource constraint on growth is
weak. When the price is high, the economy uses substitutes, but this reduces growth.
We compare the growth rates of the technology in the two sectors.
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Proposition 6. The level of technology in the labor intensive sector is
NZ =
(
1− γ
γ
)−ε(
ηRδ1δ2
1 + ψηR
)ε(
γ−ε −
(
1− γ
γ
)ε
ηRδ1δ2
1 + ψηR
)( 11−ε)(−ε+ 1−ββ )
(1−γ)εL−1Y .
The growth rate of technology in the extractive sector
N˙R = (1− γ)ε ηR
1 + ψηR
Y .
There is thus a qualitative difference in the growth rate of the two sectors. While
the level of technology in the intermediate goods sector is proportional to output,
the growth rate of technology in the extractive sector is proportional to output. NZ
therefore has the constant growth rate g, as given in Proposition 3. NR has an
increasing growth rate. It is the second derivative ∂
2NR
∂2t
which is equal to g.
1.4.3 Market structure in the resource market
We have assumed so far that the non-renewable resource is provided competitively
so that the resource is priced at marginal cost (see Proposition 5). In this section
we first elaborate on the assumption of a fully competitive resource sector. We then
consider monopoly power as an alternative assumption in the later part.
As the proof of Proposition 2 shows, the cost of extracting one unit of the resource
is given by 1+ψηR
ηRδ1δ2
. Each extractive firm faces a demand function for Rt from the final
good producer and sets the price pRt optimally. Profits of firms in the extractive
sector are thus given by
piRt =
(
pRt − 1 + ψηR
ηRδ1δ2
)
Rt . (1.23)
The use of a patent to produce a new machine decays immediately since the
corresponding mineral occurrence is depleted. Any firm willing to invest in a new
machine is thus able to extract the resource from a mineral occurrence of lower grade
and to sell it to the final good producer. This situation is conducive to competition.
Accordingly, profits in the extractive sector are zero and firms price the resource at
marginal extraction cost.
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For the purpose of illustration, we assume that there is a mass of firms J in the
extractive sector, each without resource deposits, Stj = 0. Each firm’s cost for new
machines and their resource output are described by
Rtj = δ1δ2ηRMRtj . (1.24)
The final good producer buys the total amount of resources of
Rt =
∫
j
Rtjdj . (1.25)
Each firm in the extractive sector makes profits according to
piRtj =
(
pRtj − 1 + ψηR
ηRδ1δ2
)
Rtj . (1.26)
Suppose firm A offers a price of pRtA <
1+ψηR
δ1δ2ηR
. In this case the marginal cost per
unit is above the offered price. Firm A would make a loss and would have to leave
the market. Suppose instead firm A would offer a price of pRtA >
1+ψηR
δ1δ2ηR
. In this case
firm B offers a price pRtA > pRtB ≥ 1+ψηRδ1δ2ηR and makes a profit or breaks even. The
final good producer would buy only from firm B such that firm A would leave the
market. Therefore, the only remaining option for firm A is to price at marginal cost:
pRtA =
1+ψηR
δ1δ2ηR
.
We have thus established the price of the resource. The quantity is determined
by the final good producer. As we have seen in Equation 1.30 in the Appendix, the
demand curve is given by
Rt =
Yt(1− γ)ε
pεRt
. (1.27)
There is a unique quantity sold on the market. If existing extractive firms do
not offer this unique amount, new etractive firms enter the market and sell the non-
renewable resource. By the same means, existing firms may expand their business.
If more than the demanded quantity is offered, the final good producer would select
some firms, from which to buy. In equilibrium, there is therefore a unique price and
a unique quantity in a market without market entry barriers. The number of firms
in the extractive sector as well as their size is indeterminate. We therefore use an
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aggregate production function for the extractive sector.
In the following we assume a monopoly in the extractive sector. In this case
the monopolist first maximizes profits from Equation 1.23 without restriction. The
resulting resource price has a markup over marginal cost, which depends on the degree
of substitutability. Cases where a resource is provided with an intermediate degree
of market power are in between the two extreme cases.
Given the central role of the resource price, it is important to analyze the effect
of the market structure in the resource sector. To do this we consider a variant
of the model, where we assume a monopolist in the resource sector instead of full
competition.
Proposition 7. Let the resource market be dominated by a single monopolist and let
ε > 1. Then the price of the non-renewable resource is
pMonRt =
1 + ψηR
ηRδ1δ2
ε
ε− 1 .
If the resource market is dominated by a single monopolist, the pricing strategy
depends strongly on the elasticity of substitution. If Z and R are complements
(0 < ε < 1), the economy cannot produce aggregate output without the resource. A
resource monopolist could demand an arbitrarily high price in this case. We therefore
exclude this case. In the case where the two inputs are substitutes (1 < ε), the pricing
becomes a typical monopoly pricing problem: The monopolist imposes the markup
ε
ε−1 .
As a corollary of Proposition 7, we note that a stronger market power in the
resource sector results in an economy with lower resource intensity and a lower growth
rate. The reason is that market power puts a markup on prices. A consequence of a
lower resource intensity is also less R&D expenditure in the extractive sector, since
less technology is needed when less of the resource is sold.
This result highlights that the market structure in the resource market affects the
level of the price, but not its long-term trend. A monopolist simply takes a markup
over the competitive price. This allows us to understand the effect of a change in
market structure on resource prices. If resource producers form a cartel for example,
the price will be higher in the new steady state and the resource intensity of the
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economy will be lower. In the new steady state, the price will again be constant and
the quantity supplied will grow at the same rate as the economy.
1.4.4 The social planner solution
With the help of the social planner solution, we are able to establish that technology
firms in the intermediate goods sector cause an inefficiency by their market power.6
The growth rate of the economy gopt is not constant but growing in the optimum as
xZ
NZ
is not constant in:
gopt =
1
θ
(
1
ηZ(1− β)ψ
xZ
NZ
− ρ
)
. (1.28)
As a consequence, there is no balanced growth path in the social planner solution.
This is in contrast to the decentralized solution, where the growth rate of the economy
is constant (see Equation 3). The reason for this difference is that there are efficiency
losses in the decentralized solution due to the monopoly power of the technology
firms for machines in the intermediate goods sector. In the decentralised solution the
quantity of machines, which is supplied for each variety xZ(j), is constant as pZ and
χZ(j) are constant (see Equation 1.37 in the Appendix). In contrast, in the social
planner solution xZ is proportional to aggregate output as xZ = z2Y (see Equation
1.74). Furthermore, the decentralized solution features constant returns to scale in the
production of Zt (see Equation 1.13), since firms do not internalize technology in their
production technology. For the social planner, however, technology is endogenous so
that production has increasing returns in the factors NZ and xZ (see Equation 1.51
in the Appendix).
The comparison between the decentralized and the social planner solution illus-
trates the difference between our model based on Acemoglu (2002) and the Schum-
peterian model in Section 5.3.2 in Aghion and Howitt (1998). In the latter model a
social planner solution with resources is presented. Aghion and Howitt (1998) make
the assumption that “succeeding vintages of goods are increasingly capital intensive”
(p. 153) in order to explain an exponent smaller than one on technology. The idea
6Acemoglu (2002) provides only a decentralised solution of his model. The derivation of the
central planner solution of our model is in Appendix A1.3.
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of Acemoglu (2002) is that there are increasing returns to scale, but these are not
exploited due to the inefficiency of the market solution.
The extractive sector does not make a difference to the two solutions. Technology
firms are not able to obtain a monopoly price for machines, because machines are
linked to the extraction of one specific occurrence while the produced resource is a
homogeneous good. There is therefore no efficiency loss in the extractive sector of
the decentralized model. The resource production in the decentralized and in the
social planner solution functions in the same efficient way. Comparing the respective
first order conditions, the first order condition of the decentralized solution is given
by the demand of the final good producer for the resource (see Equation 1.30 in the
Appendix). When substituting the price from Equation 1.33 to Equation 1.30 in the
Appendix, it becomes identical to the respective first order condition in the social
planner solution in Equation 1.63 in the Appendix.
There is no straightforward way to correct for the inefficiency in the decentralized
model. Technology firms obtain patents for machines. The property right of the
patent ensures that only the respective firm is able to produce the machine. However,
the patent also entails market power in the intermediate goods sector such that the
provided quantity of machines is below the social optimum. There is demand for each
variety and each variety is supplied by a single firm. A subsidy on the sale of machines
in the intermediate goods sector affects the supply of machines, but does not have an
impact on the growth rate of machine supply. To do so, the government needs to apply
policy instruments like a subsidy on sales that increases with time, or to modify the
market structure by disconnecting R&D investment from the market power created
by patents. The latter solution would require government compensation to inventors
or some other incentive device. Finally, we have to keep in mind that this inefficiency
has also been introduced by Acemoglu (2002) to obtain a balanced growth path in
the decentralized solution.
1.4.5 Discussion
We discuss a number of issues that arrive from our model, namely the assumptions
made in Section 1.3, the comparison to the other models with non-renewable re-
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sources, and the question of the ultimate finiteness of the resource. Function D from
Equation 1.7 shows the amount of the non-renewable resource in the Earth’s crust
for a given occurrence of grade d. Geologists cannot give an exact functional form for
D, so we used the form given in Equation 1.8 as a plausible assumption. How would
other functional forms affect the predictions of the model? First, the predictions are
valid for all parameter values δ2 ∈ R+. Secondly, if D is discontinuous with a break
at d0, at which the parameter changes to δ
′
2 ∈ R+, there would be two balanced
growth paths: one for the period before and one for the period after the break. Both
paths would behave according to the predictions of the model. They would differ
in the extraction cost of producing the resource and in the level of extraction and
use of the resource in the economy. To see this, recall from Proposition 1 that Xt
is a function of δ2. A non-exponential form of D would produce results that differ
from ours. It could feature a scarcity rent as in the Hotelling (1931) model, as an
non-exponential form of D could cause a positive trend in resource prices or the ex-
traction from occurrences at a lower ore grade becomes infeasible. In these cases the
extractive firms would consider the opportunity cost of extracting the resource in the
future in addition to extraction and innovation cost.
How does our model compare to other models with non-renewable resources? We
do not assume that resources are finite, as their availability is a function of tech-
nological change. As a consequence, resource availability does not limit growth.
Substitution of non-renewable resources by capital, technological progress in the use
of the resource, and increasing returns to scale are therefore not necessary for sus-
tained growth as in Groth (2007) or Aghion and Howitt (1998). Growth depends
on technological change as much as it does in standard growth models without a
non-renewable resource.
Our model suggests that the non-renewable resource can be thought of as a form
of capital: If the extractive firms invests in new machines and trigger R&D in the
extraction technology, the resource is extractable without limits as an input to ag-
gregate production. This feature marks a distinctive difference from models such as
the one of Bretschger and Smulders (2003). They investigate the effect of various
assumptions on substitutability and a decentralized market on long-run growth, but
keep the assumption of a finite non-renewable resource. Without this assumption, the
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elasticity of substitution between the non-renewable resource and other input factors
is not central to the analysis of limits to growth anymore.
Some might argue that the relationship described in Proposition 1 cannot continue
to hold in the future as the amount of non-renewable resources in the Earth’s crust is
ultimately finite. Scarcity will become increasingly important and the scarcity rent
will be positive even in the present. However, for understanding current prices and
consumption patterns current expectations about future developments are important.
Given that the quantities of available resources indicated in Table (1.1) are very large,
their ultimate end far in the future does not affect behavior today. Furthermore,
when the resources in the Earth’s crust are exhausted, so much time will have passed
that technology might have developed to a point where the Earth’s crust, which
makes up one percent of the Earth’s mass, is no longer a limit to resource extraction.
Deeper parts of the planet or even extraterrestrial sources might be explored. These
speculative considerations are not crucial for our model. What is important is that
the relation from Proposition 1 has held in the past and looks likely to hold for the
foreseeable future. Since in the long term, extracted resources equal the resources
added to the resource stock due to R&D in the extraction technology, the price for
a unit of the resource will equal the extraction cost plus the per-unit cost of R&D
and hence stay constant in the long term. This explains why scarcity rents cannot
be found empirically as shown in Hart and Spiro (2011).
1.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the long-term evolution of prices and production of major non-
renewable resources from a theoretical and empirical perspective. We argue that eco-
nomic growth causes the production and use of a non-renewable resource to increase
exponentially and its production costs to stay constant in the long term. Economic
growth enables firms to invest more in R&D which makes resources from mineral
occurrences of lower grade extractable. We explain the long-term evolution of non-
renewable resource prices and world production for more than 200 years. If historical
trends in technological progress continue, it is within the realm of possibility that
non-renewable resources are, within a time frame relevant for humanity, de facto
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inexhaustible.
Our model makes four major simplifications, which should be examined in more
detail in future extensions. First, there is no uncertainty in R&D development and
therefore no need to keep a positive stock of the resource. When R&D development
is stochastic (as in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1981)), there would be a need for firms to
keep stocks as we observe it in reality. Second, our model features full competition in
the extractive sector. We could obtain a model with monopolistic competition in the
extractive sector by introducing privately owned mineral occurrences. A firm would
need to pay a certain upfront cost or exploration cost in order to acquire a mineral
occurrence (see, e.g., Cairns and Quyen (1998) and Slade (1988)). This upfront cost
would give technology firms a certain monopoly power as they develop machines that
are specific to single mineral occurrences. Third, extractive firms could face a trade-off
between high extraction costs at lower technology levels and R&D investment to lower
extraction costs. The general extraction technology function in Equation 1.1 provides
the basis to generalize this assumption. Treatment of a similar problem are Farzin,
Huisman, and Kort (1998) and Doraszelski (2004). Finally, our model does not
include recycling. Recycling will likely become more important for metal production
due to the increasing abundance of recyclable materials and the comparatively low
energy requirements to recycle the items (see Steinbach and Wellmer, 2010; Wellmer
and Dalheimer, 2012). Introducing recycling into our model would further strengthen
our argument as it increases the available stock of the non-renewable resource.
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A1 Appendix
A1.1 Additional figures and regression results
Source: British Petroleum (2011).
Figure 1.7: Historical evolution of oil reserves, including canadian oil sands from 1980
to 2010.
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Source: Managi et al. (2004).
Figure 1.8: Average water depth of wells drilled in the Gulf of Mexico.
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Aluminum Copper Lead Tin Zinc Crude Oil
Range 1905-2009 1792-2009 1792-2009 1792-2009 1824-2009 1862-2009
Constant Coeff. -1.774 0.572 0.150 1.800 1.072 8.242
t-stat. (-0.180) (0.203) (0.052) (0.660) (0.205) (0.828)
Lin.Trend Coeff. 0.008 0.009 0.016 0.001 0.014 -0.021
t-stat. (0.137) (0.428) (0.714) (0.069) (0.357) (-0.317)
Range 1905-2009 1850-2009 1850-2009 1862-2009 1850-2009 1850-2009
Constant Coeff. -1.299 0.109 -0.268 2.439 1.894 7.002
t-stat. (-0.200) (0.030) (-0.073) (0.711) (0.407) (1.112)
Lin.Trend Coeff. 0.008 0.020 0.030 -0.004 0.013 -0.021
t-stat. (0.137) (0.518) (0.755) (-0.109) (0.267) (-0.317)
Range 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009
Constant Coeff. -0.903 -1.428 -0.490 1.068 2.764 -1.974
t-stat. (-0.239) (-0.332) (-0.102) (0.269) (0.443) (-0.338)
Lin.Trend Coeff. 0.008 0.055 0.054 0.010 0.010 0.100
t-stat. (0.137) (0.820) (0.713) (0.168) (0.099) (1.106)
Range 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009
Constant Coeff. 2.269 1.556 -3.688 -0.061 -0.515 3.445
t-stat. (0.479) (0.240) (-0.505) (-0.011) (-0.062) (0.354)
Lin.Trend Coeff. -0.055 0.041 0.198 0.049 0.103 0.090
t-stat. (-0.411) (0.225) (0.958) (0.307) (0.441) (0.326)
Range 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975
Constant Coeff. -0.549 1.323 0.370 3.719 1.136 -1.111
t-stat. (-0.088) (0.266) (0.081) (0.812) (0.176) (-0.176)
Lin.Trend Coeff. -0.003 0.011 0.030 -0.012 0.051 0.094
t-stat. (-0.033) (0.135) (0.383) (-0.152) (0.468) (0.875)
Notes: The table presents coefficients and t-statistics for regressions of the growth rates on a constant and a linear
trend.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 2.5% and 5% level, respectively.
Table 1.2: Tests of the stylized fact that the growth rates of real prices of mineral
commodities equal zero and do not follow a statistically significant trend.
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Aluminum Copper Lead Tin Zinc Crude Oil World GDP
Range 1855-2009 1821-2009 1802-2009 1792-2009 1821-2009 1861-2009 1792-2009
Constant Coeff. 48.464 4.86 16.045 4.552 30.801 35.734 0.128
t-stat. *** 3.810 *** 2.694 *** 3.275 * 2.231 ** 2.58 *** 4.365 0.959
Lin.Trend Coeff. -0.221 -0.006 -0.087 -0.016 -0.174 -0.182 0.018
t-stat. ** -2.568 -0.439 ** -2.294 -0.999 * -1.975 *** -3.334 *** 16.583
Range 1855-2009 1850-2009 1850-2009 1850-2009 1850-2009 1861-2009 1850-2009
Constant Coeff. 48.464 5.801 6.032 3.569 5.579 25.198 0.995
t-stat. *** 3.810 *** 3.461 ***3.371 * 2.185 *** 3.774 *** 4.81 *** 5.49
Lin.Trend Coeff. -0.221 -0.018 -0.038 -0.015 -0.021 -0.182 0.019
t-stat. ** -2.568 -1.007 -1.938 -0.833 -1.308 *** -3.334 *** 9.797
Range 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009
Constant Coeff. 19.703 5.965 2.980 2.844 4.44 9.883 2.004
t-stat. *** 5.498 *** 2.651 * 2.043 1.361 * 2.225 *** 6.912 *** 7.8
Trend Coeff. -0.l78 0.035 -0.019 -0.015 -0.018 -0.083 0.018
t-stat. *** 3.174 -0.995 -0.853 -0.464 -0.592 ***-3.711 ***4.549
Range 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009
Constant Coeff. 10.781 5.043 13.205 0.051 5.675 9.897 4.729
t-stat. *** 7.169 *** 4.979 *** 2.936 0.028 *** 4.619 *** 9.574 *** 12.89
Lin.Trend Coeff. -0.171 -0.057 -0.48 0.04 -0.078 -0.196 -0.028
t-stat. *** -3.999 -1.978 -1.553 0.768 * -2.255 *** -6.64 *** -2.724
Range 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975
Constant Coeff. 50.75 6.307 3.851 3.762 4.384 12.272 1.244
t-stat. *** 4.846 ** 2.543 1.938 1.664 * 2.032 *** 4.060 *** 5.509
Lin.Trend Coeff. -0.53 -0.024 -0.018 -0.026 -0.005 -0.072 0.027
t-stat. *** -2.974 -0.566 -0.536 -0.66 -1.26 -1.403 ***7.045
Notes: The table presents coefficients and t-statistics for regressions of the growth rates on a constant and a linear
trend. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 2.5% and 5% level, respectively.
Table 1.3: Tests for the stylized facts that growth rates of world primary production
and world GDP are equal to zero and trendless.
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Aluminum Copper Lead Tin Zinc Crude Oil World GDP
Range 1855-2009 1821-2009 1802-2009 1792-2009 1821-2009 1861-2009 1792-2009
Constant Coeff. 48.301 5.474 20.57 4.427 30.7 35.689 0.032
t-stat. *** 3.824 *** 3.06 *** 3.845 * 2.181 ** 2.584 *** 4.379 0.276
Lin.Trend Coeff. -0.229 -0.018 -0.125 -0.023 -0.182 -0.19 0.01
t-stat. *** -2.677 -1.367 *** -3.025 -1.457 * -2.071 *** -3.499 *** 11.066
Range 1855-2009 1850-2009 1850-2009 1850-2009 1850-2009 1861-2009 1850-2009
Constant Coeff. 48.301 5.399 5.629 3.179 5.18 24.681 0.628
t-stat. *** 3.824 *** 3.254 ***3.169 1.961 *** 3.541 *** 4.733 *** 4.052
Lin.Trend Coeff. -0.229 -0.027 -0.047 -0.024 -0.03 -0.19 0.01
t-stat. *** -2.677 -1.523 ** -2.442 -1.348 -1.895 *** -3.499 *** 5.876
Range 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009 1900-2009
Constant Coeff. 18.595 4.985 2.028 1.903 3.473 8.869 1.071
t-stat. *** 5.242 * 2.241 1.41 0.918 1.763 *** 6.306 *** 4.862
Trend Coeff. -0.l84 -0.042 -0.027 -0.023 -0.026 -0.09 0.01
t-stat. *** -3.315 -1.214 -1.186 -0.694 -0.404 *** -4.084 *** 3.01
Range 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009 1950-2009
Constant Coeff. 8.583 2.952 1.141 -1.954 3.578 7.716 2.632
t-stat. *** 5.742 *** 2.892 1.04 1.086 *** 2.87 *** 7.493 *** 7.444
Lin.Trend Coeff. -0.156 -0.044 -0.35 0.051 -0.065 -0.18 -0.016
t-stat. *** -3.667 -1.515 -1.129 0.997 -1.819 *** -6.14 -1.551
Range 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975 1875-1975
Constant Coeff. 50.004 5.854 3.413 3.317 3.942 11.789 0.834
t-stat. *** 4.81 ** 2.386 1.738 1.480 1.851 *** 3.933 *** 4.509
Lin.Trend Coeff. -0.542 -0.038 -0.032 -0.039 -0.019 -0.086 0.013
t-stat. *** -3.06 -0.908 -0.959 -1.028 -0.517 -1.691 ***4.004
Notes: The table presents coefficients and t-statistics for regressions of the growth rates on a constant and a linear
trend. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 2.5% and 5% level, respectively.
Table 1.4: Tests for the stylized fact that growth rates of world per capita primary
production and world per capita GDP are equal to zero and trendless.
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A1.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
D(dNRt) = −δ2 ln(dNRt)
= −δ2 ln(e−δ1NRt)
= δ1δ2NRt

Proof of Proposition 2
The final good producer demands the resource for aggregate production. The
price of the final good is the numeraire. The first order condition with respect to the
resource from production (see Equation 1.12) is
Y
1
ε (1− γ)R− 1ε − pR = 0 , (1.29)
so that the demand for the resource is
R =
Y (1− γ)ε
pεR
. (1.30)
Assume that initially, the resource stock available to the extractive firms is zero,
St = 0. Revenues are given by pRR and expenses are given by MR =
1
ηR
N˙R in terms of
the final good. Given the machine price from Equation 1.18, the per-unit production
cost of the resource is (
1
ηR
+ ψ
)
1
δ1δ2
=
1 + ψηR
ηRδ1δ2
. (1.31)
The resource firms make profits
piRt = pRRt − 1 + ψηR
ηRδ1δ2
Xt . (1.32)
Since the stock of resources S cannot be negative, newly acquired resources cannot
be less than resources sold to the final good producer: Xt ≥ Rt. Newly acquired
resources in excess of those sold could be stored. In a world without uncertainty,
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however, this would not be profitable. The price therefore must be equal to marginal
cost:
pR =
1 + ψηR
ηRδ1δ2
. (1.33)
It remains to consider the case of a positive initial stock of the resource, St > 0.
Under perfect competition, this stock is immediately sold off to the final good pro-
ducer sucht that the case of St = 0 returns. 
Proof of Proposition 3
The first order conditions (FOC) of the final good producer for the optimal input
of Z and R are Y
1
εγZ−
1
ε − pZ = 0 and Y 1ε (1− γ)R− 1ε − pR = 0, where the final good
is the numeraire. From this the relative price is
p =
pR
pZ
=
1− γ
γ
(
R
Z
)− 1
ε
. (1.34)
Setting the price of the final good as the numeraire gives (for the derivation of
the price index see the derivation of Equation (12.11) in Acemoglu (2009)):
[
γεp1−εZ + (1− γ)εp1−εR
] 1
1−ε = P = 1 . (1.35)
The intermediate goods sector
As in Acemoglu (2009), the maximization problem in the intermediate goods
sector is:
max
L,{xZ(j)}
pZZ − wZL−
∫ NZ
0
χZ(j)xZ(j)dj . (1.36)
The FOC with respect to xZ(j) is pZxZ(j)
−βLβ − χZ(j) = 0 so that
xZ(j) =
(
pZ
χZ(j)
) 1
β
L . (1.37)
From the FOC with respect to L we obtain the wage rate
wZ =
β
1− βpZ
(∫ NZ
0
xZ(j)
−βdj
)
Lβ−1 . (1.38)
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The profits of the technology firms are:
piZ(j) = (χZ(j)− ψ)xZ(j) . (1.39)
Substituting Equation 1.37 into Equation 1.39 we calculate the FOC with respect to
the price of a machine χZ(j):
(
pZ
χZ(j)
) 1
β
L− (χZ(j)− ψ)p
1
β
Z
1
β
χZ(j)
1
β
−1L = 0. Solving
this for χZ(j) yields χZ(j) =
ψ
1−β . Following Acemoglu (2002) we normalize ψ = 1−β
so that χZ(j) = 1. Combining this result with Equations 1.37 and 1.39 we write
profits as
piZ(j) = βp
1
β
ZL . (1.40)
The present discounted value is:
rVZ − V˙Z = piZ . (1.41)
The steady state (V˙ = 0) is:
VZ =
βp
1
β
ZL
r
. (1.42)
Substituting Equation 1.37 into Equation 1.13 yields
Z =
1
1− βp
1−β
β
Z NZL . (1.43)
Solving for the variables of the intermediate goods sector
Solving Equation 1.35 for pZ yields
pZ =
(
γ−ε −
(
1− γ
γ
)ε
pR
) 1
1−ε
. (1.44)
This can be used, together with the expression for R from Equation 1.30 and the
expression for pR from Equation 1.33 to determine Z as a function of Y from Equa-
tion 1.34. We obtain the range of machines NZ as a function of Y from Equation 1.43.
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The growth rate
The consumer earns wages from working in the sector which produces good Z
and earns interest on investing in the technology NZ . The budget constraint thus is
C = wZL + rM . Maximizing utility in Equation 1.11 with respect to consumption
and investments yields the first order conditions C−θe−ρt = λ and λ˙ = −rλ so that
the growth rate of consumption is
gc = θ
−1(r − ρ) . (1.45)
This will be equal to output growth on the balanced growth path. We can thus
solve for the interest rate and obtain r = θg + ρ. The free entry condition for the
technology firms imposes that profits from investing in patents must be zero. Revenue
per unit of R&D investment is given by VZ , cost is equal to
1
ηZ
. Consequently, we
have ηZVZ = 1. Substituting Equation 1.42 into it we obtain
ηZβp
1
β
Z L
r
= 1. Solving
this for r and substituting into Equation 1.45 we obtain
g = θ−1(βηZLp
1
β
Z − ρ) . (1.46)
Plugging this in Equation 1.44 yields the growth rate. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Substitute Equation 1.33 into Equation 1.30. 
Proof of Proposition 5
The total cost of extracting resources can be split into the price of the new machine
and the extraction cost. The technology costs have been derived in Proposition 1 as
proportional to R&D in extraction technology. The extraction cost isgiven by the
constant E. Since the extraction cost is constant and this model focusses on the
innovation side, we make the simplifying assumption of zero extraction cost, E = 0.
Therefore the total cost is given by the cost for the new machine.
The extractive firms sell the resource R, to the final good producer at price pR.
Its total revenues are thus RpR. The expenses are given by the price of a ma-
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chine, χR(j) times the number of machines bought, N˙RtxR(j) with xR(j) = 1. To-
tal expenses are thus 1
χR(j)
N˙Rt. The extraction firms are in perfect competition,
just like firms in the intermediate goods sector. Therefore profits are zero, its rev-
enues must equal expenses: RpR = χR(j)N˙Rt. Inserting Equation 1.16 we obtain
δ1δ2N˙RtxR(j)pR = χR(j)N˙Rt, so that pR =
1+ψηR
ηRδ1δ2
. 
Proof of Proposition 6
We use Equation 1.44, together with the expression for R from Equation 1.30
and the expression for pR from Equation 1.33 to determine Z as a function of Y
from Equation 1.34. This can then be used to obtain the range of machines NZ as a
function of Y from Equation 1.43.
The expression for N˙R follows from Equation 1.10, Proposition 2 as well as equa-
tion 1.30. 
Proof of Proposition 7
The resource monopolist maximizes Equation 1.32. A monopolist will spread a
potential endowment of St > 0 over time, but will drive it down to zero nevertheless.
In any case, inflow and outflow will have to be balanced in the long run so that
Xt = Rt. Substituting the expression for R from Equation 1.30 into Equation 1.32,
the FOC for pR is
Y (1− γ)ε
pεR
+
(
pR − 1 + ψηR
ηRδ1δ2
)
(−εp−ε−1R Y (1− γ)ε) = 0 , (1.47)
which gives
pMonR =
1 + ψηR
ηRδ1δ2
ε
ε− 1 . (1.48)

A1.3 The social planner solution
We present a social planner solution of the model for comparison. Since production
has increasing returns to scale as apparent in Equation 1.52, there is no constant
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growth rate. This can be seen in Equation 1.76 below when considering the two
preceding equations.
Preferences and budget
Household preferences are
∫ ∞
0
C(t)1−θ − 1
1− θ e
−ρtdt , (1.49)
where ρ is the discount rate and θ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
The budget constraint is
C + I +M ≤ Y =
[
γZ
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)R ε−1ε
] ε
ε−1
, (1.50)
where I is aggregate investment into new machines and M is aggregate R&D expen-
diture. The R&D expenditure is used for research in the production of Z and R:
M = MZ + MR. Aggregate production uses two inputs, intermediate goods Z and
resources R, with elasticity of substitution ε and distribution parameter γ.
The production function of good Z
The production function of Z is
Z =
1
1− β
(∫ NZ
0
xZ(j)
1−βdj
)
Lβ , (1.51)
where L is labor. Production inputs are therefore labor and machines xZ(j) of variety
j. The range of machine varieties is denoted NZ . The social planner chooses the xZ(j)
identical, so that we can write
Z =
1
1− βNZx
1−β
Z L
β . (1.52)
Intermediates xZ depreciate fully after use and the marginal cost of production is the
same for all machine varieties and equal to ψ in terms of the final good. Investment
in machines is thus given by
xZψ = I . (1.53)
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The range of intermediates expands through investment in R&D by the following
production function
N˙L = ηZMZ , (1.54)
where MZ is spending on R&D and ηZ is a cost parameter. One unit of the final
good spent for R&D will generate ηZ new varieties of machines.
Production of the resource
The evolution of the resource stock follows:
S˙t = Xt −Rt , St ≥ 0, Xt ≥ 0, Rt ≥ 0 . (1.55)
The per unit production cost of the resource is as in equation (1.31):
1
ηRδ1δ2
. (1.56)
The cost for R&D in the extractive sector is analogous to R&D in the intermediate
goods sector and follows:
N˙R = ηRMR . (1.57)
The social planner chooses X = R such that
Rt = Xt = δ1δ2N˙Rt =
1
ηRδ1δ2
MR . (1.58)
The objective function and first order conditions
The social planner maximizes the intertemporal utility from consumption as de-
fined in equation 1.49 with respect to the endogenous variables C, NZ , xZ , R, and
MZ , and subject to the budget constraint:
[
γZ
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)R ε−1ε
] ε
ε−1 − C − I −MZ − 1
ηRδ1δ2
R = 0 , (1.59)
where M = MZ +
1+ψηR
ηRδ1δ2
R is the aggregate R&D expenditure and I = ψxZ + ψxR is
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the aggregate expenditure on machines.
The Hamiltonian to be maximized by the social planner is therefore
H =
C(t)1−θ − 1
1− θ
+λ
(γ ( 1
1− βNZx
1−β
Z L
β
) ε−1
ε
+ (1− γ)R ε−1ε
 εε−1 − C − ψxZ − ψxR −
−MZ − 1
ηRδ1δ2
R
)
+µηZMZ .
The first order conditions are
∂H
∂C
= C−θ − λ = 0 , (1.60)
∂H
∂NZ
= λY
1
εγZ
ε−1
ε N−1Z = µρ− µ˙ , (1.61)
∂H
∂xZ
= λY
1
εγZ
ε−1
ε (1− β)x−1Z − λψ = 0 , (1.62)
∂H
∂R
= λY
1
ε (1− γ)R− 1ε − λ 1
ηRδ1δ2
= 0 , (1.63)
∂H
∂MZ
= −λ+ µηZ = 0 . (1.64)
(1.65)
Derivation of the growth rate
The FOC for C in growth rates is
gλ = −θgC . (1.66)
Substituting the FOC for MZ into the FOC for NZ gives
gµ = ρ− ηZY 1εγZ ε−1ε N−1Z (1.67)
and
gλ = gµ . (1.68)
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From the FOC for xZ we obtain
Y
1
εγZ
ε−1
ε =
xZψ
(1− β) . (1.69)
The FOC for R shows that the ratio of resource use and output is constant
R
Y
=
(
ηRδ1δ2(1− γ)
)ε
(1.70)
and consequently that they have the same growth rate:
gR = gY . (1.71)
Substituting (1.70) into the production function (1.50) yields
[
1− (1− γ) (ηRδ1δ2(1− γ))ε−1]Y ε−1ε = γZ ε−1ε (1.72)
such that
Z = z1Y , (1.73)
where z1 = [
1
γ
(1− (1− γ)(ηRδ1δ2(1− γ))ε−1)] εε−1 is a constant.
Substituting this into (1.69) yields
xZ = z2Y , (1.74)
where z2 = γz
ε−1
ε
1 (1− β) 1ψ is again a constant.
Substituting this in Equation 1.52 yields
NZ = z1(1− β)L−βY β . (1.75)
Therefore xZ
NZ
is not constant.
Combining Equations 1.66, 1.67, 1.68, and 1.69, we obtain the growth rate of the
economy
gopt =
1
θ
(
1
ηZ(1− β)ψ
xZ
NZ
− ρ
)
. (1.76)
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Chapter 2
150 years of boom and bust -
What drives mineral commodity
prices?1
2.1 Introduction
The prices of mineral commodities, including fuels and metals, have repeatedly un-
dergone periods of boom and bust over the last 150 years. These long-term fluctua-
tions affect the macroeconomic conditions of developing and industrialized countries
(World Trade Organization, 2010; IMF, 2012b). Moreover, strong booms have raised
the issue of “security of supply” to the top of governmental agendas again and again.
However, the literature is far from conclusive on the driving forces behind these
long-term fluctuations.
2
Extensions of the Hotelling (1931) model explain price fluctu-
ations by referring to irregular exploration for deposits and so focus on the supply side
(Arrow and Chang, 1982; Fourgeaud, Lenclud, and Michel, 1982; Cairns and Lasserre,
1986). Competitive storage models usually interpret shocks as supply driven, but ul-
timately leave the source of shocks open. (Gustafson, 1958a,b; Wright and Williams,
1982; Cafiero et al., 2011). Another strand of literature on the subject stresses the
role of storage in the presence of expected supply shortfalls in explaining price fluc-
1A different version has been published as a Discussion Paper of the German Development
Institute (see Stu¨rmer, 2013).
2See Carter, Rausser, and Smith (2011) for a detailed summary of theories on fluctuations in
commodity markets.
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tuations (Alquist and Kilian, 2010). Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985), Barsky and
Kilian (2002) and other authors point to monetary policy as a major driving force.
Finally, Dvir and Rogoff (2010) and other authors argue that price booms are due to
persistent demand shocks combined with supply constraints.
What empirical work there is tends to focus on the oil market. According to Kilian
(2009) and Kilian and Murphy (2012), fluctuations in the price of oil are driven mainly
by demand shocks due to the global business cycle. In contrast, Hamilton (2008)
stresses the role of supply shocks as a driver of crude oil prices. Thomas, Muehleisen,
and Pant (2010) find that a combination of supply and demand shocks determines
the price of oil. Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) claim that such macroeconomic
variables as inflation and money supply help to explain the concurrent movements
of various commodity prices. In the same direction, Belke, Bordon, and Volz (2012)
present empirical evidence that monetary aggregates drive various commodity price
indices. Frankel and Rose (2010) find that, while global output and inflation have
positive effects on the prices of several agricultural and mineral commodities, they
are outstripped by volatility and inventories. Regarding storage models, Deaton
and Laroque (1992, 1996) show that supply shocks and storage are not sufficient to
explain price fluctuations and autocorrelation of commodity prices. They come to
the conclusion that “demand shocks are a more plausible source of price fluctuations
than has usually been supposed in the literature” (Deaton and Laroque, 1996, p.
899). Cafiero et al. (2011) use a different estimation methodology and find empirical
evidence in favour of the predictions of the empirical storage model.
This paper identifies the dynamic effects of demand and supply shocks on mineral
commodity prices from 1840 to 2010. It covers a far longer time period than most
previous work, thus allowing me to include a long series of boom and bust in prices.
Commodities have always shown greater price volatility than manufactures (Jacks,
O’Rourke, and Williamson, 2011), and booms and busts are not a new phenomenon
(see, e.g., Cuddington and Jerrett, 2008). In contrast to Erten and Ocampo (2012),
who examine “super-cycles” of a metal price index over the period from 1865 to
2009, I am able to include data on the supply side of the mineral commodity markets
examined here and hence to pin-down the contribution of shocks to the fluctuation
of prices. In addition, I provide a detailed historical account for each price.
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To obtain empirical evidence from such a long time period, I use a new set of
annual data which includes prices, world production of copper, lead, tin, zinc, and
crude oil, and world GDP. I chose copper, lead, tin, and zinc because they were traded
on the London Metal Exchange and its predecessors as fungible and homogeneous
goods in an integrated world market over the long period considered here. The
four mineral commodities studied exhibit a substantial track record in industrial
use and are still among the top twenty-five in value of world production. Hence,
these four mineral commodity markets exhibit long-term characteristics that other
mineral commodities such as iron ore or coal have only gained in recent times. To
ease comparison to the literature, I also present regression results for the crude oil
market. In contrast to the other four mineral commodities, the market has undergone
major structural changes (Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011; Dvir and Rogoff, 2010) which
make it difficult to obtain regression results that are robust across sub-periods.
I use a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model to decompose demand and
supply shocks to fluctuations in the real price of the commodity concerned. To do so,
I assume the existence of three different types of shock to commodity prices: “supply
shocks”, e.g., a disruption in physical production due to strikes; “world output-driven
demand shocks”, which include shocks in global demand for all commodities due to,
e.g., an unexpected strong growth of world output; and “other demand shocks”. The
latter include all other shocks that have no correlation with the aforementioned two
shocks. I interpret them as mainly capturing unexpected changes in inventories driven
by the market power of producers, government stocking programs, and changing
expectations of consumers. My identification is based on long-run restrictions, which
allows me to leave short-run relationships unrestricted.
My paper is to my knowledge the first to provide long-term evidence on demand
and supply shocks in mineral commodity markets. The main conclusion drawn in this
paper is that price fluctuations of the four mineral commodities studied here were
basically driven by demand shocks rather than by supply shocks over the period from
1840 to 2010. My results point to the importance of models that take into account
demand shocks due to world output like in Kilian (2009); Kilian and Murphy (2012).
Dvir and Rogoff (2010), Mitraille and Thille (2009), Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011),
and others have only recently begun to develop such theoretical models.
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My analysis suggests that extensions of the seminal Hotelling (1931) model such
as those by Arrow and Chang (1982), Fourgeaud, Lenclud, and Michel (1982), and
Cairns and Lasserre (1986) which explain price fluctuations by supply shocks must be
rethought. It also questions the usual interpretation of shocks in competitive storage
models (Gustafson, 1958a,b; Wright and Williams, 1982), which views supply shocks
as a key to explaining commodity price fluctuations. Supply shocks are only of some
importance in explaining fluctuations of tin and copper prices. Such shocks appear
to increase with the importance of concentrated industry structures and government
intervention in the markets. This evidence is in contrast to industrial organization
models which predict that higher product market concentration will reduce price
volatility (see Slade and Thille, 2006).
In contrast to the classical competitive storage models, my findings point to in-
ventories as a source of fluctuations rather than a calming agent. My results provide
long-term evidence in support of Alquist and Kilian (2010) and others who maintain
that storage in the presence of expected supply shortfalls explains price fluctuations.
Narrative evidence in this paper, however suggests that shocks due to changes in
inventories are rather driven by producer cartels and government stockpiling, and
only in recent times by “precautionary” behaviour of consumers or investors in the
markets examined here.
Impulse response functions show that “world output-driven demand shocks” have
had a large and statistically significant effect on the prices of all the commodities
considered, reaching their peak after one or two years. They persist for five to ten
years. “Other demand shocks” have direct and significant effects on all commodities
and are quite persistent. “Supply shocks” exhibit a significant impact only on the
prices of tin and copper. Whereas “world output-driven demand shocks” have a
strong, significant, persistent and positive effect on the production of copper, lead
and tin, they have a positive, but only insignificant effect on the production of zinc.
In contrast to the other mineral commodities examined in this study, the results
for crude oil are not robust for different sub-periods and lag lengths. This is possibly
due to multiple structural changes in the time series for price and production (see
Dvir and Rogoff, 2010) and the strong change of importance of oil in the economy over
time. At the same time, my results show that during earlier periods supply shocks
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have played an important role in driving the price of crude oil, whereas they confirm
the empirical evidence provided by Kilian (2009), which indicates that demand shocks
have been the main driving force for the period from 1973 to 2007.
My results have important policy implications both for commodity exporting and
commodity importing countries. For optimal fiscal and macroeconomic policy re-
sponses in commodity exporting, developing countries, it is important to know, first,
whether a price change is temporary or permanent, and second, to identify the driv-
ing source behind the price change (see IMF, 2012b). My results suggest that the
current price boom is temporary rather than permanent: the long-term trends are sig-
nificantly negative or statistically insignificant for the commodities examined. Hence,
commodity exporters should take a countercyclical policy stand rather than increasing
long-term public investment based on the assumption of a permanent price increase.
Since the current boom is mainly driven by “world output-driven demand shocks”,
which exhibit strong effects on the external and fiscal balances of commodity export-
ing countries, preparation for a down-swing of mineral commodity prices is all the
more important. Finally, my results illustrate that self-imposed supply restrictions
by a group of exporting countries are at most only temporarily effective in the cop-
per and tin market but are ineffective, as history shows, in increasing prices over the
long-run.
For countries which import mineral commodities, my results indicate that appre-
hensions about the security of the supply are exaggerated in the light of historical ev-
idence for broadly used mineral commodities. Various forms of subsidies for overseas
mining and the reduction of import dependencies as well as “resource diplomacy”,
are questionable in effect given the fact that these mineral commodities are traded
on world markets, while prices react only moderately to supply restrictions in the
short-run.
I have organized the remainder of this paper as follows. In section 2.2 I introduce
my interpretation of the shocks studied here. In section 2.3 I describe the construction
of my data set. Section 2.4 focuses on the econometric model and the scheme used
to identify and distinguish the different structural shocks. In sections 2.5 and 2.6, I
present empirical results and robustness checks for copper, lead, tin, and zinc. Section
2.7 gives empirical results and robustness checks for the case of crude oil. Section 2.8
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offers conclusions.
2.2 Interpretation of shocks to mineral commodity
prices
I classify the key determinants of mineral commodity prices close to Kilian (2009).
This allows me to distinguish three shocks, notably “world output-driven demand
shocks”, “supply shocks” and “other demand shocks”.
I define “world output-driven demand shocks” in such a way as to capture shocks
to the global demand for all mineral commodities due to unexpectedly strong ex-
pansions or contractions of the world economy. They thus also include unexpectedly
strong periods of industrialization such as those of Great Britain, Germany and the
U.S. in the 19th century, Japan in the 20th century, and China and other emerg-
ing economies at the beginning of the 21st century. “World output-driven demand
shocks” result from both non-persistent aggregate demand shocks (e.g., monetary
policy shocks) and persistent aggregate supply shocks (e.g., productivity changes).
“Supply shocks” are shocks to the production of mineral commodities due to
unexpected changes in production caused by cartels, strikes, or natural catastrophes.
I do not directly include “other demand shocks” in this model due to missing
long-term data on inventories and on the world use of the mineral commodities.
Instead, controlling for “world output-driven demand shocks” and “supply shocks”
allows me to pin down the “other demand shocks” as the residual of a structural
dynamic simultaneous-equation model. They mainly reflect changes in the demand
for inventories of mineral commodities which stem from three different sources: first,
government stocking programs, second, producers with market power who increase
their inventories in an attempt to increase prices, and finally, shifts in expectations
of the downstream processing industry about the future supply and demand balance
(see Kilian, 2009; Kilian and Murphy, 2012, on the last point).
As “other demand shocks” capture all shocks that are uncorrelated to “world
output-driven demand shocks” and “supply shocks”, they also include unexpected
changes in the intensity of use of the respective mineral commodity in the production
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of world output. The intensity of use reflects the quantity of a mineral commodity
which an economy needs to produce one unit of output. The intensity of use is driven
by several factors: first, technical improvements that either decrease or increase the
quantity of a mineral commodity used to produce a specific good, second, substitution
by other materials, third, changes in the structure of world output (e.g., a higher share
of services), fourth, saturation of markets, and finally, government regulations that
change the use of materials (for example the phase-out of lead additives in gasoline see
(Cleveland and Szostak, 2008)). However, all of these processes are rather longterm,
especially on the world level. Even government regulation, such as that imposed on
lead additives, has become set in a continuous process of phasing-out over several
decades. Narrative historical evidence suggests that “other demand shocks” rather
capture unexpected changes in inventories rather than changes in the intensity of use.
The latter are rather captured in the linear trends in the regressions.
2.3 A new data set
I have compiled annual data for real prices and world production of copper, lead, tin,
and zinc as well as world GDP over the time period from 1840 to 2010. For crude
oil, data is only available from 1861 onwards.3
With respect to world market prices, I make use of annual nominal price data
for copper, lead, tin, and zinc from the London Metal Exchange (LME) and its
predecessors. The LME was the principal price setter in these non-ferrous metals
markets outside of the U.S. during most of the study period (Schmitz, 1979; Rudolf
Wolff & Co Lt., 1987; Slade, 1991). The prices are in British-£ for most of the
period covered in this study. Since the middle of the 1970s they have been given in
U.S.-$, and I have transformed them to British-£ by using annual exchange rates.
For robustness checks I have also collected U.S.-American prices. I obtained nominal
world market prices for crude oil from British Petroleum (2011). This price series
reaches back to 1861. Please note that there have been some gradual changes in the
quality of products over time.
Following Krautkraemer (1998) and Svedberg and Tilton (2006), I deflate all
3See also the chapter on data sources and description.
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nominal prices by the respective consumer price indices (CPI) for the U.K. and the
U.S. I also use producer price indices (PPI) as a robustness check. To obtain the
U.S.-PPI, I have spliced together the wholesale price index for all commodities by
Hanes (1998) and the producer price index for all commodities from the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics (2011). I have constructed the U.K.-PPI based on data from
Mitchell (1988) and the World Bank (2012) in the same way.
A common definition for the existence of a world market is that prices for a
homogeneous good strongly co-move across different areas of the world. This implies
that price movements are in accordance with the law of one price, even though the
levels of prices might differ due to transportation costs or trade barriers. Klovland
(2005) shows that British and German markets for copper, lead, tin, and zinc were
integrated from 1850 until World War I, whereas price gaps for pig iron and coal
remained quite significant due to trade policies and high transport costs. O’Rourke
and Williamson (1994) find a strong convergence of U.S. and British copper and tin
prices between 1870 and 1913.
Unfortunately, there is to my knowledge no empirical evidence regarding historical
integration of the oil market. However, narrative evidence from Yergin (2009) suggests
that American kerosene rapidly became an internationally traded good after the first
discovery of oil in Titusville in 1859. In the 1870s and 1880s it was even the 4th
largest U.S. export in value. By the 1880s competition was already strong from
Russian oil. Hence, I assume in the following sections that world oil markets have
been as integrated over time as the non-ferrous metal ones described above and leave
it to future research to find statistical evidence for this assumption.
According to Findlay and O’Rourke (2007), commodity markets disintegrated
during the First and Second World War. Price and supply controls for mineral
commodities tend to characterize war-time economies (see Backman and Fishman
(1941) regarding the example of Great Britain). Unfortunately, no systematic study
of price convergence for the above metals in the inter-war period has been carried
out. I account for the disintegration of world markets during the two World War
periods by using yearly dummies for the war periods and the three consecutive years.
For the period after the Second World War until today, Labys (2008) finds evidence
for strong market integration.
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Notes: For other mineral commodities see the Appendix.
Figure 2.1: Historical evolution of world GDP, world copper production, and the real
price of copper from 1841 to 2010.
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I have assembled data on the world production of the four mineral commodities
from several sources. I use mine output or smelter output for earlier times and refined
output where available for the 20th century. World production includes production
from primary as well as secondary materials. However, the differentiation between
primary and secondary materials is not easy, since so-called “new scrap” accrues
across the different stages of the production process. “New” and “old” scrap are also
fed back in the production process at different stages according to quality. Overall, I
have tried to keep the data series as consistent as possible.
In contrast to Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Murphy (2012) I do not create a freight
rate index to measure global economic activity but use world GDP from Maddison
(2010) and The Conference Board (2012). Unfortunately, Maddison’s data set only
provides annual world GDP data from 1950 onwards. Therefore, I sum up country
based annual data. For those years where country based annual data is missing,
I generally interpolate the data with linear trends. For European countries and
Western offshoots, I compute their respective shares of output related to neighboring
countries, where data is available. I then interpolate these shares and multiply them
with the data from those countries, where annual data is available. This process
assumes that the business cycle of these countries moves in tandem to that of their
neighboring countries.
2.4 Identification
I use a three-variable, structural VAR model with long-run restrictions to decom-
pose unpredictable changes in the real mineral commodity prices into three mutu-
ally uncorrelated shocks, notably “world output-driven demand shocks”, “supply
shocks”, and “other demand shocks”. Blanchard and Quah (1989) have introduced
this methodology to explain fluctuations in GNP and unemployment, while I use
this methodology to explain fluctuations in mineral commodity prices. It is therefore
important to keep in mind that Blanchard and Quah (1989) identify and interpret
demand and supply shocks at the aggregate level, wheras I do so at the level of a
specific commodity market.
The basic idea of the variance decomposition is to find what amount of information
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each variable, notably world total output and world mineral production, contributes
to the world mineral commodities price in the autoregression. It hence shows how
much of the predicted error variance of the mineral commodity price can be explained
by exogenous shocks to world total output and world mineral production.
The vector of endogenous variables is zt = (∆Yt,∆Qt, Pt)
T , where ∆Yt refers to
the percentage change in world GDP, ∆Qt denotes the percentage change in world
primary production of the respective mineral commodity, and Pt is the log of the
respective real commodity price. Dt denotes a matrix of deterministic terms, notably
a constant, a linear trend, and annual dummies during World War I and II periods
and the three years immediately after. The structural VAR representation is
Azt = Γ
∗
1zt−1 + ...+ Γ
∗
pzt−p + Π
∗Dt +Bt. (2.1)
The reduced form coefficients are Γj = A
−1Γ∗j for (j = 1, ..., p). t is a vector of serially
and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations. The relation to the reduced form
residuals is given by ut = A
−1Bt. p is the number of lags, which I choose according
to the Akaike information criterion (AKI) for the benchmark regressions.
To compute the structurally identified impulse responses, I estimate the contempo-
raneous impact matrix C = A−1B by Cˆ = Φˆ−1Ψˆ = Φˆ−1chol[ΦˆΣˆuΦˆ′]. Φ is the matrix
of accumulated effects of the impulses, namely Φ =
∑∞
s=0 Φs = (IK −Γ1− ...−Γp)−1.
Ψ is the long-run impact matrix of structural shocks. We need K(K − 1)/2 = 3
restrictions to identify the structural shocks of the VAR. I hence assume that Ψ is
lower triangular and obtain it from a Choleski decomposition of the matrix ΦˆΣˆuΦˆ
′.
(See Lu¨tkepohl and Kra¨tzig, 2004)
Assuming that Ψ is lower triangular means that I place zero restrictions on the
upper-right hand corner of the long-run impact matrix. Thereby, I make the assump-
tion that shocks to the supply of mineral commodities and “other demand shocks”
exhibit transitory but not permanent effects on world total output. These two shocks
thus affect world total output in the short-run but not in the long-run. Furthermore,
“other demand shocks” exhibit only a transitory effect on mineral commodity pro-
duction. These assumptions lead to the identification of the following three shocks:
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World output-driven demand shocks
I refer to “world output-driven demand shocks” as those shocks to global real
GDP that are neither explained by the short-run effects of shocks to the supply of the
respective mineral commodity nor by the short-run effects of “other demand shocks”.
I hence impose the restriction that shocks to the production of the mineral commodity
which are not driven by “world output-driven demand shocks” (see below) have no
long-term effect on global real GDP. This assumption seems strong as one might
argue that a reduction in inputs of a certain commodity might affect productivity
and hence world total output in the long-term. However, Barsky and Kilian (2004)
state that U.S. productivity losses due to the search for substitutes for oil are too
small to be of relevance. They sum up that none of the models which establish a
link from oil price shocks to productivity changes “can claim solid empirical support”.
Kilian (2009) demonstrates that unanticipated oil supply shocks exhibit a statistically
significant impact on the level of U.S. GDP only for the first two years and then
become insignificant. Since the other mineral commodities examined here are of
even less importance to world output than crude oil, I believe that my assumption is
reasonable.
Moreover I assume that shocks to mineral commodity prices due to “other demand
shocks” exhibit no long-term effect on total world output. Certainly an increase in a
commodity price decreases the income of consumers in the importing countries. At
the same time, it increases the income of consumers in exporting countries so that
there is no effect on global real GDP from the aggregate demand side. Even in the
case of crude oil, Rasmussen and Roitman (2011) have shown that oil price shocks on
a global scale exhibit only small and transitory negative effects on a slight majority
of countries.
I do not distinguish between the different sources of “world output-driven demand
shocks”, be they transitory aggregate demand shocks due, e.g. to unexpected changes
in unemployment, or persistent aggregate supply shocks due, e.g., to increases in
productivity (see Blanchard and Quah, 1989). However, it is important to keep these
different sources of “world output-driven demand shocks” in mind when it comes to
explaining mineral commodity production.
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Supply shocks
I define “supply shocks” as those innovations to the production of the respec-
tive commodity that are neither driven by the short and long-term effects of “world
output-driven demand shocks” nor by the short-term effects of “other demand shocks”.
I hence assume that “supply shocks” and “world output-driven demand shocks” af-
fect the world’s primary production of the respective commodity in the long run. In
contrast, price changes driven by “other demand shocks” exhibit only a transitory
effect on world primary production. They hence affect only capacity utilisation of
the extractive sector but not long-term investment decisions. This is plausible, given
the fact that expanding extraction and first-stage processing capacities exhibits high
upfront costs and takes many years (Radetzki, 2008; Wellmer, 1992). This makes it
likely that “other demand shocks” affect world primary production only in the short
term.
Other demand shocks
Other demand shocks encompass all innovations to the respective real mineral
commodity price that are neither driven by “world output-driven demand shocks”
nor “supply shocks”. It hence captures all shocks that are uncorrelated to these two
latter shocks. These in turn mainly capture changes in the demand for inventories
due to government stocking programs, producer market power, and shifts in expec-
tations of the downstream processing industry about the future supply and demand
balance (see on the last point Kilian, 2009; Kilian and Murphy, 2012).
Overall, this methodology allows me to identify the effects of demand and supply
shocks on mineral commodity prices and to estimate long-run price trends. Theo-
retical models make different predictions on the long-term trends and the type of
shocks that drive fluctuations in prices. The seminal Hotelling (1931) model predicts
an increasing trend in prices, while it makes no statement on price fluctuations. Ex-
tensions of the Hotelling (1931) model such as those by Arrow and Chang (1982),
Fourgeaud, Lenclud, and Michel (1982), and Cairns and Lasserre (1986) introduce the
exploration of deposits which causes sudden price changes. Following this literature,
I would expect “supply shocks” to mainly drive price fluctuations. These models
predict different short-term price trends, but mainly point to increasing trends in the
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long term.
Competitive storage models (Gustafson, 1958a,b; Wright and Williams, 1982) usu-
ally assume supply shocks as the source of uncertainty.
4
Storage smoothes these shocks
intertemporally and explains the empirically observed autocorrelation in prices. Com-
modity storage model do not make a prediction concerning the trend. Based on this
literature I would expect supply shocks to drive fluctuations in prices. Alquist and
Kilian (2010) and Kilian and Murphy (2012) extent the storage model in a way
that storage in the presence of expected supply shortfalls explains price fluctuations.
These shocks would show up in the “other demand shocks” in our model. Finally,
some scholars have explicitely modelled demand shocks. Dvir and Rogoff (2010) in-
troduce persistent demand shocks to a competitive storage model. In this model
storage amplifies rather than smoothes these shocks if supply is restricted. Mitraille
and Thille (2009) endogenize production and therefore regard demand shocks as the
source of uncertainty in a competitive storage model. Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011)
introduce several types of demand shocks in a two-country DSGE model. Overall,
these models seem to suggest that demand shocks drive price fluctuations.
2.5 Empirical results
I employ ordinary least squares to consistently estimate the reduced-form coefficients
of the VAR models of each of the four mineral commodity markets. On the basis of
these estimates, I obtain the contemporaneous and long-run matrices by the Cholesky
decomposition described above. I use a recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2000
replications for inference, following Goncalves and Kilian (2004). See Tables 2.2 to
2.12 in the Appendix for the estimated coefficients.
In the following, I set out the main results for each of the mineral commodities
examined. For each mineral commodity, I first present the respective impulse response
functions which plot the respective responses of world GDP, world mineral commodity
production, and real copper prices to a one-standard deviation of the three respective
structural shocks. I use accumulated impulse response functions for the shocks to
4However, these models ultimately leave the source of shocks open, since shocks to demand and
supply are “isomorphic” in the model setup (Dvir and Rogoff, 2010, p. 10).
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world mineral commodity production and world GDP to trace the long-term effects
on the levels of these variables.
I compare the identified structural shocks to evidence from economic history. This
helps to better understand the dynamics of the markets and to give the identified
shocks a proper interpretation. I do so with the help of two figures: First, I present
the evolution of the three structural shocks to the respective mineral commodity price
(see Figure 2.3 for the example of copper). Second, I show the historical decomposi-
tion of each mineral commodity price which quantifies the contribution of the three
structural shocks to the deviation of the respective price from its base projection
(see Figure 2.4 for the example of copper). Since the vertical scales across the three
sub-panels are identical, they show the relative importance of a given shock. The two
figures are related as, e.g., a positive structural shock as in Figure 2.3 drives upwards
the curve of the cumulative effect of the shocks in the historical decomposition in
Figure 2.4.
2.5.1 Copper market
My results show that the major fluctuations in the price of copper are mainly driven
by “world output-driven demand shocks”. “Supply shocks” and “other demand
shocks” also play a pronounced role in determining medium-term swings in price.
The narrative evidence suggests that the copper market is characterized by a long
history of oligopolistic structures. Chandler (1990) points out that the five largest
U.S. copper producers in 1917 were still under the top five in 1930 and in 1948. In
addition, copper production has also always been strongly concentrated, with the
main producers in Chile and the U.S. (Schmitz, 1979).
The impulse response functions in Figure 2.2 show that a positive “world output-
driven demand shock” exhibits a strong, positive, and persistent effect on world GDP.
It causes a positive significant increase in copper production that lasts for about three
years. Finally, it triggers a major increase in the real price of copper for a maximum
of about one year after the shock. The shock continues to persist significantly over a
period of more than ten years.
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Notes: Point estimates with one- and two-standard error bands based on Model (2.1). I use ac-
cumulated impulse response functions for the shocks to world mineral commodity production and
world GDP to trace the effects on the level of these variables. For the other mineral commodities
see the Appendix.
Figure 2.2: Impulses to one-standard-deviation structural shocks for copper.
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A positive shock to the supply of copper has a positive significant effect on GDP
for three to ten years and then approaches zero, in accordance with our identifying
assumptions. The supply shock affects copper production strongly and persistently.
Moreover, it reduces the real price of copper significantly for more than ten years,
with an insignificant period of three to five years after the shock.
A positive “other demand shock” has by assumption only a transient effect on
world GDP and copper production. Its impact on the real price of copper is immediate
and statistically significant for the first two years and then again five to ten years
after the shock.
Notes: Structural residuals implied by Model (2.1). For other mineral commodities see the Ap-
pendix.
Figure 2.3: Historical evolution of structural shocks to copper.
In the late 1840s the price of copper was low owing to the British railway cri-
sis from 1847 to 1848 (see Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011), which caused negative
“world output-driven demand shocks”. In the 1850s the price underwent a major
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upswing, driven mainly by positive “world output-driven demand shocks” due to the
world economic boom at that time (see Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). In the mid
1850s, prices stopped rising even though “world output-driven demand shocks” still
persisted. Large positive supply shocks due to the “copper mania” (Richter, 1927,
p. 246), the opening of copper mines in the Southern Appalachians of the U.S., put
downward pressure on the price of copper, which experienced a long downturn during
the 1860s, reaching a trough around 1870. This was due to negative “world output-
driven demand shocks” triggered by the Panic of 1857, the American Civil War from
1861 to 1865, and the Overend-Gurney Crisis in 1866 and their respective economic
aftermaths (see Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). At the same time, there was some
downward pressure caused by positive “supply shocks” due to the opening of new
mines in Arizona and Michigan - despite the problems posed by the Civil War - and
a substantial increase in production in Chile and elsewhere in the world, especially
in the late 1860s (Richter, 1927).
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Notes: Estimates derived from Model (2.1). The historical decomposition quantifies the contribution
of the three specific shocks to the deviation of the actual copper price data from its base projection.
Since the vertical scales are identical, the panels show not only the positive and negative effects, but
also the relative importance of a given shock. Please note that I have not included data for the two
World War periods and the three subsequent years because of the price controls and other major
market distortions at that time.
Figure 2.4: Historical decomposition of the real price of copper.
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After the price peaked at the end of the 1870s owing to positive “world output
driven demand shocks”, it fell until the mid 1880s. This was caused by two shocks.
First, the Long Depression beginning in 1873 led to strong negative “world output
driven demand shocks” (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011) . Second, major, positive
“supply shocks” drove prices down. Between 1875 and 1885, annual U.S. copper
production rose by more than 500 percent. The Anaconda mine in Montana “proved
fabulously rich and enormously productive” (Richter, 1927, p. 255), and several
others mines opened in Arizona.
The mines in Michigan, which had already created a selling pool in the 1870s,
reacted to the low prices with an aggressive rise in production and a sales policy
aimed at driving out the new competitors (Richter, 1927, p. 256). This explains
the major positive copper “supply shock” that drove prices down further in the first
half of the 1880s. As many mines were unable to continue operating at a profit at
these low prices, world production fell from 229,600 mt in 1885 to 220,500 mt in 1886
(Richter, 1927, p. 257). This explains the negative “supply shock” at that time.
In response, the new Secre´tan copper syndicate, which controlled up to eighty per-
cent of world production, became active from 1887 to 1889 (Richter, 1927; Herfind-
ahl, 1959), driving up the world market price to a high in 1887 by stockpiling copper
(Richter, 1927; Herfindahl, 1959), as reflected in the strong “other demand shocks”
at the time. However, the high prices led to increased production and oversupply,
which the syndicate tried to compensate for by stockpiling even more (Richter, 1927;
Herfindahl, 1959). This led to the syndicate’s collapse in 1889. The Socie´te´ Indus-
trielle et Commerciale des Me´taux, which handled the operations of the syndicate,
and the main financing bank, Comptoir d’Escompte, were forced into bankruptcy,
and the manager responsible committed suicide (Richter, 1927; Herfindahl, 1959).
The copper from the inventories was sold over a period of three to four years, driving
prices down until the mid 1890s (Richter, 1927, p. 259), as the accumulated effects
of the “other demand shocks” show. “World output-driven demand shocks” also had
a waning impact on prices over this period.
Prices increased again at the end of the 1890s, then experienced a downturn
reaching a low around 1904, followed by another boom in the mid 1900s and then a
further downturn. These cycles of boom and bust were driven by all three kinds of
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shock. After gradual economic recovery in the 1890s, positive “world output-driven
demand shocks” peaked at the beginning of the 20th century, followed by recessions
in 1904 and 1907, which were triggered by a financial crisis in the U.S as described
by Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) (see also data provided by Crafts, Leybourne, and
Mills, 1989; National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010). “Other demand shocks”
and “supply shocks” also affected prices over that period. In the late 19th century,
the Amalgamated Copper Company, which controlled about one fifth of world copper
production, and a number of other firms tried to stabilize the price of copper by
withholding stocks from the markets and restricting output (Herfindahl, 1959, p.
81). This is also revealed by spikes in the cumulative effects of both “other demand
shocks” and “supply shocks”. In late 1901 the company changed course by releasing
copper from its stocks in order to undersell its competitors, which resulted in negative
“other demand shocks” to the market. Subsequently, there were renewed attempts
at price manipulation through the withholding of stocks from 1904 to 1905, 1906 to
1907 and, finally, 1912 to 1913 (Herfindahl, 1959, pp. 83-91). These manipulations
played a major part in the fluctuations in the price of copper, as the accumulated
effects of “other demand shocks” show. Finally, from 1910 onwards the introduction
of fine grinding methods and milling by flotation made large-scale mine production
from low-grade ores possible (Richter, 1927, p. 278-281). The consequent positive
supply shocks helped to drive down prices, as copper production in Alaska and the
South-West of the U.S. surged (Richter, 1927, pp. 278-281).
The price of copper stayed relatively flat during the 1920s, with a small peak in
1929. According to my analysis, this was due to upward pressure by “other demand
shocks” and downward pressure by “supply shocks” that roughly balanced each other
out. On the one hand, strong positive “supply shocks” followed the sharp increases
in production capacity during the First World War owing to improved mining tech-
nology (Radetzki, 2009) and war-time demand. The increased mining capacities were
temporarily abandoned in the first few-years after the war in coordinated action by
the Copper Export Association5. In 1917 world refined production totalled 1.4 mil-
lion metric tons. It slumped to 0.5 million metric tons in 1921, but then rebounded
5Please note that I have not included the three years after the First and Second World Wars in
my regressions.
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to 1.3 million metric tons in 1923, after the cartel operation ceased. From 1927 to
1929 production leapt again (for the aforementioned data see U.S. Geological Sur-
vey, 2011a). On the other hand, there were strong positive “other demand shocks”
that put upward pressure on the price of copper owing to the build-up of inventories
and price manipulations by two cartels: the Copper Export Association (Herfindahl,
1959, pp. 93-4) in the early 1920s and later by the Copper Exporters Inc. (Herfindahl,
1959, pp. 100-6).
The Great Depression that began in 1929 caused a major negative “world output-
driven demand shock” that drove down the price of copper. In response, the Copper
Exporters Inc. cartel, which controlled about 85 percent of world output, succeeded
in firmly restricting copper production by taking collective action (Herfindahl, 1959,
pp. 100-6). This resulted in strong accumulated effects of “supply shocks” that
counterbalanced the “world output-driven demand shocks” to some extent. How-
ever, diverging interests and declining discipline among its members brought Copper
Exporters Inc. to an end in 1932, and world copper production rebounded (Herfind-
ahl, 1959, p. 105). In 1935 the International Copper Cartel emerged and succeeded
in driving up the price of copper in the late 1930s (Herfindahl, 1959, p. 110), as the
cumulative effects of “other demand shocks” reveal.
In the period from the end of the Second World War until the mid 1970s, the price
of copper rose sharply, with peaks in 1955, 1966, 1969, and 1974. During this time
post-war reconstruction and the economic rise of Japan generated strong, positive
“world output-driven demand shocks”, which mainly determined price fluctuations.
Interventions by the U.S. government in the form of price controls, import and ex-
port restrictions, and government stockpiling were quite common in this period (see
Herfindahl, 1959; Sachs, 1999) and are largely reflected in “other demand shocks”.
Their accumulated effect was, however, rather transient and insignificant. Voluntary
production cutbacks in 1963 and strikes in the U.S. from 1959 to 1960 and 1967 to
1968 explain most of the supply shocks during this period (see Sachs, 1999). The
nationalization of mines in Chile, Zambia, and elsewhere in the 1960s, and as well
as the attempts by the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries
(CIPEC) to limit production in 1975 aggravated the negative “supply shocks” (see
Mardones, Silva, and Martinez, 1985; Sachs, 1999). Overall, the cumulative effects of
77
“supply shocks” were rather limited compared to the “world output-driven demand
shocks” during this period.
The price of copper reached its peak in 1974. This was due to several kinds of
shocks. On the one hand, the CIPEC cartel reduced its exports by fifteen percent
(Mikesell, 1979, p. 205), as is evident from the strong accumulative effects of “supply
shocks” and “other demand shocks”. On the other hand, the recession in 1974 caused
strong negative “world output-driven demand shocks”, which led to a serious decline
in the price in 1975, since the CIPEC could not sustain its action. In the following
three decades prices fell mainly because of the negative “world output-driven demand
shocks” caused by the recession in 1981, the economic impact of the breakup of the
U.S.S.R., and the Asian crisis. There were two small peaks in the late 1980s and the
mid 1990s due to the interplay of positive “world output-driven demand shocks” and
“supply shocks”.
The sharp rise in copper prices from 2003 to 2007 was basically driven by the
cumulative effects of large “world output-driven demand shocks” due to the booming
economy. Supply shocks also played a role. In 2005 and 2006 in particular, global
copper mine production grew far less than expected owing to strikes, equipment
shortages, and other production problems (U.S. Geological Survey, 2007, 2008).
Since the onset of the Great Recession in 2008 “world output-driven demand
shocks” have had a negative effect on the real price of copper. This has been offset
by strong “other demand shocks”, which have had a positive effect on price since 2005.
These shocks reflect changes in inventories (see data provided by the International
Copper Study Group, 2010a, 2012a). However, while consumers’ and producers’ in-
ventories have stayed roughtly constant, inventories at exchanges grew more then
fourfold between 2004 and 2010. At the same time, Chinese firms imported signifi-
cant quantities in 2009 and 2010, but their inventories are not transparent (see U.S.
Geological Survey, 2010b, 2011c).
Overall, my results demonstrate that the major fluctuations in the price of copper
are mainly driven by “world output-driven demand shocks”. “Supply shocks” and
“other demand shocks” also play a pronounced role in determining medium-term
swings in price. The narrative evidence suggests that the copper market is character-
ized by a long history of oligopolistic structures. Recurrently appearing cartels were
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able to influence prices by both restricting output and by stocking. The evidence
points to inventory changes by producer cartels, governments, and in the most recen
years by investors as key drivers of “other demand shocks”
2.5.2 Lead market
My results show that the fluctuations in the real price of lead have basically been
driven by “world output-driven demand shocks” and “other demand shocks”. “Sup-
ply shocks” do not play a role. My historical account reveals that the lead market
does not have a strong oligopolistic structure so that supply is quite elastic. This is
due to the fact that lead resources are relatively widespread and production takes
mainly place in the industrialized countries (BGR, 2007). As a consequence, the
formation of cartels to restrict output has not been successful in the history of the
lead market.
Figure 2.5 plots the impulse response functions for lead. An unexpected positive
rise in demand due to an increase in world output triggers a persistent and significant
positive increase in world GDP and in lead production. Its impact on the real price
of lead is positive and significant for a period of about five years. This is far less than
in the cases of copper and tin but relatively similar to the case of zinc.
A positive unexpected shock to the supply of lead exhibits no significant change
in world GDP but a strong, significant, and persistent effect on the world production
of lead. It exhibits a slighly positive but not significant effect on the real price of
lead. This result is in line with my finding for zinc, where the effect of a “supply
shock” on the real price of lead is also insignificant. In contrast, in the copper and
tin market positive “supply shocks” have a strong and significant effect on price. I
explain this difference through market structures. The production of copper and tin
is horizontally more concentrated than that of zinc and lead (BGR, 2007; Rudolf
Wolff & Co Lt., 1987). In addition, mine production of copper and tin takes rather
place in developing countries, while lead and zinc are mainly mined in industrialized
countries, which also use lead and zinc as an input to manufacturing (Rudolf Wolff
& Co Lt., 1987; Schmitz, 1979; BGR, 2007). As a consequence, shocks to the supply,
e.g., in the form of coordinated production decreases by a cartell, have an impact on
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Notes: Point estimates with one- and two-standard error band based on Model (2.1). I use accumu-
lated impulse response functions for the shocks on world mineral commodity production and world
GDP to trace out the effects on the levels of these variables.
Figure 2.5: Impulses to one-standard-deviation structural shocks for lead.
copper and tin prices but do not affect the zinc and lead market.
The impulse response functions in Figure 2.5 show that a positive “other demand
shock” exhibits no significant impact on world GDP and lead production. There is
no long term impact due to my identifying assumptions. However, it has a strong
positive effect on the real price of lead that is persistent for a period of about ten
years.
Lead prices were mainly driven by “world output-driven demand shocks” and
“other demand shocks” in the period considered. Prices went up at the beginning
of the 1850s and remained at this level for the next decade. Overall, prices were
relatively stable until the 1880s, compared to the other threemineral commodities
examined. McCune-Lindsay (1893) comes to the conclusion that the price of lead was
far less affected by a “twist of fate” (German original: “schicksalsreiche Laufbahn”
(McCune-Lindsay, 1893, p. 150). McCune-Lindsay (1893) also adds that it is not
possible to find data on stocks in order to explain price movements for lead.
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Notes: Structural residuals implied by Model (2.1).
Figure 2.6: Historical evolution of structural shocks for lead.
Notes: Please see notes to Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.7: Historical decomposition of the real price of lead.
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Unfortunately, not much is known about the lead market in the 19th century.
The “other demand shocks” in the mid 1860s may be due to the high uncertainty
in the market about the German War that probably affected the trade in zinc from
its main production sites in Silesia. Moreover, according to (Gibson-Jarvie, 1983)
the zinc industry has always been prone to producer cartels in the main producing
country Germany, where “the cartel “rationale” generally was both established and
indeed encouraged...” (Gibson-Jarvie, 1983, p. 73). Through the last decade of
the 19th century there were “repeated rumours in circulation as to a potential zinc
cartel (...) sufficiently strong as to have an unsettling effect on prices.” (Gibson-
Jarvie, 1983, p. 73) However, as producers were not able to agree on or sustain
production limits, these rumours faded again (Gibson-Jarvie, 1983, p. 73). The
Metallgesellschaft (1904) mentions that the Lead Trust, a large cartel in the U.S.,
limited its production, and stocks increased so sharply that prices rose for a time.
Overall, these ups and downs in cartel action may explain the “other demand shocks”
that drove up prices in the mid 1890s, then vanished, and had a strong positive impact
on prices again in the mid 1910s.
In 1909 the Metallgesellschaft which controlled most German and non-U.S. output
led a successful attempt at market manipulation by creating the Lead Smelters’ Asso-
ciation together with the main Belgian and Spanish lead mining companies (Gibson-
Jarvie, 1983). Instead of production controls, the members agreed to leave the entire
marketing of lead to the Metallgesellschaft, which could use stocks to withhold lead
from the market (Gibson-Jarvie, 1983). The “other demand shocks” show that the
Association was in line with the historical account relatively successful in driving up
prices from 1910 to 1913 (Gibson-Jarvie, 1983).
In the interwar period, prices increased and peaked in 1924 owing to the accumu-
lated effects of “world output-driven demand shocks”. However, prices came under
pressure from strong negative “other demand shocks”, probably caused by exten-
sive stockpiling (Gibson-Jarvie, 1983). As a reaction to stocks that “had amassed
to an alarming degree” (Gibson-Jarvie, 1983, p. 79) non-U.S. producers established
the Lead Producers’ Reporting Association in 1931. It tried to increase prices by
both production restrictions and stocking (Gibson-Jarvie, 1983). As the accumu-
lated effects of “other demand shocks” show, it had considerable positive impact in
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the first year as it partly compensated for the strong negative “world output-driven
demand shocks” due to the Great Depression. However, it collapsed when Great
Britain imposed import tariffs in 1932 (Gibson-Jarvie, 1983). This put downward
pressure on the price as stocks were dissolved (Gibson-Jarvie, 1983). Besides positive
“world output-driven demand shocks”, “other demand shocks” drove the market in
the following years. The latter shocks included actions by goverments to protect their
zinc producers with import tariffs and other measures as well as speculation on the
London Metal Exchange (Gibson-Jarvie, 1983; Hughes, 1938).
After the Second World War prices rose sharply reaching a peak in 1951 due to
“world output-driven demand shocks” triggered by postwar reconstruction and “other
demand shocks”. These “other demand shocks” were caused by several factors. First,
after the Second World War the U.S. enacted the Strategic and Critical Minerals Stock
Piling Act leading to heavy stockpiling, which can be seen in the sharp rise in the
accumulative effects of “other demand shocks”, especially during the Korean War (see
Mote and den Hartog, 1953, p. 684). In 1951 the U.S. government imposed a price
ceiling (see Bishop and den Hartog, 1954, p. 752). As foreign importers were not
willing to sell their lead at the low mandatory U.S. price and foreign consumers could
not absorb these quantities, stocks of non-U.S. producers accumulated, as evident
from the positive “other demand shocks”. As these stocks were sold on the market
in the following two years, they extend downwards pressure on the real price of lead.
From 1961 to 1969 the U.S. government enacted the Lead and Zinc Mining Sta-
bilization Program, which paid subsidies to mining companies when prices dropped
below a certain threshhold (Smith, 1999). This kept prices fairly stable over this
period (Smith, 1999). From 1971 to 1973 the U.S. government imposed price limits,
which were lifted in 1973 and then strongly increased the price of lead (Smith, 1999),
which was followed by a strong negative “other demand shock” due to destocking.
The price peak in 1979 was mainly attributed to a wordwide shortage of lead con-
centrates and a strong demand from centrally planned economic countries (Smith,
1999). However, my analysis suggests that it was rather the strong demand from
centrally planned economies as shown in the “other demand shocks” that drove the
price then supply shortages. There were also strong increases in stocks of refined lead
at consumers’ and producers’ sites (see data by U.S. Geological Survey, 2011a) that
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might be captured by these shocks.
In the 1980s there were strong downward pressures on the price of lead owing to
the recession in 1981, as evident in the accumulated effects of “world output-driven
demand shocks”, and owing to the phasingout of lead from many appliances, which
caused strong negative “other demand shocks” (see Smith, 1999). However, demand
picked up again in the late 1980s with the growth of the battery industry (Smith,
1999).
From 2003 prices recovered. This was partly driven by positive “world output-
driven demand” until 2007, but mostly by positive “other demand shocks” in 2005,
2007, 2009, and 2010. While the positive demand shocks in 2009 and 2010 are
attributable to a quadrupling of stocks at commercial exchanges, reflecting mainly
demand by institutional investors (see data by International Lead and Zinc Study
Group, 2011), the strong demand shocks from 2005 to 2007 probably reflect the lead
intensive growth in rapidly industrializing countries such as China (Guberman, 2009).
To conclude, fluctuations in the real price of lead have basically been driven by
“world output-driven demand shocks” and “other demand shocks” but not by “supply
shocks”. Historical evidence shows that the formation of cartels to restrict output
has not been successful in the history of the lead market. This is due to the fact
that lead resources are relatively widespread and production takes mainly place in
the industrialized country (BGR, 2007). “Other demand shocks” have been basically
driven by changes in inventories by producers, the U.S. government, and in recent
times probably also by investors. “Other demand shocks” also encompasse shocks to
the use of lead due to environmental regulation in the 1970s and 1980s.
2.5.3 Tin market
The price of tin has experienced large fluctuations in the past 170 years. According
to my results these fluctuations are mainly driven by “world output-driven demand
shocks” and “other demand shocks”, but “supply shocks” also play a role. The tin
market has been characterized by a long history of oligopolistic structures. Govern-
ments have attempted to control the market since after the First World War. There is
a strong geographic narrowness of supplies in the Earth’s crust (Gibson-Jarvie, 1983).
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During history supplies shifted from England, to the Straits and Australia, and then
to the South-East Indies (Gibson-Jarvie, 1983). Today, the main mine producers are
China, Indonesia, and Peru (U.S. Geological Survey, 2013). ”Tin is unusual among
minerals in that the world is dependent on less developed countries for the bulk of
its supplies” (Thoburn, 1994, p. 1)
A positive unexpected shock to supply significantly increases GDP slighly for the
first three years, but then subsides. It has a strong, significant, and persistent affect
on the tin production. It exerts a strong and negative effect on the real price of tin
that persists significantly for more than fifteen years. This effect is similar to the
effect of a copper supply shock on price but different to the respective effects for zinc
and lead.
Notes: Point estimates with one- and two-standard error bands based on Model (2.1). I use ac-
cumulated impulse response functions for the shocks on world mineral commodity production and
world GDP to trace out the effects on the levels of these variables.
Figure 2.8: Impulses to one-standard-deviation structural shocks for tin.
Finally, I find that positive “other demand shocks” have no statistically significant
impact on world GDP, but exert a positiv and rather minor effect on tin production,
which turns statistically significant about three years after the shock hits. Owing to
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the long-run restrictions, the effects level off over time. An unexpected increase in
“other demand shocks” leads to a strong and positive increase in the real price of tin,
which remains statistically significant for more than fifteen years.
Notes: Structural residuals implied by Model (2.1).
Figure 2.9: Historical evolution of structural shocks for tin.
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Notes: Please see notes to Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.10: Historical decomposition of the real price of tin.
The rise in the prices from the 1840s until the late 1850s was due to positive
“world output-driven demand shocks”, as the world economy boomed in the 1850s
(Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). At the same time, there were unexpected negative
“supply shocks” due to partly simultaneous production shortfalls in the main mining
areas of Cornwall and Banka, which drove up prices (see data provided by Neumann,
1904, pp. 251-2). “Other demand shocks” also exerted downward pressure on the
price, but their sources are not identifiable from the literature.
The price of tin slumped in the following years, reaching a trough in 1867. Britain,
whose industry was the main user of tin at that time, lifted the restrictive import
policies it had adopted to protect tin producers in Cornwall (Thoburn, 1994), which
opened the market to tin from South-East Asia and led to positive “supply shocks”
that drove prices down as the structural shocks in Figure 2.9 show. At the same
time, several negative “world output-driven demand shocks” triggered by the Panic
of 1857, the American Civil War and the Overend-Gurney crisis exerted downward
pressure on the price (see Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011).
In the late 1860s and early 1870s, conflicts between Chinese clans that con-
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trolled mining production on the Malayan peninsula turned into war (Thoburn, 1994).
Britain intervened and took control of important parts of the Malayan peninsual by
1874 (Thoburn, 1994). My analysis suggests that this event triggered major “other
demand shocks”, since it increased uncertainty in the tin market, which led to a rise
in pre-cautionary stockholding by consumers. The resulting high price resulted in
greater production elsewhere. Tin production in Cornwall reached a high in 1871,
and Australian production rose significantly in the early 1870s (Thoburn, 1994). This
caused positive supply shocks that put downward pressure on the price, which rose
even higher after the British consolidated their control of the Malayan peninsula. The
result was a significant increase in production and the Malayan peninsula became the
most important producer in the world by the late 1870s (Thoburn, 1994). Moreover,
the Long Depression in the industrializing world began in 1873 and exerted further
downward pressure on the price of tin. Prices recovered from their low levels, reaching
a peak in the late 1880s owing to the economic recovery after the Long Depression,
which triggered positive “world output-driven demand shocks”. From 1889 to the
late 1890s prices fell again because of sluggish economic growth and further positive
“supply shocks”.
At the end of the 1890s prices rose dramatically. This was due to several factors.
First, positive accumulative effects of “world output-driven demand shocks” peaked
at the beginning of the 20th century (see also data provided by Crafts, Leybourne, and
Mills, 1989; National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010), which led to unexpectedly
high rises in the demand for tin. Second, labor shortages and equipment problems
caused negative “supply shocks”. These problems were also linked to the need to
produce tin from deposits of lower ore grades and of greater depths (Thoburn, 1994)
and were exacerbated by the decision of local authorities to stop the exploration for
new deposits in Kinta Valley, the most important tin-mining area (Thoburn, 1994).
Until the outbreak of the First World War, the price of tin was essentially driven by
positive and negative “world output-driven demand shocks” due to the business cycles
of the two major economies at the time, the U.S. and the U.K. (see data provided by
Crafts, Leybourne, and Mills, 1989; National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010).
Price fluctuations in the inter-war period were mainly influenced by the economic
recovery after the First World War, the effects of the Great Depression, and attempts
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to form cartels. In 1921 the governments of the Federated Malay States and the Dutch
East Indies establishd the Bandoeng Pool and agreed to stabilize the price of tin by
jointly managing inventories (Thoburn, 1994). The Bandoeng Pool controlled more
than fifty percent of world production at the time (Thoburn, 1994, p. 77). From 1921
to 1923 it withheld some fifteen percent of world tin production from the market and
sold it gradually when prices rose in the mid of the 1920s owing to positive “world
output-driven demand shocks” (Thoburn, 1994). The action taken by the cartel is
evident form the “other demand shocks”. The Bandoeng Pool reaped a “substantial
profit from the operation” (Thoburn, 1994, p. 77) and was dissolved in 1924 with its
stocks exhausted (Baldwin, 1983).
The Great Depression caused strong negative “world output-driven demand shocks”
to the price of tin, which coincided with a major expansion of world production
(Thoburn, 1994). In response, a number of tin producers tried to withhold tin from
the markets by stockpiling it, which explains the positive “other demand shocks”
at the time. However, as these attempts were unsuccesssful, the International Tin
Agreement was drawn up. It encompassed the major producers and introduced formal
restrictions on output (Thoburn, 1994). This caused a large negative supply shock
in 1932, evident from the accumulative effects of the “supply shocks”, which drove
the price up again. In 1938 a buffer stock was formed under the International Tin
Agreement to stabilize prices (Thoburn, 1994). While the International Tin Agree-
ment inventories were increased in the first year, causing prices to rise, it was soon
exhausted in the run-up to the Second World War (Thoburn, 1994).
The high price from the end of the Second World War until the early 1970s
was driven mainly by upward pressure from strong “world output-driven demand
shocks” and mild “supply shocks”. The “world output-driven demand shocks” re-
flected post-war reconstruction, followed by South-Korea’s and Japan’s industrial
expansion. Downward pressure at that time resulted from “other demand shocks”
due to the U.S. stockpiling programme. After the Second World War the U.S. passed
the Strategic and Critical Minerals Stock Piling Act and bought tin into government
inventories because of fears about supplies due to the spread of communism in South-
East Asia (Thoburn, 1994). After the Korean War it stopped buying and gradually
reduced its inventories during a period of high prices (Smith and Schink, 1976). Pur-
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chases from government stocks help to explain the downward pressure on prices by
“other demand shocks” until the mid 1950s.
In 1956 the main producing and consuming countries, with the exception of the
U.S., concluded a new International Tin Agreement with a view to stabilizing prices.
It provided for both export restrictions and an international buffer stock (Thoburn,
1994). It imposed export restrictions, which are visible in the accumulative effects
of “supply shocks” until they were lifted in 1960 (Thoburn, 1994). The resulting
oversupply is clear from the structural shocks. The buffer stock formed under the
International Tin Agreement also exerted some influence on the market in this pe-
riod (see Thoburn, 1994; Smith and Schink, 1976). From an examination of “other
demand shocks” it seems that the downward pressure of subsequent releases from the
U.S. stockpiling programme was offset by the upward pressure of action under the
International Tin Agreement during the 1960s.
The recessions of 1974 and the early 1980s caused large negative “world output
driven demand shocks” to the price of tin (Thoburn, 1994). However, the price rose
sharply in 1974 and continued at this high level because of action taken under the
International Tin Agreement. Export restrictions were imposed, and the buffer stock
was increased (Thoburn, 1994). This strategy worked until the famous collapse of the
buffer stock and the suspension of the trade of tin on the London Metal Exchange
(see Kestenbaum, 1991, for a detailed account). The collapse and dissolution of the
buffer stock caused a serious slump in the price of tin, which levelled-off slowly in the
1990s. During this time, the Association of Tin Producing Countries was established
and tried to restrict supplies (Thoburn, 1994).
From the beginning of the new millennium until 2010 the price of tin rose sharply
as a result of positive “world output-driven demand shocks” caused by the rise of
China and, to a far larger extent, by “other demand shocks”. This accords with data
on inventories at the London Metal Exchange, which more than doubled from 2008
to 2010, according to data released by the BGR, 2013. This reveals the strong part
played by inventory changes in the current price hike, and especially in compensating
for the negative “world output-driven demand shock” in 2009. These changes have
not only been been due to restocking at producers and consumers, but also, accord-
ing to industry observers, due to stockpiling by investment funds as attribute (U.S.
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Geological Survey, 2011c).
Overall, my results provide evidence that fluctuations in the price of tin are mainly
driven by “world output-driven demand shocks” and “other demand shocks”, but
“supply shocks” also play an important role. The tin market is characterized by a
long history of oligopolistic structures and continuous attempts to manipulate prices
since after the First World War. Cartels were able to do so by restricting output
but also by stockpiling. My account shows that “other demand shocks” were mainly
driven by government stockpiling programs, the change in stocks of different cartels,
and recently by increases in demand for inventories at metal exchanges. A special
feature has been the build-up and collapse of the International Tin Agreement, which
influenced the price strongly over several decades.
2.5.4 Zinc market
My results show that “world output-driven demand shocks” and “other demand
shocks” are the main drivers of fluctuations in the real price of zinc. As it is the
case for lead, zinc is basically produced in industrialized countries and resources are
found all across the world. The market is therefore not prone to functioning cartels
and does not have an oligopolistic structure (BGR, 2007).
The impulse response functions in Figure 2.11 show that the behaviour of the
zinc market is very similar to that of the one for lead. An unexpected rise in demand
due to an increase in world output is causing a strong and persistent increase in zinc
production. While the effect on world output is of considerable statistical significance,
the effect on zinc production is statistically significant in only the four following years.
Later it becomes a borderline case. Its effect on the price of zinc is substantial and
continues to be significant for about five years.
An unexpected increase in zinc supply does not have an effect on world GDP, but
has a strong positive impact on zinc production, as expected. It leads to a statistically
insignificant fall in the real price of zinc. In this respect, zinc is similar to lead, but
different from copper and tin, which are affected by “supply shocks”. I attribute this
difference to market structures. Copper and tin production are horizontally more
concentrated than zinc and lead production (BGR, 2007; Rudolf Wolff & Co Lt.,
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Notes: Point estimates with one- and two-standard error bands based on Model (2.1). I use ac-
cumulated impulse response functions for the shocks on world mineral commodity production and
world GDP to trace out the effects on the levels of these variables.
Figure 2.11: Impulses to one-standard-deviation structural shocks for zinc.
1987). In addition, copper and tin are generally mined in developing countries, while
lead and zinc are mined mainly in industrialized countries, which also use lead and
zinc as manufacturing inputs (Rudolf Wolff & Co Lt., 1987; Schmitz, 1979; BGR,
2007). As a consequence, shocks to supply in the form of coordinated production
decreases by a cartell, for example, have an impact on copper and tin prices, without
affecting the markets of lead and zinc.
A positive “other demand shock” has no impact on world GDP or zinc production.
It has an immediate, major, highly significant, and persistent positive effect on the
real price of zinc for a period of up to fifteen years.
The price of zinc has been driven mainly by “world output-driven demand shocks”
and “other demand shocks” in the course of history as Figure 2.13 shows. Prices
rose sharply in the 1850s and peaked in 1857, driven by the accumulative effects of
“positive output-driven demand shocks” as the world economy boomed in the 1850s
(see Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). Prices then slumped due to the accumulative
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effects of negative “world output-driven demand shocks” caused by the Panic of
1857 and the American Civil War (see Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). Even though
“world output-driven demand shocks” continued to put pressure on zinc prices, strong
positive “other demand shocks” supported them in the mid-1860s as the structural
shocks in Figure 2.12 show. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find a conclusive
explanation for these shocks. A possible explanation is the German War of 1866,
which may have affected the trade in zinc from the main mining area in Silesia and
so caused “precautionary demand” for inventories. I leave it to future research to
delve deaper into the history of the zinc market around that time.
Prices recovered in the early 1870s owing to “world output-driven demand shocks”
and then reached a peak in 1875. This peak was mainly driven by market manipu-
lations of U.S. producers, which are evident from the strong positive “other demand
shocks” at the time (Jolly, 1997). The high price caused production increases else-
where, which sent prices down again (Jolly, 1997). The falling prices led to attempts
by German producers in 1979 and by a number of other European producers in 1882
to form cartels and to put upwards pressure on prices by limiting production (Jolly,
1997; Cocks and Walters, 1968). These attempts failed, since local production de-
creases were offset by production elsewhere (Jolly, 1997; Cocks and Walters, 1968).
As a result, negative “other demand shocks” in combination with “world output-
driven demand shocks” due to the Long Depression exerted downward pressure on
prices, which reached their lowest level in the mid-1880s.
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Notes: Structural residuals implied by Model (2.1).
Figure 2.12: Historical evolution of structural shocks for zinc.
Notes: Please see notes to Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.13: Historical decomposition of the real price of zinc.
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As a reaction to the low prices in the 1880s, major European producers joined
the “first significant international zinc cartel” (Jolly, 1997, p. 116), which accounted
for about 85 percent of world production (Jolly, 1997). The accumulative effects of
“other demand shocks” show that it succeeded in temporarily increasing the price,
which reached a peak in 1890. There were also supply cuts, which are evident from the
structural supply shocks, but did not have a major impact on prices, as can be seen
from the accumulative effects. However, the cartel lost its power when new production
came on to the market in reaction to the high prices (Jolly, 1997). Subsequent
destocking inhibited strong negative “other demand shocks” and exerted additional
downward pressure on the price.
The price rose sharply in the late 1890s owing to “world output-driven demand
shocks”, reflecting the booming world economy, but also due to “other demand
shocks”, which may reflect not only growing stocks at smeltering plants but also
attempts by U.S. producers to form a trust (Metallgesellschaft, 1904). In the follow-
ing years, the price was driven mainly by “other demand shocks”, possibly reflecting
the “cartel mentality” (Cocks and Walters, 1968, p. 16) of the German metal industry
at the time. In 1909 another major attempt was made by European producers to
form a cartel, known as the Spelter Convention, which drove up prices in the period
until the outbreak of the First World War, as can be seen from the accumulated
effects of the “other demand shocks” (Jolly, 1997).
In the inter-war period, prices began by falling, then rose to a peak in the mid-
1920s, slumped sharply during the Great Depression and did not recover from this
low level until the end of the Second World War. My analysis shows the peak in the
mid-1920s to be the result of positive “world output-driven demand shocks” due to
the booming world economy and “other demand shocks” probably due to industry
stockpiling (see data provided by U.S. Geological Survey, 2011a). Positive supply
shocks also exerted significant downward pressure on prices. I attribute these to
the widespread introduction of flotation extraction and the electrolytic technique of
smelting which made the zinc production from complex sulphide ores possible (Gupta,
1982). These new techniques increased production especially in non-European areas
such as Canada, Australia, Mexico, Rhodesia, and Indochina (Gupta, 1982). As a
result the production of flotation concentrate in the U.S. for example increase from
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34,000 tons in 1921 to 500,000 tons in 1928 (Jolly, 1997, p. 39).
The new competition from outside Europe triggered the formation of the Euro-
pean zinc cartel in 1928 but which was dissolved in 1929 due to disparate interests
of its members (Jolly, 1997; Gupta, 1982). The Great Depression caused a major
negative “world output-driven demand shock” in 1930 and send prices down. As a
reaction, the European zinc cartel was revived and imposed a 45 percent cutback
of production in 1931 which was raised to 55 percent in the following year (Jolly,
1997). This explains the negative “supply shocks” during these two years. However,
the cartel dissolved in 1934 as some participants cheated on their production and
sales. Problems with the treatment of inventories, which started to be released on
the market as “other demand shocks” show, were also not solved (Jolly, 1997; Gupta,
1982). Several attempts to renew the cartel failed until a cartel called the Interna-
tional Sheet Zinc Cartel was founded at the end of the 1930s. It had a short impact
on the market as the “other demand shocks” suggest but was dissolved by the start
of Second World War (Jolly, 1997).
The high price level from the end of the Second World War until the beginning of
the 1970s was mainly driven by upwards pressure due to strong “world output-driven
demand shocks” fueled by post-war reconstruction and the following industrial ex-
pansion in South-Korea and Japan. After Second World War the U.S. enacted the
Strategic and Critical Minerals Stock Piling Act which led to heavy stockpiling, vis-
ible in the sharp rise of accumulated “other demand shocks” and driving up prices
enormously (Gupta, 1982, p. 32). The following years were characterized by price con-
trols and sales and purchases into the government stockpile in the U.S. This economic
policy strongly influenced the price in the rest of the world and had a rather desta-
bilizing effect (Gupta, 1982, p. 32). It is also visible in the “other demand shocks”.
Furthermore, a new informal cartel was founded in 1964, known as the “Zinc Club”
(Jolly, 1997, p. 117). Its members, mainly European, Canadian, and Australian zinc
companies aimed at supporting the newly introduced European Producer Price and
to restrain the influence of the London Metal Exchange (Jolly, 1997). They used
inventories as a tool to set the European Producer Price (Jolly, 1997). .
At the beginning of the 1970s the zinc price increased dramatically. My analysis
shows that this was mainly driven by “other demand shocks”. The U.S. government
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imposed a stabilization program in 1971 which fixed prices at a low level (Jolly, 1997).
After lifting the fixed price in 1973, both the U.S. producers and the “Zinc Club”
increased their prices sharply by more than 225 percent (Gupta, 1982, p. 30). As
producers withhold stocks, visible in the strong accumulated response of the “other
demand shocks”, the price of the London Metal Exchange also increased drastically.
In 1974 the recession had a strong negative shock on the price and producers were
not able to support prices anymore such that prices dropped again (Gupta, 1982).
The governments of the U.S., Japan, and France helped zinc companies to reduce
inventories in these times of a low zinc price by increasing government stocks in 1975
and 1976 (Gupta, 1982). After investigations of the U.S. department of Justice, the
informal “Zinc Club” collapsed in 1976 (Jolly, 1997).
In the 1980s the zinc price reached peaks in the middle of the 1980s and at the end
of the 1980s. Both are explainable by a combination of positive “world output-driven
demand shocks” due to economic expansions of the world economy (U.S. Geological
Survey, 2011a) and “other demand shocks”. I attribute these “other demand shocks”
to the introduction of the zinc penny by the U.S. government (Jolly, 1997). This led
to irregular purchases of zinc by the U.S. mint which influenced the zinc price over
the decade (see Jolly, 1984, 1986, 1989).
In the 1990s the real price of zinc was driven by negative “world output-driven
demand shocks” due to the breakup of the U.S.S.R. and the Asian Crisis later
on. The price increase at the beginning of the 2000s was fueled by positive “world
output-driven demand shocks” until the Great Recession starting in late 2007 caused
strongest negative “world output-driven demand shocks”. However, strong positive
“other demand shocks” partly compensated for these negative shocks. They reflect
a strong change in warehouse inventories of the London Metal Exchange and the
Shanghai Futures Exchange, which have increased eightfold and sixfold in the period
from 2007 to 2010 (International Lead and Zinc Study Group, 2011). Interestingly
data on inventories at consumers’ and producers’ sites have not increased over the
time period (International Lead and Zinc Study Group, 2011), which points to the
role of institutional investors in buying inventories.
Overall, the price of zinc was mainly driven by “world output-driven demand
shocks” and “other demand shocks” over the course of history. Cartels have not had
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success in restricting output. Historical evidence points to changes in inventories by
firms, government, and investors as an interpretation of the “other demand shocks”.
2.5.5 Long-term trends
The estimated coefficients of the linear trends in the five estimated VAR models show
that prices - with the exception of copper - have basically been trendless from 1840
to 2010. The negative linear trend is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in
the case of the price of copper and only statistically significant at the 10 percent level
in the cases of the prices of lead and zinc. The estimated coefficients for the linear
trends in the prices of tin and crude oil (since 1861) are zero. These results partly
differ to those presented in chapter 1 as price data has been deflated by the producer
price index and not by the consumer price index as in 1
Est. coefficient t-stat. t-prob.
Copper -0.002 -2.811 0.006
Lead -0.001 -1.871 0.063
Tin 0.000 0.315 0.753
Zinc -0.001 -1.777 0.077
Crude Oil 0.001 0.698 0.486
Table 2.1: Estimated coefficients of the linear trends.
2.6 Sensitivity analysis
I have employed several robustness checks, including an alternative identification
scheme, and different time periods and alternative price data to test whether my
main results still hold. To ease comparison, I present the results of forecast error
variance decompositions for each of the respective specifications. The respective
regression results are available from the author upon request. Table 2.17 shows the
respective contributions of the three shocks for my baseline specification.
In order to check the robustness of the results over that of an alternative identifi-
cation, I use Kilian’s identification scheme, which is based on short-run restrictions.
I postulate a vertical short-run supply shape and no effect of price changes driven by
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“other demand shocks” on world GDP within the first year. I describe the identifica-
tion in detail in the Appendix. Even if it is not clear how reasonable the identifying
restrictions on annual data are, the empirical results are relatively similar. As table
2.18 shows, my results stand up with respect to the overall strong impact of demand
shocks on the prices of copper, lead, tin, and zinc. However, the effect of supply
shocks on the prices of tin and copper do not show up due to the restrictions that I
apply regarding the instantaneous impact of world output shocks and other demand
shocks on supply.
My results are also robust regarding alternative price data. Table 2.19 illustrates
the empirical results obtained from using the producer price index instead of the
consumer price index for disinflation.
Employing New York prices instead of London based prices (see Table 2.21) in-
creases the contribution of supply shocks and reduces the contribution of demand
shocks due to unexpected changes in world output significantly in the cases of tin
and copper prices. In the cases of the lead and zinc market, “other demand shocks”
strongly dominate other shocks. These results illustrate how strong government in-
tervention and stockpiling, the imposing of restrictions on trade policies, and pro-
ducer prices have dominated non-ferrous metals markets in the U.S. most of the
time, whereas the market in London was basically the market-based price setter on
a global scale (see also Slade, 1989).
Finally, I check the results for robustness with respect to different subperiods.
Starting the observation period in 1900 or 1925 does not change the general results
in the cases of copper, lead, tin and zinc (see table 2.20).
2.7 The case of crude oil
While the empirical results are quite robust and relatively homogeneous across the
four mineral commodities, the results for the crude oil market are less compelling
due to structural breaks in the time series. As a comparison, I present the empirical
results in the following.
The structural shocks evolve in a plausible way. “World output-driven demand
shocks” develop in relatively similar fashion for the examined other mineral com-
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modities. “Supply shocks” are quite pronounced in the pre-World War I and inter-
war period, but have decreased in amplitude after the Second World War. “Other
demand shocks” are also plausible. All in all the structural shocks are in line with
those identified by Kilian (2009) over the period from 1973 to 2007. However, im-
pulse response functions raise questions. The cumulative effects of positive “world
output-driven demand shocks” have strong negative effects on the real price. This
seems to be an anomaly, since they should feature positive effects. An explanation for
this behaviour is the still unsettled issue of causality in the relationship between the
oil price and economic growth (see, e.g., Ozturk (2010) for an overview). All other
impulse response functions behave as expected. The historical decomposition reveals
again the problem with the “world output-driven demand shocks”. As expected from
the impulse response function, their contribution is turned on its head with a large
accumulation of positive shocks during the Great Depression and a large accumula-
tion of negative shocks during the 1950s and 60s. As in Kilian (2009) supply shocks
are not important and other demand shocks make a strong contribution to the crude
oil price especially during the 1970s. This is in line with the argumentation of Kilian
(2009) that the political uncertainty in the Middle East caused a strong increase in
the precautionary demand for oil. Overall, the evolution of supply and other demand
shocks is plausible and in line with the empirical evidence presented by Kilian (2009).
The results for crude oil are not robust with respect to different subperiods due
to the familiar structural changes in the oil market (see Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011;
Dvir and Rogoff, 2010; Hamilton, 2011). My results show that supply shocks played
an important role in shaping oil prices before the structural break in 1973. This is
in contrast to the time period from 1973 to 2007, where the oil price was shaped by
demand shocks (as also examined by Kilian (2009)). I use annual GDP data instead
of the freight rates in Kilian’s regressions and find that it generates relatively similar
results over the period from 1973 to 2007 when I use his identification (see figures
2.20 to 2.23). However, the results change when his identification is used over the
entire time period from 1861 to 2010. Whereas “other demand shocks” are quite
strong, “world output-driven demand shocks” do not play a role and supply shocks
have some effect on the oil price.
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2.8 Conclusion
This paper has examined the dynamic effects of demand and supply shocks on the real
prices of copper, lead, tin, zinc, and crude oil from 1840 to 2010. Using a historical
decomposition based on a structural VAR model with long-term restrictions, my
results show that these prices are mainly driven by persistent “world output-driven
demand shocks” and “other demand shocks”, namely shocks to inventory demand.
“Supply shocks” play a role only in the cases of tin and copper, possibly due to the
oligopolistic structure of these markets.
My results contribute to the literature by providing long-term empirical evidence
from a new data set on mineral commodity prices. Two major limitations to my
analysis may guide further research. First, my model does not include asymmetric
responses of prices to positive or negative shocks. This may be particularly important
for the effect of positive and negative supply shocks on prices and vice versa. For
example, Radetzki (2008) describes an experience which is common in the extractive
sector, namely that firms keep their utilization rates high even after negative price and
demand shocks hit the market. Second, “other demand shocks” capture all shocks
that are orthogonal to “supply shocks” and “world output-driven demand shocks”.
Disentangling these shocks by explicitly controling for changes in inventories or the
resource intensity of the economy would shed further light on the sources of these
shocks.
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A2 Appendix
A2.1 An alternative identification
As a robustness check and to ease comparison, I provide an identification scheme
following Kilian (2009). I use a structural VAR model with short-run restrictions to
decompose unpredictable changes in the real mineral commodity prices into mutually
orthogonal components.
The vector of endogenous variables is zt = (∆Qt,∆Yt, Pt)
T , where ∆Qt denotes
the percentage change in world production of the respective mineral commodity, ∆Yt
refers to the percentage change in world GDP, and Pt is the log of the respective real
commodity price. Dt denotes the deterministic terms, notably a constant, a linear
trend, and the annual dummies during the World War I and II periods and the three
consecutive years. The structural VAR representation is
Azt = Γ1zt−1 + ...+ Γpzt−p + ΠDt + t. (2.2)
t is a vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural shocks. Assuming that
A−1 has a recursive structure, I decompose the reduced-form structural errors et
according to et = A
−1t:
et ≡

eQt
eYt
ePt
 =

a11 0 0
a21 a22 0
a31 a32 a33


Qt
Yt
Pt

.
I use the same restrictions on the short-term relations as Kilian (2009) to iden-
tify the model. However, since he uses monthly and I annual data, I explain my
restrictions as follows:
I define “supply shocks” as unpredictable changes to the global production of
the respective mineral commodity. The underlying assumption is a vertical short-run
supply curve of that commodity. Shocks to demand or supply instantaneously change
the price, inasmuch they shift the demand curve or the vertical supply curve. Hence,
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I assume that innovations due to neither world output nor price affect supply within
the same year. This assumption seems plausible as an explanation for expanding ex-
traction and first-stage processing capacities, which are highly capital-intensive. Thus
it takes five or more years before new capacities become operational (see Radetzki,
2008; Wellmer, 1992).
However, firms might also respond to demand shocks by increasing capacity uti-
lization, which would make the above assumption implausible. At the same time,
Kilian (2008) states that capacity utilization rates in world crude oil production were
around 90 percent from 1974 to 2004, so that major expansions in capacity utiliza-
tion within the space of a month were not possible. He states that firms run their oil
production facilities only at 90 percent of nominal capacity - and not at full nominal
capacity -, because there is uncertainty about the threshold of sustainable production.
Exceeding that threshold might permanently damage an oil field. I find similarly high
utilization rates in U.S.-data for the oil extraction, mining and primary metals in-
dustries from 1967 to 2011 (U.S. Federal Reserve, 2011). In the case of the mining
and primary metals industries, maintenance and repairs make a capacity utilization
rate higher than 90 percent also unlikely. To sum up, there is some evidence that
the assumption of a vertical supply curve in the short-run is reasonable, but for the
annual data that I use it is nevertheless contestable.
I define “world output-driven demand shocks” as shocks to global GDP that
cannot be explained by “supply shocks”. Hence, I impose the restriction that price
changes driven by “other demand shocks” do not affect global GDP within a year.
Kilian (2009) shows that price increases due to oil market specific demand shocks
do not result in a statistically significant decline in the level of even the U.S.-GDP.
Furthermore, on a global scale a price increase is only a redistribution of income from
importing to exporting countries such that global output should not be affected in
the short-run.
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A2.2 Additional figures
Figure 2.14: Historical evolution of world GDP, world lead production, and the real
price of lead from 1841 to 2010.
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Figure 2.15: Historical evolution of world GDP, world tin production, and the real
price of tin from 1841 to 2010.
Figure 2.16: Historical evolution of world GDP, world zinc production, and the real
price of zinc from 1841 to 2010.
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A2.3 Regression results
Indep. variable Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
Dependent variable: World GDP (percentage share)
World GDP lag1 0.375 3.964 0.000
World GDP lag2 0.353 3.281 0.001
World GDP lag3 0.149 1.603 0.111
World GDP lag4 -0.196 -2.340 0.021
Production lag1 -0.025 -1.547 0.124
Production lag2 -0.008 -0.518 0.605
Production lag3 -0.035 -2.345 0.021
Production lag4 -0.003 -0.206 0.837
Price lag1 -1.539 -1.661 0.099
Price lag2 -0.544 -0.436 0.663
Price lag3 0.206 0.170 0.865
Price lag4 1.790 2.122 0.036
Constant 1.267 0.344 0.731
Trend 0.005 0.660 0.510
Dependent variable: Copper production (percentage share)
World GDP lag1 1.950 4.366 0.000
World GDP lag2 1.706 3.355 0.001
World GDP lag3 0.810 1.848 0.067
World GDP lag4 -0.258 -0.650 0.517
Production lag1 -0.287 -3.701 0.000
Production lag2 -0.258 -3.493 0.001
Production lag3 -0.374 -5.245 0.000
Production lag4 -0.245 -3.333 0.001
Price lag1 -13.522 -3.088 0.002
Price lag2 -2.990 -0.507 0.613
Price lag3 3.053 0.533 0.595
Price lag4 4.787 1.200 0.232
Constant 68.142 3.916 0.000
Trend -0.184 -5.172 0.000
Dependent variable: Price of copper (logs)
World GDP lag1 0.031 3.024 0.003
World GDP lag2 0.009 0.756 0.451
World GDP lag3 0.011 1.044 0.299
World GDP lag4 -0.002 -0.171 0.865
Production lag1 -0.004 -2.273 0.025
Production lag2 -0.002 -1.122 0.264
Production lag3 -0.001 -0.597 0.552
Production lag4 -0.001 -0.604 0.547
Price lag1 0.850 8.366 0.000
Price lag2 -0.164 -1.198 0.233
Price lag3 0.063 0.474 0.636
Price lag4 0.086 0.929 0.355
Constant 1.130 2.801 0.006
Trend -0.002 -2.811 0.006
Notes: I choose a lag length of 4 according to the Akaike IC). Sample range: 1845-2012, t=166. The
coefficients for the World War periods are available from the author upon request.
Table 2.2: Estimated coefficients for the copper market.
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World GDP Production Price
World GDP 1.533 0.325 0.055
(6.383) (0.917) (0.185)
Production 1.298 4.805 5.488
(1.602) (4.295) (3.930)
Price 0.102 -0.091 0.105
(1.859) (-2.990) (5.100)
Notes: World GDP and production reflect the percentage changes of world GDP and of the annual
copper production. Price is the average annual real price of copper in logs. Estimates for the
structural version of Model (2.1). Bootstraped standard errors are in brackets. Maximum likelihood
estimation, scoring algorithm (see Amisano and Giannini (1992)).
Table 2.3: Estimated contemporaneous impact matrix for the copper market.
World GDP Production Price
World GDP 4.002 0 0
(2.623) — —
Production 1.394 5.496 0
(0.714) (3.919) —
Price 1.744 -0.818 0.633
(1.785) (-2.378) (3.958)
Notes: World GDP and production reflect the percentage changes of world GDP and of the annual
copper production. Price is the average annual real price of copper. Estimates for the structural
version of Model (2.1). Bootstraped standard errors are in brackets. Maximum likelihood estimation,
scoring algorithm (see Amisano and Giannini (1992)).
Table 2.4: Estimated identified long-term impact matrix for the copper market.
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Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
Dependent variable: World GDP (percentage share)
World GDP lag1 0.265 2.762 0.007
World GDP lag2 0.130 1.289 0.199
Production lag1 0.019 0.665 0.507
Production lag2 0.017 0.649 0.517
Price lag1 -0.466 -0.500 0.618
Price lag2 0.341 0.405 0.686
Constant 1.173 0.522 0.602
Trend 0.011 2.229 0.027
Dependent variable: Lead production (percentage share)
World GDP lag1 0.958 3.102 0.002
World GDP lag2 -0.457 -1.409 0.161
Production lag1 0.039 0.426 0.670
Production lag2 0.031 0.363 0.717
Price lag1 4.933 1.645 0.102
Price lag2 -4.592 -1.695 0.092
Constant 1.321 0.183 0.855
Trend -0.013 -0.814 0.417
Dependent variable: Price of lead (logs)
World GDP lag1 0.031 3.257 0.001
World GDP lag2 -0.021 -2.053 0.042
Production lag1 0.001 0.303 0.763
Production lag2 0.004 1.422 0.157
Price lag1 0.888 9.597 0.000
Price lag2 -0.040 -0.474 0.636
Constant 0.782 3.506 0.001
Trend -0.001 -1.871 0.063
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients for the reduced form Model (2.1) with a lag length
of 2 (chosen according to the Akaike Information Criterion). Sample range: 1843-2010, t=168. The
coefficients for the World War periods are available from the author upon request.
Table 2.5: Estimated coefficients for the lead market.
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World GDP Production Price
World GDP 1.644 -0.156 0.127
(7.052) (-0.819) (0.397)
Production 2.664 4.604 -0.344
(3.192) (6.399) (-0.324)
Price 0.060 0.008 0.153
(1.700) (0.247) (6.149)
Notes: World GDP and production reflect the percentage changes of world GDP and of the annual
lead production. Price is the average annual real price of lead in logs. Estimates for the structural
version of Model (2.1). Bootstraped standard errors are in brackets. Maximum likelihood estimation,
scoring Algorithm (see Amisano and Giannini (1992)).
Table 2.6: Estimated contemporaneous impact matrix for the lead market.
World GDP Production Price
World GDP 2.844 0 0
(0.620) — —
Production 4.666 5.028 0
(1.584) (0.834) —
Price 0.732 0.209 1.010
(0.365) (0.241) (0.304)
Notes: World GDP and production reflect the percentage changes of world GDP and of the annual
lead production. Price is the average annual real price of lead. Estimates for the structural version
of Model (2.1). Bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. Maximum likelihood estimation,
scoring algorithm (see Amisano and Giannini (1992)).
Table 2.7: Estimated identified long-term impact matrix for the lead market.
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Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
Dependent variable: World GDP (percentage share)
World GDP lag1 0.263 2.840 0.005
World GDP lag2 0.159 1.612 0.109
World GDP lag3 -0.020 -0.249 0.803
Production lag1 0.002 0.128 0.898
Production lag2 -0.008 -0.523 0.602
Production lag3 -0.026 -1.817 0.071
Price lag1 0.428 0.424 0.672
Price lag2 0.533 0.352 0.726
Price lag3 -0.705 -0.736 0.463
Constant -1.056 -0.442 0.659
Trend 0.011 2.868 0.005
Dependent variable: Tin production (percentage share)
World GDP lag1 1.664 3.278 0.001
World GDP lag2 0.418 0.773 0.441
World GDP lag3 -1.098 -2.527 0.013
Production lag1 -0.164 -1.961 0.052
Production lag2 -0.141 -1.766 0.080
Production lag3 -0.124 -1.583 0.116
Price lag1 -5.369 -0.971 0.333
Price lag2 15.807 1.906 0.059
Price lag3 -12.616 -2.406 0.017
Constant 20.780 1.588 0.115
Trend -0.046 -2.115 0.036
Dependent variable: Price of tin (logs)
World GDP lag1 0.007 0.866 0.388
World GDP lag2 -0.017 -1.930 0.056
World GDP lag3 0.001 0.140 0.889
Production lag1 -0.001 -0.727 0.468
Production lag2 -0.001 -0.733 0.465
Production lag3 -0.001 -0.586 0.559
Price lag1 1.262 14.265 0.000
Price lag2 -0.421 -3.174 0.002
Price lag3 0.098 1.166 0.246
Constant 0.466 2.225 0.028
Trend 0.000 0.316 0.753
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients for the reduced form Model (2.1) with a lag length
of 3 (chosen according to the Akaike Information Criterion). Sample range: 1844-2010, t=167. The
coefficients for the World War periods are available from the author upon request.
Table 2.8: Estimated coefficients for the tin market.
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World GDP Production Price
World GDP 1.507 0.532 -0.390
(5.824) (1.469) (-0.911)
Production 0.376 8.364 3.322
(0.317) (6.501) (1.294)
Price 0.097 -0.050 0.094
(2.219) (-1.444) (3.575)
Notes: World GDP and production reflect the percentages change of world GDP and of the annual tin
production. Price is the average annual real price of tin in logs. Estimates for the structural version
of Model (2.1). Bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. Maximum likelihood estimation,
scoring algorithm (see Amisano and Giannini (1992)).
Table 2.9: Estimated contemporaneous impact matrix for the tin market.
World GDP Production Price
World GDP 2.981 0 0
(3.975) — —
Production 0.575 7.589 0
(0.258) (4.231) —
Price 1.141 -1.139 1.525
(1.137) (-1.494) (2.727)
Notes: World GDP and production reflect the percentage changes of world GDP and of the annual
tin production. Price is the average annual real price of tin. Estimates for the structural version of
Model (2.1). Bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. Maximum likelihood estimation, scoring
algorithm (see Amisano and Giannini (1992)).
Table 2.10: Estimated identified long-term impact matrix for the tin market.
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Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
Dependent variable: World GDP (percentage share)
World GDP lag1 0.333 3.432 0.001
World GDP lag2 0.151 1.497 0.137
World GDP lag3 -0.017 -0.209 0.835
Production lag1 -0.017 -1.029 0.305
Production lag2 0.024 1.420 0.158
Production lag3 -0.028 -1.776 0.078
Price lag1 0.814 0.964 0.337
Price lag2 -1.911 -1.654 0.100
Price lag3 1.247 1.511 0.133
Constant -0.115 -0.039 0.969
Trend 0.010 2.067 0.041
Dependent variable: Zinc production (percentage share)
World GDP lag1 1.285 2.629 0.010
World GDP lag2 -0.077 -0.151 0.880
World GDP lag3 -1.052 -2.532 0.012
Production lag1 -0.085 -0.100 0.319
Production lag2 -0.104 -1.245 0.215
Production lag3 -0.113 -1.455 0.148
Price lag1 -2.860 -0.673 0.502
Price lag2 -2.627 -0.451 0.652
Price lag3 4.647 1.118 0.266
Constant 13.170 0.876 0.383
Trend -0.036 -1.412 0.160
Dependent variable: Price of zinc (logs)
World GDP lag1 0.025 2.415 0.017
World GDP lag2 -0.001 -0.098 0.922
World GDP lag3 -0.008 -0.878 0.382
Production lag1 -0.005 -2.555 0.012
Production lag2 0.001 0.472 0.637
Production lag3 -0.001 -0.596 0.552
Price lag1 1.064 11.846 0.000
Price lag2 -0.563 -4.581 0.000
Price lag3 0.337 3.834 0.000
Constant 0.890 2.799 0.006
Trend -0.001 -1.777 0.078
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients for the reduced form Model (2.1) with a lag length
of 3 (chosen according to the Akaike Information Criterion). Sample range: 1844-2010, t=167. The
coefficients for the World War periods are available from the author upon request
Table 2.11: Estimated coefficients for the zinc market.
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World GDP Production Price
World GDP 1.622 0.163 -0.142
(7.054) (0.860) (-0.390)
Production 3.447 7.449 0.800
(3.212) (4.847) (0.483)
Price 0.080 -0.014 0.154
(1.820) (-0.394) (5.597)
Notes: World GDP and production reflect the percentage changes of world GDP and of the annual
zinc production. Price is the average annual real price of zinc in logs. Estimates for the struc-
tural version of Model (2.1). Bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. Maximum likelihood
estimation, scoring algorithm (see Amisano and Giannini (1992)).
Table 2.12: Estimated contemporaneous impact matrix for the zinc market.
World GDP Production Price
World GDP 3.149 0 0
(3.976) — —
Production 2.555 5.888 0
(1.801) (5.040) —
Price 0.731 -0.256 0.952
(1.749) (-1.071) (3.056)
Notes: World GDP and production reflect the percentage changes of world GDP and of the annual
zinc production. Price is the average annual real price of zinc. Estimates for the structural version
of Model (2.1). Bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. Maximum likelihood estimation,
scoring Aagorithm (see Amisano and Giannini (1992)).
Table 2.13: Estimated identified long-term impact matrix for the zinc market.
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A2.4 The case of crude oil: Figures and regression results
Figure 2.17: Historical evolution of world GDP, world crude oil production, and the
real price of oil from 1862 to 2010.
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Notes: Structural residuals implied by Model (2.1).
Figure 2.18: Historical evolution of the structural shocks for crude oil.
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Notes: Point estimates with one- and two-standard error band based on Model (2.1). I use accumu-
lated impulse response functions for the shocks on world mineral commodity production and world
GDP to trace out the effects on the level of these variables.
Figure 2.19: Impulses to one-standard-deviation structural shocks for crude oil.
Figure 2.20: Historical decomposition of the real price of crude oil using the original
monthly dataset from Kilian (2009).
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Notes: The data has been annualized to illustrate that his results are not due to frequency and that
his identification strategy produces the same results for annual data.
Figure 2.21: Historical decomposition of the real price of crude oil using an annualised
version of the dataset of Kilian (2009).
Figure 2.22: Historical decomposition of the real price of crude oil using my dataset
and the first identification scheme for the period from 1973 to 2007.
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Figure 2.23: Historical decomposition of the real price of crude oil using my dataset
and the identification scheme of Kilian (2009) for the period from 1973 to 2007.
Notes: Estimates derived from model (2.1).
Figure 2.24: Historical decomposition of the real price of crude oil.
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Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
Dependent Variable: World GDP (percentage share)
Variable Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
World GDP lag1 0.317986 3.458524 0.000751
World GDP lag2 0.071221 0.787402 0.432586
Production lag1 -0.007504 -0.497782 0.619541
Production lag2 0.016091 1.200206 0.232404
Price lag1 -1.385274 -2.381678 0.018793
Price lag2 0.820845 1.367192 0.174100
Constant 2.055494 2.562365 0.011623
Trend 0.014000 3.047203 0.002837
Dependent Variable: Crude Oil Production (percentage share)
World GDP lag1 0.209041 0.365172 0.715620
World GDP lag2 0.431103 0.765509 0.445459
Production lag1 -0.050558 -0.538683 0.591095
Production lag2 -0.311928 -3.736971 0.000286
Price lag1 0.218645 0.060377 0.951955
Price lag2 0.331791 0.088760 0.929420
Constant 17.250599 3.453922 0.000762
Trend -0.144032 -5.035084 0.000002
Dependent Variable: Price of Crude Oil (logs)
World GDP lag1 0.010816 0.743631 0.458541
World GDP lag2 -0.016559 -1.157210 0.249466
Production lag1 -0.005225 -2.190927 0.030373
Production lag2 0.002072 0.976797 0.330618
Price lag1 0.992449 10.785610 0.000000
Price lag2 -0.101103 -1.064446 0.289246
Constant 0.267617 2.108760 0.037027
Trend 0.000508 0.698426 0.486251
Notes: World GDP and production reflect the percentage change of world GDP and of the annual
crude oil production. Price is the average annual real price of crude oil in logs (CPI deflated).
The table presents estimated coefficients for the reduced form Model (2.1) with a lag length of 2
(according to the Akaike Information Criterion). Sample range: 1864-2010, t=147. The coefficients
for the annual dummies during the periods 1914-1921 and 1939-1948 are available from the author
upon request.
Table 2.14: Estimated coefficients for the crude oil market.
119
World GDP Production Price
World GDP 1.2153 -0.0732 1.0432
(4.4925) (-0.2981) (2.4170)
Production 4.9795 8.5917 -1.0173
(3.3926) (5.5415) (-0.4712)
Price -0.1541 0.0162 0.2008
(-2.1241) (0.3243) (4.8525)
Notes: World GDP and production reflect the percentage change of world GDP and of the annual
crude oil production. Price is the average annual real price of crude oil. Estimates for the struc-
tural version of Model (2.1). Bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. Maximum likelihood
estimation, scoring algorithm (see Amisano and Giannini (1992)).
Table 2.15: Estimated contemporaneous impact matrix for the crude oil market.
World GDP Production Price
World GDP 3.6707 0 0
(3.4743) — —
Production 4.6732 6.2922 0
(1.7918) (6.4412) —
Price -1.7479 -0.0339 1.8482
(-1.4078) (-0.0794) (2.9159)
Notes: World GDP and production reflect the percentage change of world GDP and of the annual
crude oil production. Price is the average annual real price of crude oil. Estimates for the struc-
tural version of Model (2.1). Bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. Maximum likelihood
estimation, scoring algorithm (see Amisano and Giannini (1992)).
Table 2.16: Estimated identified long-term impact matrix for the crude oil market.
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A2.5 Sensitivity analysis
Comm. Model Time Market Deflator Lag Forecast error variance decomp. (%)
Place length horizon: 1 horizon: 5 horizon: 10
P Y Q P Y Q P Y Q P
Copper LR 1841-2010 London CPI 4(AKI) 35 28 37 60 23 18 65 20 15
Lead LR 1841-2010 London CPI 2(AKI) 13 0 87 31 2 68 32 2 66
Tin LR 1841-2010 London CPI 3(AKI) 46 12 42 38 21 40 33 23 43
Zinc LR 1841-2010 London CPI 3(AKI) 21 1 79 30 4 66 32 4 64
Cr. Oil LR 1862-2010 Internat. CPI 2(AKI) 37 0 63 41 1 59 43 0 56
Notes: Y = World GDP, Q = Production, P = Price, LR = Long-run restrictions, CPI = Consumer Price Index, AKI = Akaike Information Criterion, Internat.
= International.
Table 2.17: Forecast error variance decomposition for the baseline specification.
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Comm. Model Time Market Deflator Lag Forecast error variance decomp. (%)
Place length horizon: 1 horizon: 5 horizon: 10
P Y Q P Y Q P Y Q P
Copper SR 1841-2010 London CPI 4(AKI) 20 4 76 46 2 52 51 2 47
Lead SR 1841-2010 London CPI 2(AKI) 15 3 82 26 11 63 26 13 61
Tin SR 1841-2010 London CPI 3(AKI) 14 0 85 11 3 86 8 4 88
Zinc SR 1841-2010 London CPI 3(AKI) 9 4 86 21 2 77 22 2 76
Cr. Oil SR 1862-2010 Internat. CPI 2(AKI) 2 10 89 2 15 83 1 15 83
Notes: Y = World GDP, Q = Production, P = Price, SR = Short-run restrictions, CPI = Consumer Price Index, AKI = Akaike Information Criterion, Internat.
= International.
Table 2.18: Forecast error variance decomposition for the baseline specification using the alternative identification scheme.
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Comm. Model Time Market Deflator Lag Forecast error variance decomp. (%)
Place length horizon: 1 horizon: 5 horizon: 10
P Y Q P Y Q P Y Q P
Copper LR 1841-2010 London PPI 4(AKI) 23 17 60 46 18 36 54 16 30
Lead LR 1841-2010 London PPI 2(AKI) 13 3 84 13 7 80 12 8 81
Tin LR 1841-2010 London PPI 3 33 16 51 24 28 48 20 30 50
Zinc LR 1841-2010 London PPI 3(AKI) 18 4 77 17 4 79 18 4 77
Cr. Oil LR 1862-2010 Internat. PPI 2(AKI) 51 0 49 54 0 46 56 0 44
Notes: Y = World GDP, Q = Production, P = Price, LR = Long-run restrictions, PPI = Producer Price Index, AKI = Akaike Information Criterion, Internat.
= International.
Table 2.19: Forecast error variance decomposition for the baseline specification using the producer price index instead of the consumer
price index to disinflate prices.
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Comm. Model Time Market Deflator Lag Forecast error variance decomp. (%)
Place length horizon: 1 horizon: 5 horizon: 10
P Y Q P Y Q P Y Q P
Copper LR 1900-2010 London CPI 4 48 24 27 70 17 13 76 14 10
Lead LR 1900-2010 London CPI 2 23 0 77 45 3 51 45 4 50
Tin LR 1900-2010 London CPI 3 49 29 22 36 41 22 30 43 27
Zinc LR 1900-2010 London CPI 3 39 9 52 49 12 39 50 12 38
Cr. Oil LR 1900-2010 Int. CPI 2 49 33 18 43 34 23 43 34 23
Copper LR 1925-2010 London CPI 4 38 5 57 71 5 24 77 4 19
Lead LR 1925-2010 London CPI 2 29 7 64 58 8 34 57 9 34
Tin LR 1925-2010 London CPI 3 67 22 11 52 33 15 33 34 22
Zinc LR 1925-2010 London CPI 3 35 4 61 53 12 36 57 11 32
Cr. Oil LR 1925-2010 Internat. CPI 2 45 40 14 38 42 20 40 20 20
Notes: Y = World GDP, Q = Production, P = Price, LR = Long-run restrictions, CPI = Consumer Price Index, Internat. = International.
Table 2.20: Forecast error variance decomposition for the baseline specification over the periods from 1900 to 2010 and from 1925 to
2010.
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Comm. Model Time Market Deflator Lag Forecast error variance decomp. (%)
Place length horizon: 1 horizon: 5 horizon: 10
P Y Q P Y Q P Y Q P
Copper LR 1850-2010 New York CPI 4(AKI) 3 38 59 10 50 40 12 47 38
Lead LR 1841-2010 New York CPI 2 5 0 95 21 1 78 23 1 75
Tin LR 1841-2010 New York CPI 3 15 24 61 20 35 44 18 37 44
Zinc LR 1872-2010 New York CPI 3 1 5 94 4 13 83 6 13 81
Cr. Oil LR 1862-2010 Internat. CPI 2(AKI) 51 0 49 54 0 46 56 0 44
Notes: Y = World GDP, Q = Production, P = Price, LR = Long-run restrictions, CPI = Consumer Price Index, AKI = Akaike Information Criterion, Internat.
= International.
Table 2.21: Forecast error variance decomposition for the baseline specification using New York instead of London prices.
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Chapter 3
Industrialization and the demand
for mineral commodities
3.1 Introduction
For business leaders and politicians facing rapid industrialization in China and else-
where, understanding the nexus of industrialization - the process of moving produc-
tion from primary to manufacturing sector (Black, Hashimzade, and Myles, 2009) -
and the derived demand for mineral commodities is imperative. How does demand
respond to changes in manufacturing output? What is the response to a change
in price? What is the role of structural and technological change in shaping these
relationships?
These questions have important implications both from a theoretical and a pol-
icy perspective. Demand shocks are a key driver of mineral commodity prices (see
Kilian (2009) and Chapter 2), which have pronounced macroeconomic implications
for both developing and developed countries (see Bernanke, 2006; IMF, 2012b). The
response of demand to a change in manufacturing output determines the contribution
of demand shocks to the fluctuations of prices (Slade, 1991). The price inelasticity
of demand is a key parameter in models of commodity price speculation, as a low
price elasticity enables speculation on these markets (see Hamilton, 2009a; Kilian and
Murphy, 2012). Finally, Acemoglu et al. (2012) claim in their theoretical analyses of
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resource wars that the price elasticity of demand is critical in shaping war incentives.
There is a rich body of empirical studies on the long-run and short-run elasticities
of demand of mineral commodities with respect to economic activity and price (see
Hamilton, 2009b; Pei and Tilton, 1999; Kilian and Murphy, 2012, for surveys of
the current literature). This literature mainly focusses on energy and only provides
empirical evidence for relatively short periods. For the most part, the literature does
not capture the effects of long-term structural changes.
Examining the long-run manufacturing output elasticity of demand reveals how
the intensity of use of a mineral commodity develops over the course of industrial-
ization. The intensity of use is defined as the use of a certain material per unit of
manufacturing output (Malenbaum, 1978; Tilton, 1990). If the estimated long-run
manufacturing output elasticity of demand is higher than one, the use of the mineral
commodity increases faster than manufacturing output. An estimated long-run man-
ufacturing output elasticity of demand equal to one implies no change in the intensity
of use over time. An estimate below one means a decreasing intensity of use over
time.
There are four underlying factors that drive the derived demand of the manu-
facturing sector. First, technological change causes changes in the production cost
of mineral commodities. This might drive its relative price up or down and hence
promote substitution. For example, the invention of the electrolytic method low-
ered the price of aluminum and it substituted tinplate in the production of beverage
cans (Chandler, 1990). Second, technological change leads to a more efficient use
of mineral commodities, e.g., the invention of new aluminum alloys has made alu-
minum beverage cans far thinner than they used to be (Pei and Tilton, 1999). These
two types of technological change alter “the material composition of goods”(Pei and
Tilton, 1999, p. 90).
The next two factors affect the product composition of manufacturing output
(Pei and Tilton, 1999, p. 90). Technological change might lead to the invention of
new products (Pei and Tilton, 1999), e.g., the invention of airplanes has increased
the demand for aluminum. Finally, consumer preferences change over the course of
economic development altering the mix of products the manufacturing sector pro-
duces. For example, at a low per capita manufacturing output the construction of
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infrastructure will lead to a product composition that is relatively steel intensive. At
a higher per capita manufacturing output, consumers rather demand high tech and
consumption goods that are relatively aluminum intensive.
This paper is the first to provide empirical evidence on the long-run elasticities
of demand with respect to manufacturing output and prices for several mineral com-
modities based on a long panel. To cover the main periods of industrialization, I
employ a newly constructed data set for twelve major economies, which for some
parts spans back to 1840. I focus on the demand for aluminum, copper, lead, tin,
and zinc, because they have been used broadly throughout history and have been
traded on integrated world markets for much of that time making data available.1
In contrast to the aforementioned literature, I use manufacturing output and not
GDP as the explanatory variable. This has two advantages. First, the demand for
mineral commodities is a derived demand. It is only used as an input for the manu-
facturing sector. Using manufacturing output allows me to control for technological
change and changing consumer preferences that cause sectorial shifts in the economy,
e.g., the shift to the service sector. Second, if a country produces the mineral com-
modity domestically, regressing GDP on the quantity used in the economy leads to
the problem of reverse causality as mining is also included in GDP.
My estimation strategy relies on an extension of the partial adjustment model, as
it is the standard approach in empirical energy demand analysis. This is done in order
to ensure the comparability of results with previous studies. I regress derived demand
on manufacturing output, the relative price of the respective mineral commodity, and
lagged values of demand. I follow Pesaran, Smith, and Akiyama (1998) and Pesaran,
Shin, and Smith (1999) in accounting for differences in the economic structures across
these countries by relaxing the assumption of equal short-run coefficients.
I attempt to control for the effects of the three types of technological change and
the consumer preferences in a stepwise manner. The relative price of the respective
mineral commodity basically accomodates technological change that drives substitu-
tion. I introduce a common linear time trend and finally time fixed effects following
Pesaran, Smith, and Akiyama (1998) to account for technological changes that lead
to new products and resource efficiency. Overall, it allows me to take advantage of the
1Aluminum is only widely used since the end of the 19th century.
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panel structure of the data, as it makes it possible to control for ommitted common
technological trends and spillover effects (Pesaran, Smith, and Akiyama, 1998). This
leaves those effects that are time independent and country specific and hence reflect
changes in consumer preferences to be captured by per capita manufacturing output.
I regard the comparison between the three specifications also as a misspecification
test for the importance of omitted common trends and shocks in technological change
(Pesaran, Smith, and Akiyama, 1998).
Several findings emerge. First, the estimated long-run manufacturing output elas-
ticities of demand vary significantly between the five examined mineral commodities.
A one percent increase in manufacturing output leads to an approximately 1.5 percent
increase in the demand for aluminum. This means that its demand increases more
than proportional to manufacturing output over time. The estimated manufacturing
output elasticity of copper demand is close to one, which implies a stable intensity of
use over time. The estimates are far below one for lead, tin, and zinc demand. This
causes the intensity of use of these mineral commodities to decline over time.
The estimated long-run price elasticities of demand are rather low for the ex-
amined mineral commodities. Again, there are pronounced differences across the
examined mineral commodities. While it is about -0.7 and -0.8 in the case of alu-
minum demand, it is about -0.4 for copper demand, and below or equal to about
-0.2 for lead, tin, and zinc demand. This shows that with the exception of aluminum
and copper, the aforementioned mineral commodities are rather essential to man-
ufacturing output as the processing industry change its use slowly in response to
price.
My estimation results show that the relationship between per capita manufac-
turing output, relative prices, and the per capita demand for mineral commodities is
rather driven by technological change and consumer preferences that are country spe-
cific. Effects that are common to all countries over time play only a role in decreasing
aluminum and lead demand over time. The model for tin seems to be misspecified.
I find strong evidence for the existence of long-run relationships in all regressions.
The estimated speed of demand adjustment is rather slow for all commodities and
it takes more than ten years in the cases of lead, tin, and zinc to revert back to
equilibrium. This is reasonable, given that adjustments in manufacturing capital are
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rather slow and that inventories play an important role in these markets. Overall,
my empirical results are plausible given narrative evidence on the use of the mineral
commodities over time.
The estimated long-run manufacturing output elasticities of the demand for all
examined mineral commodities except tin are higher or equal to the income elasticity
of oil demand (which is 0.55 according to Gately and Huntington (2002) for twenty-
five OECD countries over 1971 to 1997). The ones for copper and aluminum are
also higher than estimates of the income elasticity of aggregate energy demand (0.8
according to Adeyemi and Hunt (2007) for fifteen OECD countries from 1962 to
2003).
The estimated manufacturing output elasticities of demand suggest that the in-
dustrialization in China will cause aluminum to increase relative to manufacturing
output while copper will grow in proportion to manufacturing output. The demand
for lead, tin, and zinc decreases relative to manufacturing output in the long-term.
My results are important for developing long-term production strategies and allowing
for smooth markets, as mining firms face high upfront costs and long lead times to
open up new mines. Moreover, countries dependent on the exports of their mineral
commodities may better judge the long-term perspective of the respective markets
and adjust their macroeconomic and fiscal policies accordingly. Finally, my results
suggest that demand is a larger contributor to the volatility of aluminum and copper
prices than to that of lead, tin, zinc, and energy since manufacturing output fluctu-
ations lead to larger fluctuations in the cases of aluminum and copper demand (see
Slade, 1991).
The estimates of the price elasticity are in contrast to the literature on oil and
energy, where long-run price elasticity is estimated to be significant (-1.25 for energy
demand according to Heal and Chichilnisky (1991) and -0.64 for oil demand in OECD
countries according to Gately and Huntington (2002)). These results are important,
because according to models of commodity price speculation a low price elasticity of
demand makes these markets prone to speculation (see Hamilton, 2009a; Kilian and
Murphy, 2012). Moreover, the low price elasticity is a key parameter in shaping the
incentives of war over resources as Acemoglu et al. (2012) claims.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the data set. Section
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3.3 introduces the econometric model. Section 3.4 presents the estimation results.
Section 3.5 describes robustness checks while Section 3.6 draws conclusions.
3.2 A new data set
Numerous authors have estimated the income and price elasticities of demand for
crude oil, gasoline, aggregate energy, and other mineral commodities using data sets
for the time after the Second World War (see Pesaran, Smith, and Akiyama, 1998;
Hamilton, 2009b; Pei and Tilton, 1999, for surveys of the current literature). These
studies do not include major periods of industrialization for currently industrial-
ized countries, making comparison and inference with respect to emerging economies
rather difficult. In this study, I extend the data set to a far longer time horizon.2 The
examined mineral commodities are aluminum, copper, lead, tin, and zinc. My data
set consists of a sample of twelve industrialized countries, namely Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South-Korea, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the
United Kingdom (U.K.), and the United States (U.S.), from 1840 to 2010. I assem-
ble country-by-country annual data regarding demand, mineral commodity prices,
and value added by manufacturing.
The demand for a mineral commodity, my dependent variable, is derived from
the output of the manufacturing sector. The demand data captures those quantities
of mineral commodities which are finished but unwrought (e.g., metal in primary
shapes, such as cathodes and bars), and which manufacturers use at the first stage
of production (e.g., brass mills, foundries). This is also the stage at which mineral
commodities are usually traded, and it is the usual data employed for measuring the
use of mineral commodities (Tilton, 1990; U.S. Geological Survey, 2011a).
To proxy demand, I collect data on the use of the respective mineral commodities.
From the end of the First World War to today, I employ data from the BGR, 2012b.
It is mainly based on direct surveys of the respective manufacturing industries. From
1840 to 1918, I compute the apparent usage of the respective mineral commodities
from production, as well as from import and export data from several sources (see
Table 3.7). The data is plotted in Figures 3.2 through 3.6 in the Appendix.
2Please see also the chapter on data sources and description.
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Three aspects of the construction of the demand data might cause potential mea-
surement errors. As demand is also regressed on lagged values of itself, it also consti-
tutes an independent variable in the regressions. First, the BGR, 2012b has rounded
the data. This might lead to slightly larger standard deviations. Second, stocks
are not included in the computation of usage before World War I, due to a lack
of data. Third, there is no clear unanimous definition or accounting for the use of
mineral commodities across the differing countries and periods. These latter two
measurement errors are rather stochastic in their nature and the coefficients might
be underestimated to a certain extent.
I employ per capita value added in the manufacturing sector as explanatory vari-
able. In contrast to energy, mineral commodities are only used as an input for the
processing of partially finished and finished goods in the manufacturing sector, which
are then used in construction or mining equipment. Mineral commodities are not
directly purchased by consumers. Manufacturing data provides hence the best proxy
for the process of industrialization.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
P.c. alu. demanda .0068 .0078 .0000 .0490 1094
P.c. copper demanda .0056 .0063 .0000 .0402 1401
P.c. lead demanda .0032 .0018 .0001 .0079 1189
P.c. tin demanda .0002 .0001 .0000 .0008 1292
P.c. use of zinka .0038 .0045 .0000 .0384 1391
P.c. manuf. prod.b 1807 1273 83 6565 1414
Real price of alu.c 1046 5333 .77 140411 1288
Real price of copperc 602 1330 0.92 8358 1381
Real price of leadc 180 392 .28 2633 1376
Real price of tinc 1856 4155 2.53 29042 1368
Real price of zincc 238 518 .47 3798 1364
Notes: P.c. is the abbreviation for per capita, amt/person, bGK-$, clocal currency. Please find
summary statistics including between and within statistics in the Appendix.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics.
I collect national account data from several national and international sources. To
obtain a comparable measure of the value added by the manufacturing sector across
countries, I compute the share of manufacturing in GDP from the data. I then multi-
ply these percentage shares with GDP data in constant international Geary-Khamis
Dollar from the seminal Maddison (2010) data set. The international Geary-Khamis
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Dollar is a hypothetical unit of currency that allows for international comparison of
national accounts across countries and time periods. It relies on purchasing power
parity converters and is deflated with the base year 1990.
All historical national account data is based on later reconstructions and mea-
surement errors are a potential problem. To the extent that measurement errors are
stochastic, estimates will be biased towards zero and underestimate the true value.
There might also be systematic measurement errors, whose biases are hard to judge,
as I have not created the individual country data sets by myself. However, I believe
it is still constructive to investigate this data over the long-term horizon, given that
it is the best available data, but it is necessary to interpret results carefully.
I use population data from Maddison (2010) to compute the per capita value
added by manufacturing and per capita use of the respective mineral commodities.
I assemble historical price data for the U.S., U.K., and Germany from several
sources. Unfortunately, there are no price data series available for the other countries.
As the London Metal Exchange is the most important metal exchange in the world
(Slade, 1991) and sets the world market price, I derive proxies for the national prices
of the other countries by using historical exchange rates from standard sources such
as Bordo (2001), Officer (2006, 2011), and Denzel (2010). This approach neglects
some price differentials due to transport costs. These appear at the price level and
decrease gradually over the time period. Finally, to compute real prices for each
country, I have collected producer price indices from Mitchell (2003a,b, 1998), the
IMF, and national sources.
3.3 Estimating manufacturing output and price elas-
ticity of demand
My estimation strategy relies on an extension of the partial adjustment model, which
is the standard approach in empirical energy demand analysis (Adeyemi and Hunt,
2007). Pesaran, Smith, and Akiyama (1998) derive a theory-consistent dynamic
industrial energy demand function with the share of energy costs in all factor inputs
as the dependent variable by solving a multivariate cost of adjustment optimization
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Figure 3.1: Scatter plot of per capita value added by manufacturing and per capita
copper demand.
problem. However, they find that the resultant econometric model fails functional
form tests. They weight theoretical consistency and statistical adequacy and decide
to pursue estimations with the standard log linear partial adjustment model. I follow
the approach by Pesaran, Smith, and Akiyama (1998) and Pesaran, Shin, and Smith
(1999) in the rest of the my study.
I set up an autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL)(p, q, r) of a log linear
demand function, where p, q, and r notify the number of lags included of the three
explanatory variables:
ci,t =
p∑
j=1
λi,jci,t−j +
q∑
l=0
δi,lyi,t−l +
r∑
m=0
γi,mpi,t−m + µi + it . (3.1)
I explain the demand for mineral commodities ci,t (measured in metric tons per
capita) of country i at time t by real per capita value added in the manufacturing
sector yi,t, by the real price of the respective mineral commodity pi,t, and by its own
lagged values. To capture proportional effects, I employ natural logs to all variables.
λi,j, δi,l, and γi,m are the respective coefficients. µi represents country fixed effects,
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which capture omitted country-specific variables that are time independent. For
example, a strong domestic copper mining industry might cause a generally higher
level of copper demand in a country as downstream manufacturing specializes in
processing copper.
Reparametrizing Equation 3.1, I obtain the error correction form
∆ci,t = Φi(ci,t−1 − θ0,i − θ1,iyi,t − θ2,ipi,t)
+
p−1∑
j=1
λ∗i,j∆ci,t−j +
q−1∑
l=0
δ∗i,l∆yi,t−l +
r−1∑
m=0
γ∗i,m∆pi,t−m + it ,
(3.2)
where the vector θi captures the long-run relationship between the variables. θ1,i is
the long-run elasticity of demand with respect to value added by the manufacturing
sector and θ2,i represents the long-run elasticity of demand with respect to price. Φi
denotes the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.
I use the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator proposed by Pesaran, Smith, and
Akiyama (1998) and Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999) to accommodate the heteroge-
neous dynamic of the demand functions across countries. Different economic struc-
tures across countries may affect the strength and speed at which manufacturing
output and price affect the demand for mineral commodities in the short-run. To ac-
count for this heterogeneity, the PMG estimator allows the short-run effects to vary
across countries. It only imposes homogeneity of the coefficients for the long-run
effects.
My econometric model is potentially subject to the well-known identification prob-
lem in estimating energy demand elasticity. There is the problem of reverse causality
running from the demand variable to the price variable. The demand curve will only
be identified, if national prices track closely international prices and/or supply is
highly elastic (Pesaran, Smith, and Akiyama, 1998). In my study, domestic prices
follow - partly by construction - international prices as these markets have been fairly
well integrated at the global level (see Chapter 2.3). At the same time, the respective
shares of the U.S. and the U.K. in world consumption of the mineral commodities in
this study were more than forty percent respectively during different sub-periods of
my sample (Stu¨rmer and von Hagen, 2012b). It is therefore likely that the change in
demand in one of these two countries affected world prices. However, it is possible
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that it impacted prices only in the short-run as the supply of mineral commodities
is highly elastic in the long-run according to Radetzki (2008) and others (see also
the theoretical argument in Chapter 1). Chapter 2 also provides empirical evidence
on this question, as it examines the effect of unexpected changes in world output on
price. I find that such a shock affects the price of the different mineral commodities
significantly between five and ten years of time. This suggest that supply is inelastic
in the short- and medium-run. As I only examine long-run elasticities, I believe it
is plausible to make the identifying assumption for the rest of the paper that the
long-run supply is elastic and that a single country did not cause long-term price
changes. However, I discuss alternative estimation strategies that do not depend on
this assumption in the conclusion.
By choosing manufacturing output as an explanatory variable, I accomodate an
identification problem often overlooked in studies of energy demand. Most of these
studies use GDP or industrial output as explanatory variables. This can potentially
cause reverse causality from demand to GPD or industrial output, if the domestic
extractive sector produces the mineral commodity. The reason is that the extractive
sector is part of GDP and industrial production, while it is not included in manufac-
turing output. Choosing manufacturing output reduces this potential identification
problem.
Manufacturing output as an explanatory variable also allows controlling for the
effects of structural change in the composition of total GDP on the demand for mineral
commodities, e.g., the shift to the service sector, as described by Malenbaum (1978),
Tilton (1990), Stu¨rmer and von Hagen (2012b), and others. Furthermore, I control
for the effect of population growth by using per capita manufacturing output as well
as per capita demand of each mineral commodity. Overall, the scatter plots in Figure
3.1 for copper and in Figures 3.13 to 3.16 in the Appendix illustrate that the use of
manufacturing data and controlling for population growth leads to an approximately
linear log-log relationship, particularly in the cases of aluminum, copper, and zinc.
In my benchmark specification, the pooling of long-run coefficients shows that
there is commonality across countries in the way manufacturing output and prices
affect the demand for mineral commodities. In my benchmark specification the rel-
ative price of the respective mineral commodity partly controls to some extent for
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technological change that drives substitution over time. The other factors are implic-
itly included in the manufacturing output elasticity.
Following Pesaran, Smith, and Akiyama (1998), I add a common linear time trend
and time fixed effects to my benchmark specification in a stepwise manner. I inves-
tigate whether there is a common linear trend or common shocks across countries,
which reflect technological change in resource savings technology and in new prod-
ucts as well as changes in consumer preferences. This allows me to take advantage of
the panel structure of the data, as it makes it possible to control for ommitted com-
mon technological trends and spillover effects (Pesaran, Smith, and Akiyama, 1998).
However, time fixed effects also include other effects than technological change, e.g.,
the effect of the two World Wars on the demand for mineral commodities. I see the
comparison between the three specifications also as a misspecification test, for the
importance of ommitted common trends and shocks in technological change (Pesaran,
Smith, and Akiyama, 1998).
I model the time fixed effects by expressing all variables as deviations from their
respective cross-sectional means in each period in line with Pesaran, Shin, and Smith
(1999). Such a procedure reduces the common time specific effects and also makes
PMG estimates consistent. PMG estimation assumes that regression residuals are
independent across countries. Non-zero error co-variances may arise due to the omis-
sion of these common effects (Pesaran, Shin, and Smith, 1999).
The disadvantage of including time fixed effects is that they also control for
changes in the world market price, leaving only those price changes in the regres-
sion that are due to changes in inflation and exchange rates. If market participants
assume that these nominal shocks exhibit no long-term impact on prices, the es-
timated price elasticities will be small and/or statistically insignificant. Moreover,
besides technological change in resource efficiency and in the product composition of
manufacturing output, they capture also technological change leading to substitution.
The ARDL specification makes no unit root pretesting of the variables necessary.
Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran (1997) show that the method is valid whether
or not the variables follow a unit root process or not. This is based on the assumptions
that there is in fact a long-run relationship, that regressors are strictly exogenous,
and that there is no serial correlation in the residuals. The existence of a long-run
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relationship requires the adjustment coefficient to fulfil −2 < Φi < 0 (Loayza and
Rancie`re, 2006).
Determining the lag order by information criteria on a country-by-country basis,
reveals significant differences across countries. However, to make regression results for
the short-run and long-run parameters comparable, I impose a common lag structure
across countries. My benchmark model is an ARDL(4,4,2) model, which means that
I include four lags of mineral commodity demand and of manufacturing output and
two lags of mineral commodity prices respectively in Model 3.2. I choose to use a
comparatively long lag structure to allow for rich dynamics and to account for possible
serial correlation in the data.
I make use of unbalanced panel data for each of the five mineral commodities.
The time dimension is relatively large, while the cross-sectional dimension is rather
small with the number of countries N = 12, as Table 3.7 in the Appendix shows.
The incidental parameter problem (Nickell, 1981), which affects dynamic panel data
models with small T and large N , is therefore not an issue. The common long-run
coefficients of θi from the PMG estimator are consistent as long as T → ∞, even if
N is small (Pesaran, Shin, and Smith, 1999).
I check the robustness of my results with respect to a different choice of lag
lengths and the use of other estimators, which impose full heterogeneity and full
homogeneity across the coefficients. I present estimation results for ARDL(1,1,1)
and ARDL(3,3,3) of Model 3.2. Furthermore, I employ the mean group (MG) and
the standard dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimators as robustness checks. The PMG
estimator stands between these two estimators with respect to the homogeneity that it
imposes. On the one hand, the MG estimator proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995)
derives the full panel estimates of θ, Φ, δ, and γ by simply averaging the individual
country coefficients θi, Φi, δi, and γi. It imposes no homogeneity restrictions on
long-run or short-run restrictions. On the other hand, the DFE estimator restricts
the long-run and short-run coefficients as well as the adjustment coefficient making
them equal across the range of countries. I make use of a standard Hausman (1978)
test, as proposed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999), to examine whether or not
the long-run elasticity is in fact equal across the countries. If the null hypothesis of
equality is not rejected, the PMG estimator is superior to the MG estimator as it is
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both consistent and efficient in this case, while the MG estimator is only consistent.
3.4 Estimation results
I present estimates of the three specifications for each of the examined mineral com-
modities: the first specification is the benchmark model in Equation 3.2 that I esti-
mated with a pooled mean group estimator that imposes homogeneity on the long-run
coefficients. In the second specification, I add a linear time trend to accomodate for
common technological change. In the third specification, I make use of time fixed
effects to control for common shocks from technological change and other factors such
as the two World Wars.
I find pronounced differences in the estimated long-run manufacturing output
elasticities of demand across the five examined mineral commodities. Aluminum has
a high estimated long-run manufacturing output elasticity of demand, while lead has
the lowest. The estimated long-run price elasticities of demand are inelastic for all
examined mineral commodities. Changes in prices have either a small impact or no
impact on demand.
My results for the estimated long-run manufacturing output elasticity of demand
are relatively robust across the three specifications for aluminum, copper, lead, and
zinc. The estimation results for the price elasticites of demand are only robust to
the second specification. This is as expected as the time fixed effects in the third
specification take out the price effects due to changes in the world market price. The
common linear trend is statistically significant in the regressions for aluminum and
lead. The empirical results are plausible given narrative evidence on the application
of the different mineral commodities across time.
Finally, I find evidence for the existence of long-run relationships in all regressions.
The estimated speed of demand adjustment is rather slow for all commodities and
it takes more than 10 years to revert back to equilibrium. This is reasonable, given
that adjustments in manufacturing capital are rather slow and that inventories play
an important role in these markets.
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3.4.1 Aluminum
I find a relatively high estimate for the long-run manufacturing output elasticity
of aluminum demand. A one percent increase in manufacturing output leads to a
more than 1.5 percent increase in aluminum demand. Including a linear time trend,
increases the estimated elasticity to about 1.8. This means that the demand for
aluminum increases more than proportional to manufacturing output and hence the
material intensity of use in the manufacturing sector increases over the course of
industrialization. Aluminum is mainly used for the production of high technology
goods such as airplanes, electronics, or machinery, and for the packaging of consumer
goods (Stu¨rmer and von Hagen, 2012b; Krebs, 2006). It is plausible that changing
consumer preferences increase the demand for aluminum in manufacturing production
over the course of industrialization. The large estimates for the manufacturing output
elasticity of demand imply that aluminum demand fluctuates far more strongly than
manufacturing output. As a consequence, prices will be strongly driven by these large
demand shocks.
1 2 3
Time fixed effects No No Yes
Manufacturing (log) 1.551*** 1.759*** 1.518***
(0.092) (0.173) (0.073)
Aluminum price (log) -0.706*** -0.883*** -0.836***
(0.184) (0.221) (0.236)
Constant -0.056 1.411*** 0.054
(0.059) (0.421) (0.083)
Linear trend -0.012*
(0.007)
Adjustment coefficient -0.117*** -0.113*** -0.142***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.031)
Observations 973 973 973
Log likelihood 404.4 405.2 432.4
Notes: The table shows results from the pooled mean group (PMG) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(4,4,2) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.2: Estimates of the long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of
aluminum demand.
The estimated long-run price elasticity of aluminum demand is significant and
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ranges between -0.7 and about -0.8 across the three specifications. This is a low es-
timate of the long-run price elasticity in comparison to manufacturing goods. Com-
pared to the other examined mineral commodities, the estimated long-run price elas-
ticity of aluminum demand is by far the largest. This is in line with the fact that
aluminum has substituted for many different materials such as composites, glass,
paper, plastics, copper, and steel in a wide range of appliances in manufacturing
production over the course of history (Radetzki, 2008; Krebs, 2006). Aluminum is
in wide use since the end of the 19th century as production costs have decreased
dramatically due to the invention of the electrolysis by Charles Martin Hall in 1886
(Chandler, 1990).
My regression results provide evidence for a negative linear time trend at a statisti-
cal significance of ten percent. This might reflect that there is a common technological
trend across countries towards more resource efficiency in the use of aluminum over
time. It is reassuring that imposing common time fixed effects do not change the
results. I find evidence for the existence of long-term relationships as the coefficients
of adjustment are statistically significant and negative in all specifications. The esti-
mates suggest a speeds of convergence to equilibrium of about fourteen percent per
year for aluminum.
3.4.2 Copper
Copper is very versatil in its uses in human history (Krebs, 2006). The manufacturing
sector employs copper in the production of a broad variety of products in electronics,
construction, transportation, and machinery (Krebs, 2006; Stu¨rmer and von Hagen,
2012b).
The estimates for copper yield a point elasticity of demand to manufacturing
output of about one across the three specifications. The demand for copper increases
approximately in proportion to manufacturing output. This is plausible as copper
is used in many different applications (Krebs, 2006). In the past, it was important
in the production of hardware and cooking utensils in the form of alloys such as
brass and bronze. It has been and is still essential in construction, roofing, and
plumbing (Krebs, 2006). As an excellent conductor of electricity it has become more
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and more important in the use of technological goods and electronics (see Radetzki,
2009; Mardones, Silva, and Martinez, 1985). The estimated elasticity of demand
with respect to manufacturing output is quite large for copper, compared to lead,
tin, and zinc. This helps to explain why copper shows the strongest effect of “world
output-driven demand shock” on the price compared to lead, tin, and zinc as I find
in Chapter 2.
1 2 3
Time fixed effects No No Yes
Manufacturing (log) 0.914*** 1.104*** 1.128***
(0.061) (0.145) (0.067)
Copper price (log) -0.400*** -0.453*** -0.009
(0.093) (0.095) (0.049)
Constant -0.161*** 0.474*** 0.010
(0.052) (0.182) (0.030)
Linear trend -0.005
(0.004)
Adjustment coefficient -0.132*** -0.131*** -0.180***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.057
Observations 1,206 1,206 1,206
Log likelihood 502.3 502.8 434.2
Notes: The table shows results from the pooled mean group (PMG) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(4,4,2) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.3: Estimates of the long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of
copper demand.
The estimated long-run price elasticity of demand of copper is rather low with a
point estimate of about -0.4 in the the first and second specification. This shows that
copper is only moderately substitutable in its major applications. On the one hand,
aluminum and plastics have been substituted for it, especially in building materials.
On the other hand, its substitutabiliy is very low in applications as a conductor of
electricity (see Krebs, 2006).
Including time fixed effects leads to a statistically insignificant estimated long-
run price elasticity. As time fixed effects control for changes in the world prices, they
only leave those price changes in the regression that are due to changes in inflation
and exchange rates. If market participants assume that these nominal shocks exhibit
no long-term impact on prices, the estimated price elasticity will be small and/or
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statistically insignificant. Hence, this result is not a big surprise. At the same time,
it is reassuring that the estimate for the manufacturing output elasticity of demand
does not change strongly.
The estimated coefficient for the linear trend is negative and not statistically
significant different from zero. I find evidence for the existence of long-run relation-
ships as the coefficients of adjustment are statistically significant and negative in all
specifications. Overall, the estimated speed of demand adjustment is rather slow.
The estimates suggest speeds of convergence to reach equilibrium at about fourteen
percent per year for copper
3.4.3 Lead
The manufacturing sector employs lead for the production of a broad variety of
manufactures such as TV screens, pipes, and batteries. It is an important alloy,
especially in solder that is applied in electronics (Krebs, 2006). However, its use has
been phased-out in many appliances such as in gasoline, paint pigments, and pipes
due to health and environmental reasons (see Smith, 1999). At the same time, its
use has strongly shifted to automobile batteries.
The estimated long-run manufacturing output elasticity of lead demand is es-
timated to be far below one. It ranges from about 0.4 and 0.7 across the three
specifications. This shows that the demand for lead increases significantly less than
the manufacturing output and hence its intensity of use tends to decline over the
course of industrialization. This can be explained by changing preferences as con-
sumers might tend to mitigate the health and environmental effects as per capita
manufacturing output increases. However, comparing the results of the three spec-
ifications shows that the demand is also driven by shocks that are common to all
countries over time. The estimated coefficicent for the linear time trend is negative
and highly significant. This suggests that the decreasing use of lead due to negative
health and environmental impacts is also strongly driven by time related common
shocks as different governments started regulation at the same time in the 1960s and
1970s.
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1 2 3
Time fixed effects No No Yes
Manufacturing (log) 0.435*** 0.675*** 0.745***
(0.057) (0.110) (0.112)
Lead price (log) -0.220** -0.215*** -0.014
(0.093) (0.080) (0.204)
Constant 0.048** 0.393*** 0.028
(0.022) (0.095) (0.022)
Linear trend -0.005***
(0.002)
Adjustment coefficient -0.094*** -0.121*** -0.148***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.033)
Observations 1,059 1,059 1,059
Log likelihood 474.7 476.9 435.3
Notes: The table shows results from the pooled mean group (PMG) estimation of the preferred
ARDL(4,4,2) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.4: Estimates of the long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of
lead demand.
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My estimates for the price elasticity of lead demand are far lower than those for
copper and aluminum. They are about -0.2 for Specifications 1 and 2. This hints at
the low substitutability of lead. As in the case of copper, the estimate of the price
elasticity in the specification with time fixed effects is not statistically significant.
I find evidence for the existence of long-run relationships as the coefficients of
adjustment are statistically significant and negative in all specifications. Overall, the
estimated speed of demand adjustment is even lower than for copper and aluminum.
It takes up to 10 years before demand reaches equilibrium after a shock. This is
reasonable, given that adjustments in manufacturing capital are rather slow and that
inventories play an important role.
3.4.4 Tin
Tin is mainly used in the packaging industry as tinplate, which is thin steel coated
by tin. It is also employed as an aloy with lead as solder in electronics. Furthermore,
it is applied in different alloys, of which bronze is the most important (Krebs, 2006;
Stu¨rmer and von Hagen, 2012b).
The estimated manufacturing output elasticity and the estimated price elasticity
of tin demand varie strongly across the the three specifications. In Specifications 1
and 2 the output elasticity of demand is about 0.6 to 0.7. However, in the third
specification with time fixed effects, it is far lower, about 0.3. For the price elasticity,
the estimated elasticity is positive at about 0.1 in Specifications 1 and 2, while it is
negative and about 0.4 in Specification 3.
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1 2 3
Time fixed effects No No Yes
Manufacturing (log) 0.616*** 0.712*** 0.295**
(0.035) (0.080) (0.141)
Tin price (log) 0.169** 0.110 -0.384***
(0.085) (0.084) (0.046)
Constant -0.522** -0.149 0.006
(0.209) (0.118) (0.026)
Linear trend -0.004
(0.003)
Adjustment coefficient -0.132*** -0.131*** -0.180***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.057
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,142
Log likelihood 399.5 400.1 408.9
Notes: The table shows results from the pooled mean group (PMG) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(4,4,2) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.5: Estimates of the long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of
tin demand.
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These results might point to a misspecification of the model. As the scatter plot in
Figure 3.15 in the Appendix shows, there is a broad variety of different patterns in the
relationship between per capita manufacturing output and tin demand. In addition,
they do not show a linear log-log relationship. Several reasons might explain this
result. First, in comparison to the other mineral commodities examined, it is the one
with the most narrow range of applications in manufacturing production. Second, it
has strongly lost its importance due to aluminum substitution (see Thoburn, 1994;
Krebs, 2006; Stu¨rmer and von Hagen, 2012b). Finally, the strong turbulences in its
price due the collapse of the “International Tin Agreement” in 1985 (see Rudolf Wolff
& Co Lt., 1987) might cause further problems in the estimation.
I find evidence for the existence of long-run relationships as the coefficients of ad-
justment are statistically significant and negative in all three specifications. Overall,
the estimated speed of demand adjustment is, as in the case for lead and zinc, very
slow. It takes up to 10 years before demand reaches equilibrium after a shock.
3.4.5 Zinc
Zinc is mainly used in the galvanization of steel, as an alloy with copper in brass,
zinc rich paint, casting, batteries, and zinc sheet for roofing (see Gupta, 1982; Jolly,
1997).
The long-run manufacturing output elasticity of zinc demand is estimated to be
between about 0.7 and 0.8 in the three specifications. Demand increases hence less
than manufacturing output over the course of industrialization pointing to a slight
decrease in the intensity of use. This is plausible as zinc demand is on the one hand
close to general industrial and economic conditions (see Gupta, 1982; Jolly, 1997).
On the other hand, as its main appliance is in galvanization, its use is strongly linked
to products of the steel industry that rather loose importance over the course of
industrialization.
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1 2 3
Time fixed effects No No Yes
Manufacturing (log) 0.734*** 0.852*** 0.834***
(0.033) (0.101) (0.132)
Zinc price (log) -0.064 -0.066 0.207**
(0.088) (0.084) (0.083)
Constant -0.204*** -0.090 -0.017
(0.209) (0.118) (0.026)
Linear trend -0.004
(0.003)
Adjustment coefficient -0.132*** -0.131*** -0.180***
(0.055) (0.062) (0.022)
Observations 1,216 1,216 1,216
Log likelihood 579.2 579.8 518.9
Notes: The table shows results from the pooled mean group (PMG) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(4,4,2) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.6: Estimates of the long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of
zinc demand.
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The estimates for the price elasticity of zinc demand are different between the
specifications with and without the time fixed effects. In Specifications 1 and 2 the
estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero. Inclusion of time fixed
effects in Specification 3 leads to a positive value of about 0.2, which is statistically
significant, but without a plausible explanation, and hard to interpret as price only
includes changes due to inflation and exchange rates when applying time-fixed effects.
The time trend is not statistically significant.
I find evidence for the existence of long-run relationships, as the coefficients of
adjustment are statistically significant and negative in all three specifications. It
takes up to ten years before demand reaches equilibrium after a shock.
3.5 Sensitivity analysis
I check the robustness of my results with respect to a different choice of lag lengths
and the use of other estimators.
I reestimate the model using an ARDL(1,1,1) and an ARDL(3,3,3) configuration
(see Tables 3.13 to 3.22 in the Appendix). Smaller lag lengths yield qualitatively
similar results for all mineral commodities except tin, where the price elasticity be-
comes insignificant in the case of ARDL(3,3,3). The null hypothesis of the Hausman
test is not rejected in any of the specifications with the mean substracted data. The
adjustment coefficients are statistically significant in all estimations showing strong
evidence for long-run relationships between the variables.
Tables 3.8 to 3.12 in the Appendix present the results from the alternative pooled
estimators. The two alternative pooled estimators are the mean group estimator
(MG), which does not impose any homogeneity, and the dynamic fixed effects (DFE)
estimator, which imposes homogeneity across all slopes and error variances.
The estimated long-run price and manufacturing output elasticities of demand
are relatively robust across the different estimators. As expected, the standard error
of the MG estimates are larger and coefficients are not often statistically significant.
Pooling sharpens the estimates considerably as they are more robust to outliers. In
the case of aluminum, the effect of the outlier Belgium is obvious and distorts the
estimates. The estimated coefficients for the speed of adjustment are in all cases
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fairly low but significant.
The joint Hausman tests in Tables 3.8 to 3.12 do not reject the hypothesis of
homogeneity of all long-run coefficients at conventional levels of significance, when
the PMG estimates are compared to the MG estimates for results with country fixed
effects. As PMG estimates are more efficient than MG estimates, they ought to be
preferred. Overall, the joint Hausman tests provide evidence that I am not violating
the data by relying on PMG estimates rather than MG estimates for all mineral
commodities in the regressions with time fixed effects (Pesaran, Shin, and Smith,
1999).
3.6 Conclusion
This paper is the first to provide empirical evidence from a panel data set that covers
the nexus of industrialization and the derived demand for mineral commodities for a
time period spanning partly back to 1840. I focus on the demand for aluminum, cop-
per, lead, tin, and zinc, because they have been used in many applications throughout
history. I employ the pooled mean group estimator to the standard partial adjust-
ment model to estimate the manufacturing output elasticity of demand and the price
elasticity of demand of each of the commodities examined. The pooled mean group
estimator allows me to account for the heterogeneity in the short-run effects. I con-
trol for possible ommitted technology development that is common across countries
and time dependent by implementing a linear time trend and time-fixed effects in a
stepwise manner.
I find strong differences in the estimated long-run manufacturing output elastic-
ities of demand across the five examined mineral commodities. Aluminum has an
estimated long-run manufacturing output elasticity of demand of about 1.5. This
means that its demand increases more than proportional to manufacturing output
over time. I find an estimate for the long-run manufacturing output elasticitiy of
copper demand of about one, while it is below one for lead, tin, and zinc demand.
This causes the intensity of use of these mineral commodities to decline over time in
the manufacturing sector.
My results suggest that the structural change in the relationship between per
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capita manufacturing output and the demand for mineral commodities over the course
of industrialization is rather driven by changes in technology and consumer prefer-
ences specific to the stage of industrialization. Controlling for ommitted common
technology and spillover effects across countries by employing specifications with a
time trend and country fixed effects show that common effects only play a role in
decreasing aluminum and lead demand over time. The model for tin seems to be
misspecified.
The estimated long-run demand of the examined mineral commodities is rather
inelastic with respect to price. This points to the low effect of technological change
in substitution. It illustrates that the examined mineral commodities are rather
essential to manufacturing output, as the processing industry does not change its use
in response to price.
The empirical results are plausible given narrative evidence on the application of
the different mineral commodities over time. I find evidence for the existence of long-
run relationships in all regressions. The estimated speed of demand adjustment is
rather slow for all commodities and it takes more than ten years in the cases of lead,
tin, and zinc to revert back to equilibrium. This is reasonable, given that adjustments
in manufacturing capital are rather slow and that inventories play an important role
in these markets.
My estimates of the long-run manufacturing output elasticity of demand suggest
that the industrialization in China will cause aluminum and copper demand to in-
crease while the demand for lead, tin, and zinc decreases relative to manufacturing
output in the long-term. As mining firms face high upfront costs and long lead times
to open up new mines, my results are important for developing long-term production
strategies and allowing for smooth markets. Moreover, countries dependent on the
exports of their mineral commodities may better judge the long-term perspective of
the respective markets and adjust their macroeconomic and fiscal policies accordingly.
My results suggest that demand is a larger contributor to the volatility of aluminum
and copper prices than to that of lead, tin, zinc, and energy prices (see Slade, 1991).
Moreover, the manufacturing output elasticities of demand for all examined mineral
commodities except tin are higher than the income elasticities of oil demand (which
is 0.55 according to Gately and Huntington (2002) for twenty-five OECD countries
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from 1971 to 1997) .
Acemoglu et al. (2012) claim that the low price elasticity leads to an increase in
the value of the outstanding stock over time. Therefore the incentives of war increase,
making war even inevitable in the long run. It is questionable whether this is really
the case as a low price inelasticity of derived demand might also be driven by the fact
that the costs of these inputs as a share of total costs of manufacturing are relatively
small, as the law of derived demand by Hicks (1932) and Marshall (1890) suggests.
Furthermore, the model by Acemoglu et al. (2012) depends on the assumption of a
finite stock, which my coauthor and I question in Chapter 1. Following models of
commodity price speculation the low price elasticity of demand makes these markets
prone to speculation (see Hamilton, 2009a; Kilian and Murphy, 2012).
Measurement errors might lead to an underestimation of coefficients and larger
standard errors. One possible way to correct for these errors would be to use instru-
mental variables. I could employ historical labor dispute data from Mitchell (2007)
as an instrument for manufacturing output. Labor disputes are correlated to manu-
facturing output, but not directly correlated to the demand of the respective mineral
commodities. I could use historical price data for gold (data is available from Schmitz
(1979)), wheat (data is available from Uebele (2011)), or other mineral commodities,
as an instrument for the five mineral commodity prices examined here. The seminal
article by Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) shows that there is “excess co-movement”
between prices of commodities whose markets are otherwise unrelated. The cor-
relation due to the “excess co-movement” of commodity markets could be used to
mitigate the effect of measurement errors in prices. This approach would also check
the robustness of my identifying assumption that supply is highly elastic in the long
run. Another way to correct for the latter problem would be to explicitly model the
possible endogeneity of prices with respect to demand in a structural panel vector
error correction model. I leave these robustness checks to further research.
My results show that it is relatively difficult to separate and interpret the different
effects of technological change and consumer preferences on the dynamic relationship
between manufacturing output and the demand for mineral commodities. This offers
directions for further research. First, I could explicitely use variables that control
for specific uses of the different mineral commodities, e.g., the number of telephones
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(data available from Mitchell (2003a) and others) in the case of copper use. This
would help to separate the effect of technological change on the production compo-
sition of manufacturing output from the technological change in resource efficiency.
Secondly, as substitution effects play an important role, I might include prices of
close substitutes in the regressions, e.g., the aluminum price as a control variable
in the regression on copper demand. Third, I could try to find more direct proxies
for technological change in resource efficiency, e.g., Considine (1991) uses automotive
fuel economy as a proxy to technological change in resource efficiency in mineral com-
modity demand. Finally, applying time-varying parameter regression could help to
better account for the dynamic structure of the relationship between manufacturing
output and the derived demand for mineral commodities.
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A3 Appendix
A3.1 Tables
154
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Per capita GDP overall 8341 6698 860 31618 N = 1454
(Geary-Khamis $) between 1562 6098 11200 n = 12
within 6523 -1053 28759 T-bar = 121.1
Per capita value overall 1807 1273 83 6565 N = 1414
added by manu- between 320 1209 2266 n = 12
facturing (GK-$) within 1241 -276 6109 T-bar = 117.8
Per capita use overall .0068 .0078 .0000 .0490 N = 1094
of aluminum between .0037 .0036 .0171 n = 12
(mt/person) within .0071 -.0102 .0388 T-bar = 91.1
Per capita use overall .0056 .0063 .0000 .0402 N = 1401
of copper between .0038 .0013 .0139 n = 12
(mt/person) within .0053 -.0080 .0319 T-bar = 116.8
Per capita use overall .0032 .0018 .0001 .0079 N = 1189
of lead between .0012 .0015 .0051 n = 12
(mt/person) within .0014 -.0009 .0076 T-bar = 99.1
Per capita use overall .0002 .0001 .0000 .0008 N = 1292
of tin between .0001 .0001 .0004 n = 11
(mt/person) within .0001 -.0001 .0007 T-bar = 117.4
Per capita use overall .0038 .0045 .0000 .0384 N = 1391
of zink between .0034 .0017 .0146 n = 12
(mt/person) within .0031 -.0102 .0276 T-bar = 115.9
Real price of overall 1046 5333 .77 140411.3 N = 1288
aluminum (local between 1995 8.50 6491 n = 12
currencies per mt) within 4976 -4545 134966 T-bar = 107.3
Real price of overall 602 1330 0.92 8358 N = 1381
copper (local between 1234 2.73 3804 n = 12
currencies per mt) within 566 -2577 5156 T-bar = 115.1
Real price of overall 180 392 .28 2633 N = 1376
lead (local between 366 .73 1116 n = 12
currencies per mt) within 161 -656 1698 T-bar = 114.7
Real price of overall 1856 4155 2.53 29042 N = 1368
tin (local between 3750 6.55 11799 n = 12
currencies per mt) within 1925 -6920 19099 T-bar = 114
Real price of overall 238 518 .47 3798 N = 1364
zinc (local between 480 .81 1477 n = 12
currencies per mt) within 218 -949 2837 T-bar = 113.7
Table 3.7: Detailed summary statistics.
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A3.2 Additional figures
Figure 3.2: Per capita use of aluminum (log).
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Figure 3.3: Per capita use of copper (log).
Figure 3.4: Per capita use of lead (log).
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Figure 3.5: Per capita use of tin (log).
Figure 3.6: Per capita use of zinc (log).
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Figure 3.7: Per capita value added by the manufacturing sector (log).
Figure 3.8: Real price of aluminum (log).
159
Figure 3.9: Real price of copper (log).
Figure 3.10: Real price of lead (log).
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Figure 3.11: Real price of tin (log).
Figure 3.12: Real price of zinc (log).
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Figure 3.13: Scatter plot of per capita value added by manufacturing (horizontal
axis) and per capita aluminum use (vertical axis).
Figure 3.14: Scatter plot of per capita value added by manufacturing (horizontal
axis) and per capita lead use (vertical axis).
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Figure 3.15: Scatter plot of per capita value added by manufacturing (horizontal
axis) and per capita tin use (vertical axis).
Figure 3.16: Scatter plot of per capita value added by manufacturing (horizontal
axis) and per capita zinc use (vertical axis).
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A3.3 Regression results
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) 0.287 1.551*** 1.542*** 0.565 1.759*** 1.439*** 0.792 1.518*** 1.353***
(1.315) (0.092) (0.194) (1.411) (0.173) (0.248) (0.521) (0.073) (0.200)
Aluminum price (log) -0.363 -0.706*** -0.919*** -1.076 -0.883*** -0.801** -1.474*** -0.836*** -1.258***
(1.621) (0.184) (0.267) (0.809) (0.221) (0.322) (0.526) (0.236) (0.355)
Linear trend 0.006 -0.012* 0.005
(0.017) (0.007) (0.008)
Adjustment coefficient -0.124*** -0.117*** -0.080*** -0.150*** -0.113*** -0.083*** -0.189*** -0.142*** -0.107***
(0.027) (0.023) (0.010) (0.032) (0.023) (0.011) (0.035) (0.031) (0.016)
Constant 0.028 -0.056 0.014 2.291 1.411*** -0.413 0.169 0.054 -0.005
(0.743) (0.059) (0.177) (2.907) (0.421) (0.717) (0.149) (0.083) (0.007)
Observations 973 973 973 973 973 973 973 973 973
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 2.161 3.115 3.024
p-value 0.339 0.374 0.220
Log likelihood 404.4 405.2 432.4
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(4,4,2) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.8: Preferred estimates of the long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of aluminum demand.
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) 1.053*** 0.914*** 1.080*** 1.020*** 1.104*** 1.091*** 0.932*** 1.128*** 1.164***
(0.175) (0.061) (0.087) (0.188) (0.145) (0.178) (0.341) (0.067) (0.173)
Copper price (log) -0.097 -0.400*** -0.142 -0.177 -0.453*** -0.145 -0.523 -0.009 0.222**
(0.176) (0.093) (0.176) (0.125) (0.095) (0.182) (0.440) (0.049) (0.101)
Linear trend 0.006 -0.005 -0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Adjustment coefficient -0.200*** -0.132*** -0.102*** -0.236*** -0.131*** -0.102*** -0.240*** -0.180*** -0.114***
(0.039) (0.028) (0.015) (0.036) (0.028) (0.015) (0.064) (0.057) (0.016)
Constant -0.754*** -0.161*** -0.387*** -3.733* 0.474*** -0.366 0.094 0.010 0.003
(0.229) (0.052) (0.134) (2.021) (0.182) (0.334) (0.137) (0.030) (0.006)
Observations 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 3.799 98.01 1.693
p-value 0.150 0 0.429
Log likelihood 502.3 502.8 434.2
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(4,4,2) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.9: Preferred estimates of the long-run and short-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of copper demand.
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) 0.208 0.435*** 0.436*** 1.949*** 0.675*** 0.795*** 1.971 0.745*** 0.761***
(0.202) (0.057) (0.144) (0.664) (0.110) (0.256) (1.657) (0.112) (0.259)
Lead price (log) 0.061 -0.220** 0.212 -0.174 -0.215*** 0.186 1.893 -0.014 0.113
(0.606) (0.093) (0.277) (0.111) (0.080) (0.249) (1.727) (0.204) (0.510)
Linear trend -0.046** -0.005*** -0.009
(0.023) (0.002) (0.006)
Adjustment coefficient -0.158*** -0.094*** -0.074*** -0.214*** -0.121*** -0.083*** -0.211*** -0.148*** -0.086***
(0.028) (0.021) (0.015) (0.029) (0.026) (0.017) (0.047) (0.033) (0.017)
Constant 0.128 0.048** -0.061 9.787 0.393*** 0.507 0.210 0.028 0.002
(0.173) (0.022) (0.111) (7.065) (0.095) (0.408) (0.157) (0.022) (0.007)
Observations 1,059 1,059 1,059 1,059 1,059 1,059 1,059 1,059 1,059
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 1.332 3.423 1.524
p-value 0.514 0.331 0.467
Log likelihood 474.7 476.9 435.3
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(4,4,2) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.10: Preferred estimates of the long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of lead demand.
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) -0.302 0.616*** -0.091 0.760*** 0.712*** 0.517* 0.397 0.295** 0.709***
(0.475) (0.035) (0.151) (0.226) (0.080) (0.268) (0.445) (0.141) (0.273)
Tin price (log) -0.109 0.169** -0.569** -0.138 0.110 -0.454* -0.166 -0.384*** -0.216
(0.248) (0.085) (0.284) (0.166) (0.084) (0.237) (0.303) (0.046) (0.157)
Linear trend –0.017*** -0.004 -0.013**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Adjustment coefficient -0.268*** -0.095** -0.061*** -0.341*** -0.105** -0.072*** -0.196*** -0.096*** -0.071***
(0.082) (0.040) (0.012) (0.126) (0.043) (0.013) (0.038) (0.030) (0.013)
Constant -0.820 -0.522** 0.241*** 8.264 -0.149 0.944*** 0.222* 0.006 0.008
(0.756) (0.209) (0.093) (7.147) (0.118) (0.338) (0.123) (0.026) (0.006)
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 7.675 11.37 0.672
p-value 0.0215 0.00987 0.715
Log likelihood 399.5 400.1 408.9
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(4,4,2) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.11: Preferred estimates of the long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of tin demand.
168
VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) 0.765*** 0.734*** 0.862*** 1.059*** 0.852*** 0.898*** 1.151 0.834*** 0.905***
(0.229) (0.033) (0.095) (0.341) (0.101) (0.206) (0.928) (0.132) (0.226)
Zinc price (log) 0.708 -0.064 0.042 0.186 -0.066 0.041 1.005 0.207** 0.123
(1.223) (0.088) (0.253) (0.397) (0.084) (0.253) (1.540) (0.083) (0.116)
Linear trend -0.007 -0.002 -0.001
(0.009) (0.002) (0.004)
Adjustment coefficient -0.216*** -0.113*** -0.085*** -0.286*** -0.119*** -0.085*** -0.137*** -0.085*** -0.083***
(0.062) (0.030) (0.013) (0.062) (0.031) (0.013) (0.029) (0.019) (0.013)
Constant -1.247* -0.204*** -0.269*** 1.779 -0.090 -0.218 0.140 -0.017 0.002
(0.719) (0.055) (0.103) (4.597) (0.062) (0.275) (0.135) (0.022) (0.005)
Observations 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 0.759 14.68 0.248
p-value 0.684 0.00211 0.883
Log likelihood 579.2 579.8 518.9
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(4,4,2) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.12: Preferred estimates of the long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of zinc demand.
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) 2.216*** 1.601*** 1.737*** 2.283*** 1.750*** 1.602*** 1.123*** 1.518*** 1.371***
(0.344) (0.069) (0.205) (0.275) (0.142) (0.144) (0.352) (0.051) (0.145)
Aluminum price (log) -0.515** -0.823*** -1.019*** -0.462 -0.913*** -0.879** -0.881*** -0.771*** -0.786***
(0.258) (0.132) (0.267) (0.287) (0.165) (0.370) (0.324) (0.169) (0.253)
Linear time trend -0.004 -0.007 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Adjustment coeff. -0.192*** -0.135*** -0.082*** -0.224*** -0.131*** -0.085*** -0.284*** -0.200*** -0.128***
(0.038) (0.035) (0.012) (0.052) (0.035) (0.015) (0.054) (0.050) (0.032)
Constant -1.335*** -0.051 -0.078 2.709 0.986*** -0.591 0.038 0.066 -0.007***
(0.508) (0.064) (0.219) (3.520) (0.364) (0.786) (0.135) (0.107) (0.003)
Observations 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 3.583 3.668 1.153
p-value 0.167 0.300 0.562
log likelihood 206.1 206.5 280.0
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(1,1,1) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.13: Estimated long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of aluminum demand in the ARDL(1,1,1) model.
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) 1.098*** 1.055*** 1.097*** 1.392*** 0.983*** 1.113*** 0.859*** 1.165*** 1.248***
(0.193) (0.039) (0.097) (0.249) (0.095) (0.206) (0.306) (0.072) (0.210)
Copper price (log) -0.182 -0.219*** -0.201* -0.205* -0.208*** -0.205* 0.188 0.053 0.232
(0.121) (0.072) (0.107) (0.115) (0.071) (0.107) (0.201) (0.051) (0.157)
Linear trend -0.004 0.002 -0.000
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Adjustment coefficient -0.238*** -0.168*** -0.132*** -0.274*** -0.168*** -0.132*** -0.253*** -0.199*** -0.145***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.026) (0.033) (0.032) (0.027) (0.047) (0.051) (0.029)
Constant -1.097*** -0.524*** -0.483*** -0.097 -0.742*** -0.443 0.075 0.010 0.007***
(0.284) (0.107) (0.169) (1.719) (0.146) (0.725) (0.077) (0.029) (0.002)
Observations 1,253 1,253 1,253 1,253 1,253 1,253 1,253 1,253 1,253
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 0.161 15.28 2.332
p-value 0.923 0.00159 0.312
log likelihood 352.8 353.1 305.1
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(1,1,1) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.14: Estimated long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of copper demand in the ARDL(1,1,1) model.
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) 0.454*** 0.349*** 0.525*** 1.553*** 0.664*** 0.975*** 3.540 0.888*** 0.966***
(0.128) (0.048) (0.157) (0.450) (0.094) (0.203) (3.444) (0.102) (0.237)
Lead price (log) 0.140 -0.094 0.268 -0.081 -0.092 0.217 5.719 0.067 0.345
(0.253) (0.075) (0.347) (0.080) (0.065) (0.293) (5.498) (0.194) (0.358)
Linear trend -0.035** -0.005*** -0.012***
(0.016) (0.002) (0.004)
Adjustment coefficient -0.204*** -0.128*** -0.098*** -0.255*** -0.148*** -0.111*** -0.205*** -0.152*** -0.117***
(0.029) (0.024) (0.016) (0.030) (0.027) (0.020) (0.041) (0.026) (0.024)
Constant -0.048 0.130*** -0.150 8.441 0.475*** 0.829*** 0.126 0.017 0.002
(0.243) (0.035) (0.156) (6.360) (0.131) (0.283) (0.144) (0.024) (0.002)
Observations 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 2.541 6.082 2.514
p-value 0.281 0.108 0.285
log likelihood 405.6 410.0 358.8
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(1,1,1) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.15: Estimated long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of lead demand in the ARDL(1,1,1) model.
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) 0.200 0.257*** 0.083 0.683*** 0.778*** 0.560* 0.248 0.469*** 0.814***
(0.214) (0.060) (0.194) (0.237) (0.124) (0.335) (0.481) (0.108) (0.306)
Tin price (log) -0.031 -0.061 -0.163 -0.014 -0.194** -0.128 0.221 -0.364*** -0.124
(0.100) (0.115) (0.168) (0.107) (0.099) (0.130) (0.534) (0.040) (0.155)
Linear trend -0.013* -0.015*** -0.011*
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006)
Adjustment coefficient -0.254*** -0.118*** -0.089*** -0.292*** -0.127*** -0.102*** -0.267*** -0.137*** -0.100***
(0.045) (0.035) (0.019) (0.058) (0.028) (0.023) (0.043) (0.034) (0.024)
Constant -0.757 -0.160*** 0.057 5.927 1.505** 0.862 0.370** 0.015 0.005**
(0.535) (0.050) (0.131) (5.246) (0.599) (0.592) (0.168) (0.032) (0.002)
Observations 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,204 1,204 1,204
Joint Hausman Test-stat. -0.541 21.70 1.480
p-value 1 7.53e-05 0.477
log likelihood 233.4 236.7 299.4
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(1,1,1) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.16: Estimated long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of tin demand in the ARDL(1,1,1) model.
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) 1.064*** 0.818*** 0.965*** 0.951*** 0.959*** 0.945*** 0.619 0.951*** 1.012***
(0.146) (0.030) (0.143) (0.212) (0.076) (0.257) (0.526) (0.090) (0.282)
Zinc price (log) -0.288** -0.148** -0.178 -0.199* -0.153** -0.176 -0.199 0.174*** 0.106**
(0.118) (0.073) (0.173) (0.102) (0.070) (0.165) (0.720) (0.050) (0.045)
Linear Trend -0.000 -0.003* 0.000
(0.005) (0.001) (0.004)
Adjustment coefficient -0.265*** -0.144*** -0.121*** -0.317*** -0.152*** -0.121*** -0.208*** -0.135*** -0.110***
(0.069) (0.030) (0.022) (0.069) (0.032) (0.022) (0.037) (0.024) (0.019)
Constant -1.495* -0.319*** -0.399* -1.528 -0.131 -0.440 0.204* -0.008 0.002
(0.827) (0.069) (0.208) (2.594) (0.086) (0.299) (0.122) (0.023) (0.001)
Observations 1,266 1,266 . 1,266 1,266 . 1,266 1,266 .
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 2.703 0.478 0.580
p-value 0.259 0.924 0.748
log likelihood 456.6 458.1 426.2
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(1,1,1) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.17: Estimated long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of zinc demand in the ARDL(1,1,1) model.
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) 0.985* 1.528*** 1.618*** 1.017 1.740*** 1.562*** 1.089** 1.584*** 1.493***
(0.548) (0.042) (0.203) (0.929) (0.131) (0.271) (0.499) (0.072) (0.208)
Aluminum price (log) -1.224** -0.824*** -0.967*** -1.280** -0.931*** -0.902*** -1.347** -1.038*** -1.438***
(0.482) (0.138) (0.277) (0.624) (0.175) (0.348) (0.549) (0.242) (0.376)
Linear trend 0.006 -0.012* 0.003
(0.018) (0.007) (0.009)
Adjustment coeff. -0.151*** -0.134*** -0.076*** -0.175*** -0.125*** -0.077*** -0.192*** -0.142*** -0.104***
(0.054) (0.051) (0.010) (0.054) (0.044) (0.011) (0.037) (0.032) (0.015)
Constant 0.073 0.057 -0.019 0.956 1.738** -0.228 0.110 0.077 -0.009
(0.515) (0.081) (0.177) (2.087) (0.776) (0.715) (0.143) (0.107) (0.007)
Observations 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 0.934 11.31 0.985
p-value 0.627 0.0102 0.611
log likelihood 378.2 379.4 422.1
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(3,3,3) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.18: Estimated long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of aluminum demand in the ARDL (3,3,3) model.
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) 1.117*** 0.963*** 1.063*** 1.142*** 1.399*** 1.053*** 0.957*** 1.047*** 1.131***
(0.160) (0.055) (0.085) (0.139) (0.097) (0.175) (0.321) (0.063) (0.177)
Copper price (log) -0.096 -0.285*** -0.116 -0.130 -0.468*** -0.113 -0.139 -0.041 0.263**
(0.142) (0.087) (0.174) (0.130) (0.065) (0.181) (0.290) (0.053) (0.102)
Linear trend 0.002 -0.012*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Adjustment coefficient -0.217*** -0.141*** -0.105*** -0.241*** -0.147*** -0.105*** -0.259*** -0.179*** -0.112***
(0.048) (0.028) (0.015) (0.047) (0.041) (0.015) (0.067) (0.049) (0.016)
Constant -0.924*** -0.291*** -0.395*** -3.604* 1.514*** -0.416 0.170 0.017 0.005
(0.218) (0.059) (0.134) (2.176) (0.586) (0.341) (0.170) (0.028) (0.006)
Observations 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 2.827 20.72 0.125
p-value 0.243 0.000120 0.939
log likelihood 481.2 485.1 427.5
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(3,3,3) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.19: Estimated long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of copper demand in the ARDL (3,3,3) model.
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) 0.382*** 0.023 0.499*** 1.609*** 0.779*** 0.833*** 3.456 0.829*** 0.813***
(0.085) (0.067) (0.124) (0.496) (0.127) (0.227) (3.033) (0.119) (0.228)
Lead price (log) 0.070 -0.053 0.289 -0.062 -0.257*** 0.244 6.764 -0.014 0.253
(0.480) (0.082) (0.251) (0.138) (0.091) (0.229) (5.547) (0.224) (0.459)
Linear trend -0.037** -0.008*** -0.008
(0.018) (0.002) (0.005)
Adjustment coefficient -0.151*** -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.201*** -0.117*** -0.092*** -0.207*** -0.143*** -0.095***
(0.019) (0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.023) (0.016) (0.043) (0.026) (0.016)
Constant 0.150 0.287*** -0.126 6.902 0.692*** 0.471 0.281 0.025 0.001
(0.164) (0.103) (0.112) (4.594) (0.167) (0.402) (0.171) (0.022) (0.007)
Observations 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 40.09 2.956 2.321
p-value 1.97e-09 0.398 0.313
log likelihood 490.8 491.7 444.8
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(3,3,3) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.20: Estimated long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of lead demand in the ARDL (3,3,3) model.
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) -0.203 0.611*** -0.010 0.988*** -0.490 0.815*** 0.406 1.158*** 0.834***
(0.422) (0.041) (0.163) (0.296) (0.358) (0.279) (0.500) (0.081) (0.276)
Tin price (log) -0.273 0.019 -0.736** -0.224* -0.229 -0.561** -0.094 -0.124 -0.131
(0.190) (0.114) (0.340) (0.135) (0.187) (0.262) (0.317) (0.093) (0.157)
Linear trend -0.019*** -0.008 -0.018***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
Adjustment coefficient -0.228*** -0.086** -0.054*** -0.283*** -0.063* -0.068*** -0.195*** -0.106*** -0.068***
(0.060) (0.035) (0.011) (0.081) (0.032) (0.012) (0.035) (0.026) (0.013)
Constant -0.591 -0.388** 0.227** 6.782 1.001* 1.137*** 0.213* 0.009 0.004
(0.607) (0.153) (0.092) (5.190) (0.594) (0.332) (0.121) (0.018) (0.006)
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 6.140 41.56 2.210
p-value 0.0464 4.97e-09 0.331
log likelihood 392.7 395.0 399.0
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(3,3,3) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.21: Estimated long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of tin demand in the ARDL (3,3,3) model.
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VARIABLES MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
Time fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing (log) 0.885*** 0.749*** 0.866*** 1.107*** 0.894*** 0.895*** -1.686 0.709*** 0.934***
(0.184) (0.031) (0.096) (0.316) (0.090) (0.210) (2.547) (0.117) (0.224)
Zinc price (log) 0.629 -0.085 0.025 0.188 -0.098 0.023 1.359 0.146* 0.102
(1.017) (0.085) (0.269) (0.400) (0.080) (0.270) (1.393) (0.082) (0.114)
Linear trend -0.007 -0.003 -0.001
(0.008) (0.002) (0.004)
Adjustment coefficient -0.190*** -0.114*** -0.084*** -0.260*** -0.121*** -0.084*** -0.136*** -0.090*** -0.084***
(0.049) (0.033) (0.013) (0.053) (0.035) (0.013) (0.032) (0.019) (0.013)
Constant -1.094* -0.207*** -0.266** 0.572 -0.056 -0.226 0.112 -0.007 0.001
(0.566) (0.062) (0.106) (3.655) (0.063) (0.279) (0.110) (0.015) (0.005)
Observations 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224
Joint Hausman Test-stat. 1.664 12.12 1.377
p-value 0.435 0.00697 0.502
log likelihood 563.4 564.6 512.5
Notes: The table shows results from the mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimations of the preferred
ARDL(3,3,3) model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.22: Estimated long-run manufacturing output and price elasticities of zinc demand in the ARDL (3,3,3) model.
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Data sources and description
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Table 3.23: Data sources for the mineral commodity prices.
Mineral Country Time Units Sources Notes
Comm.
Aluminum U.K. 1904-75 £/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 263-5 1913-45: Ingots, 99-99.5% metal cont., London mar-
ket; 1946-75: Ingots, min. 99.5% metal cont., London
market.
U.K. 1976-2010 US-$/mt BGR, 2011a 1976-Nov 78: Primary aluminum, cash, in London
Metal Exchange (LME) warehouse, min. 99.5% metal
content; Dec 1978-Jul 87: Primary aluminum, cash, in
LME warehouse, min. 99.5% metal cont.; Aug 1987-
2010: High grade primary aluminum, cash, in LME
warehouse, min. 99.7% metal cont.
Aluminum U.S. 1895-1976 US-$/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 263-5 1895-1945: Ingots, min. 99% metal cont., New York
market; 1946-76: Ingots, min. 99.5% metal cont., New
York market.
U.S. 1977-98 US-$/mt Sachs 1999, p. 3 1977-82: New York market, 1983-98: New York mar-
ket, 99.7% pure aluminum ingot.
U.S. 1999-2000 US-$/mt U.S. Geological Survey 2001 New York market, 99.7% pure aluminum ingot.
U.S. 2001-5 US-$/mt U.S. Geological Survey 2007 New York market, 99.7% pure aluminum ingot.
U.S. 2006-10 US-$/mt U.S. Geological Survey 2011c New York market, 99.7% pure aluminum ingot.
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Aluminum Germany 1854-1975 Marks/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 263-5 1854-89: Continental European price, selling price of
refined aluminum, Deville Co. France; 1858, 1860-3,
1865-73, 1875-7, 1879-83, 1887: linear trend; 1890-
Mar 1958: Ingots, min. 99% metal cont., av. selling
price of German primary aluminum; Apr 1958-75: In-
gots, min. 99.5% metal cont., av. selling price of Ger-
man primary aluminum; 1914: Jan-Jul only; 1915-8,
1942-7: Official max. price.
Germany 1976-2010 US-$/mt BGR, 2011a 1976-Nov 78: Primary aluminum, cash, in LME ware-
house Hamburg, min. 99.5% metal cont.; Dec 1978-
Jul 87: Primary aluminum, cash, in LME warehouse
Hamburg, min. 99.5% metal cont.; Aug 1987-2010:
High grade primary aluminum, cash, in LME ware-
house Hamburg, min. 99.7% metal cont.
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Copper U.K. 1790-1976 £/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 268-72 1790-1879: Tough copper, fire-refined, av. 99.25%
metal cont., London market; 1880-1914: Best selected
copper, fire-refined, av. 99.75% metal cont., London
market; 1915-76: Electrolytic wirebars, min. 99.9%
metal cont., London market; 1939: Price av. Jan-Aug
only as LME dealings were suspended; Sep 1940-Aug
53: controlled selling price of the Ministry of Supply.
U.K. 1977-2010 US-$/mt BGR, 2011a Grade A, cash, in LME warehouse, min. 99.99% metal
cont.
Copper U.S. 1850-1976 US-$/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 268-72 1850-99: Lake copper, fire-refined, New York market,
min. 99.9% metal cont.; 1900-1934: Electrolytic wire-
bars, min. 99.9% metal cont., New York market; 1935-
1976: Electrolytic wirebars (domestic), net Atlantic
seaboard refinery, min. 99.9% metal cont.; Sep 1967-
Apr 68: U.S. producer strike, so 1967 is the average of
Jan-June and 1968 is the average of May-Dec.
U.S. 1977-90 U.S.-$/mt U.S. Bureau of Mines 1981,
1987, 1993
Cathode, min. 99.99% metal cont., U.S. producer
price.
U.S. 1991-2010 U.S.-$/mt U.S. Geological Survey 1996,
2001, 2007, 2011c
Cathode, min. 99.99% metal cont., U.S. producer
price.
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Copper Germany 1845-57 Marks/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 270-2 Price of Mansfeld copper, Berlin market; 1847-50: lin-
ear trend.
Germany 1858 Marks/mt Ministerium fu¨r Handel,
Gewerbe und o¨ffentliche Ar-
beiten 1859, p. 14
Price of Mansfeld copper, Berlin market.
Germany 1859-1975 Marks/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 270-2 1859: lin. trend; 1860-1913: Mansfeld fire-refined cop-
per ex-works; 1914-23: Source unknown; 1924-75:
Electrolytic wirebars, FOB, av. selling price of Ger-
man refineries; Oct 1939 - Jun 50 official max. price.
Germany 1976-2010 US-$/mt BGR, 2011a Grade A, cash, in LME warehouse Hamburg,
min. 99.99% metal cont.
Lead U.K. 1790-1976 £/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 226-37 1790-1886: English pig lead, mostly prices in provin-
cial markets pre-1850, then mainly London prices;
1887-1945: Good soft pig lead, London market; 1946-
76: Refined pig lead, min. 99.97% metal cont., London
market; 1914: Average Jan-July and Nov-Dec only;
1940-Sept 52: Fixed selling price, Ministry of Supply.
U.K. 1977-2010 U.S.-$/mt BGR, 2011a Lead, min. 99.97% metal cont., cash, in LME ware-
house.
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Lead U.S. 1820-1976 U.S.-$/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 274-8 1820-79: Pig lead, New York; 1880-1976: Common
grade lead, min. 99.73% metal cont., New York.
U.S. 1977-90 U.S.-$/mt U.S. Bureau of Mines 1981,
1987, 1993
Min. 99.97% metal cont., North American producer
price, delivered.
U.S. 1991-2010 U.S.-$/mt U.S. Geological Survey 1996,
2001, 2007, 2011c
Min. 99.97% metal cont., North American producer
price, delivered.
Lead Germany 1840-1976 Marks/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 274-8 1840-98: Silesian lead, ex-works at Tarnowitz; 1899-
1918: Rhenish refined lead ex-smelter, min 99.9%
metal cont.; 1924-39: Good soft pig lead, min. 99.9%
metal cont., Berlin Metal Exchange; Oct 1939-Aug
50: Officially regulated price; 1950-76: Soft pig lead,
min. 99.9% metal cont.
Germany 1977-2010 U.S.-$/mt BGR, 2011a Min. 99.97% metal cont., cash, in LME warehouse
Hamburg.
Tin U.K. 1790-1976 £/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 240-1 1790-1837: Common refined tin, Cornwall; 1838-72:
Standard tin, London market; 1873-1976: Standard
tin, min. 99.75% metal cont., London market; 1914:
Average price of Jan-July and Oct-Dec only; 1942-9:
controlled price, Ministry of Supply.
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U.K. 1977-8 U.S.-$/mt U.S. Bureau of Mines 1980,
p. 915
Standard tin, min. 99.75% metal cont., London mar-
ket.
U.K. 1979-2010 U.S.-$/mt BGR, 2011a Min. 99.85% metal cont., in LME warehouse, cash.
Tin U.S. 1841-55 U.S.-$/mt House of Commons 1853, Computed from quantities and values of U.S. imports
of tin in blocks and pigs; 1851-5: lin. trend.
U.S. 1856-1962 U.S.-$/mt Secretary of the Treasury 1864,
pp. 46-8
Computed from quantities and values of U.S. imports
of tin in blocks and pigs.
U.S. 1863 U.S.-$/mt House of Commons 1866, p. 358 Computed from quantities and values of U.S. imports
of tin in blocks and pigs.
U.S. 1864-9 U.S.-$/mt House of Commons 1868, p. 378 Computed from quantities and values of U.S. imports
of tin in blocks and pigs; 1866-9: lin. trend.
U.S. 1870-1976 U.S.-$/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 293-8 1869-80: Block tin, New York; 1881-1919: Ordinary
brands, min. 99% metal cont., New York; 1920-76:
Straits tin, Grade A, min. 99.85% metal cont., New
York; 1918: median price; 1976: av. Jan, Jul, & Dec.
U.S. 1977-90 U.S.-$/mt U.S. Bureau of Mines 1981,
1987, 1993
Contained tin, New York market.
U.S. 1991-2010 U.S.-$/mt U.S. Geological Survey 1996,
2001, 2007, 2011c
Contained tin, New York market.
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Tin Germany 1840-1975 Marks/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 293-8 1840-1902: Saxon tin at Freiberg; 1903-14: Banca tin
(from Dutch East Indies) in Frankfurt am Main; 1925-
75: Banca and Straits tin, Hamburg, min. 99.9% metal
cont.; Oct 1939-47: Official max. price; 1973: Jan-
June average only; 1974: Mar-Dec average only.
Germany 1976-8 U.S.-$/mt U.S. Bureau of Mines 1980,
p. 915
Standard tin, min. 99.75% metal cont., in LME ware-
house Hamburg.
Germany 1979-2010 U.S.-$/mt BGR, 2011a Min. 99.85% metal cont., in LME warehouse Ham-
burg, cash.
Tin Japan 1950-86 Yen/mt Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communication of Japan 2012
Computed from data on the quantity and value of tin
ore.
Zinc U.K. 1823-1976 £/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 299-303 1823-1951: Ordinary brands zinc, London market;
1940-4: controlled price, U.K. Ministry of Supply;
1952-76: virgin zinc, min. 98% metal cont., London
market.
U.K. 1977-8 U.S.-$/mt U.S. Bureau of Mines 1980,
p. 981
Prime Western grade, min. 98% metal cont., London
market.
U.K. 1979-2010 U.S.-$/mt BGR, 2011a Special high grade, min. 99.995% metal cont., cash,
LME warehouse.
Zinc U.S. 1872-4 U.S.-$/mt U.S. Bureau of Mines 1883 U.S. import price of zinc in blocks or pigs.
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U.S. 1875-1976 U.S.-$/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 300-3 1875-99: Prime Western spelter, min. 98% metal
cont., New York; 1900-76: Prime Western spelter,
Saint Louis, min. 98% metal cont.
U.S. 1977-90 U.S.-$/mt U.S. Bureau of Mines 1981,
1987, 1993
1977-9: Prime Western spelter, delivered, min. 98%
metal cont.; 1980-90: High grade, min. 99.9% metal
cont., delivered.
U.S. 1991-2010 U.S.-$/mt U.S. Geological Survey 1996,
2001, 2007, 2011c
Special high grade, delivered, min. 99.99% metal cont.
Zinc Germany 1840-1975 Marks/mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 299-303 1840-1914: Upper Silesian zinc ex-works at Breslau;
1924-34: Berlin Metal Exchange quotation for primary
zinc, min. 97% metal cont.
Germany 1977-8 U.S.-$/mt U.S. Bureau of Mines 1980,
p. 981
Prime Western grade, min. 98% metal cont., LME
warehouse, Hamburg.
Germany 1979-2010 U.S.-$/mt BGR, 2011a Special high grade, min. 99.995% metal cont., cash,
LME warehouse, Hamburg.
Crude Oil U.S./U.K. 1861-2010 U.S.-$/barrel British Petroleum 2011 1861-1944: U.S. average; 1945-83: Arabian Light
posted at Ras-Tanura; 1984-2010: Brent dated.
Note: Parts of the data described in the table above are based on a revised and extended version of data used in figures in Stu¨rmer and von Hagen (2012b).
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Table 3.24: Data sources for the producer price indices.
Country Time Source Notes
Belgium 1840-1980 Mitchell 2003a, pp. 857-8 Wholesale price index
1981-2011 IMF, 2012a Wholesale price index/ producer price index
Finland 1913-48 Mitchell 2003a, pp. 858-60 Wholesale price index
1949-2011 IMF, 2012a Wholesale price index/ producer price index
France 1850-1980 Mitchell 2003a, pp. 857-8 1850-1974: Wholesale price index; 1974-80: No general index published, pro-
ducer price index for metals products.
1981-96 IMF, 2012a Producer price index for intermediate goods
1997-2010 IMF, 2012a Wholesale price index/ producer price index
Germany 1850-1991 Mitchell 2003a, pp. 857-8 Wholesale price index
1992-2011 IMF, 2012a Wholesale price index/ producer price index
Italy 1861-1981 Mitchell 2003a, pp. 857-60 Wholesale price index
1982-2011 IMF, 2012a Wholesale price index/ producer price index
Japan 1901-60 Mitchell 1998, pp. 945-8 Wholesale price index
1961-2011 IMF, 2012a Wholesale price index/ producer price index
Netherlands 1901-53 Mitchell 2003a, pp. 857-60 Wholesale price index
1954-2011 IMF, 2012a Wholesale price index/ producer price index
South Korea 1930-53 Mitchell 1998, pp. 945-8 Wholesale price index; value for 1952: crude estimate by author
1954-2011 IMF, 2012a Wholesale price index/ producer price index
Spain 1850-1948 Mitchell 2003a, pp. 857-60 Wholesale price index
189
1949-2011 IMF, 2012a Wholesale price index/ producer price index
Sweden 1860-1968 Mitchell 2003a, pp. 857-60 Wholesale price index
1969-2011 IMF, 2012a Wholesale price index/ producer price index
U.K. 1820-1913 Mitchell 1988, pp. 722-4 Rousseaux price index constructed from wholesale prices and unit-value of
imports of vegetable, animal, agricultural, and industrial products.
1914-59 Mitchell 1988, pp. 725-7 Sauerbeck-Statist price index constructed from wholesale prices and unit-value
of food (vegetable and animnal) and raw materials (minerals, textile fibres,
sundry).
1960-2010 World Bank 2012 Wholesale price index
U.S. 1850-9 Mitchell 2003b, p. 702 Wholesale price index
1860-1912 Hanes 1998 Wholesale price index
1913-2010 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics 2011
Producer price index: all commodities.
Table 3.25: Data sources for the consumer price indices.
Country Time Source Notes
U.K. 1820-2010 U.K. Office of Statistics 2011
U.S. 1774-2008 Officer and Williamson 2011
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Table 3.26: Data sources for the exchange rates between the British-£ and other currencies.
Country Currencies Time Source Notes
Belgium British-£ per 1000 Guilders 1840-3 Denzel 2010, p. 21
British-£ per 1000 France 1844-1914 Denzel 2010, pp. 21-3
France British-£ per 1000 Old Francs 1840-1914 Denzel 2010, pp. 21-3
Italy British-£ per 1000 Piedmontese Lire Nuovo 1840-60 Denzel 2010, pp. 41-2
British-£ per 1000 Italian Lire 1861-1914 Denzel 2010, pp. 42-3
Japan British-£ per 100 Yen 1862-1914 Denzel 2010, pp. 533-4 No data available for 1872.
Netherlands British-£ per 1000 Guilders 1840-1914 Denzel 2010, pp. 21-3
Spain British-£ per 100 Pesos de Plata Antigua 1840-7 Denzel 2010, p. 34
British-£ per 100 Pesos Duros 1848-98 Denzel 2010, pp. 34-5
British-£ per 1000 Pesetas 1899-1914 Denzel 2010, pp. 35-6
Sweden British-£ per 1000 Rixdollars Species 1840-57 Denzel 2010, pp. 346-7
British-£ per 1000 Rixdollars Rixmynt 1858-74 Denzel 2010, p. 347
British-£ per 1000 Crowns 1875-1914 Denzel 2010, pp. 347-8
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Table 3.27: Data sources for the exchange rates between the U.S.-$ and other currencies.
Country Currencies Time Source Notes
Belgium Francs per U.S.-$ 1915-9 Bordo 2001
Francs per U.S.-$ 1920-99 Officer 2006 From 1927-40 the exchange rate is expressed in belgas.
Euro per U.S.-$ 2000-11 Officer 2011
Finland New Markaa per U.S.-$ 1911-70 Bordo 2001 Bordo et al (2001) transformed the original Old
Markaa data into New Markaa.
New Markaa per U.S.-$ 1971-99 Officer 2006
Euro per U.S.-$ 2000-11 Officer 2011
France Old Francs per U.S.-$ 1915-40 Officer 2006
Old Francs per U.S.-$ 1941-4 Officer 2011
Old Francs per U.S.-$ 1945-59 Officer 2006
Francs per U.S.-$ 1960-99 Officer 2006
Euro per U.S.-$ 2000-2011 Officer 2011
Germany Mark per U.S.-$ 1976-1999 Officer 2006
Euro per U.S.-$ 2000-2011 Officer 2011
Italy Lire per U.S.-$ 1915-1940 Officer 2006
Lire per U.S.-$ 1941-7 Bordo 2001
Lire per U.S.-$ 1948-99 Officer 2006
Euro per U.S.-$ 2000-11 Officer 2011
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Japan Yen per U.S.-$ 1915-55 Bordo 2001
Yen per U.S.-$ 1956-2011 Officer 2011
Netherlands Guilder per U.S.-$ 1915-40 Officer 2006
Guilder per U.S.-$ 1941 Bordo 2001
Guilder per U.S.-$ 1945-99 Officer 2006
Euro per U.S.-$ 2000-11 Officer 2011
South Korea Won per U.S.-$ 1971-81 Bordo 2001
Won per U.S.-$ 1982-2009 Officer 2011
Won per U.S.-$ 2010 IMF, 2012a
Won per U.S.-$ 2011 Officer 2011
Spain Loyalist Peseta per U.S.-$ 1915-38 Officer 2006
National Peseta per U.S.-$ 1939-41 Officer 2006
National Peseta per U.S.-$ 1947-78 Bordo 2001
National Peseta per U.S.-$ 1979-99 Officer 2006
Euro per U.S.-$ 2000-11 Officer 2011
Sweden Kronor per U.S.-$ 1915-41 Officer 2006
Kronor per U.S.-$ 1942-5 Bordo 2001
Kronor per U.S.-$ 1946-99 Officer 2006
Kronor per U.S.-$ 2000-11 Officer 2011
U.K. British-£per U.S.-$ 1791-2011 Officer 2013
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Table 3.28: Data sources for the manufacturing data.
Country Time Source Notes
Belgium 1850-1988 Smits, Woltjer, and Ma 2009 GDP in current prices, total industry (incl. mining, manufacturing, en-
ergy, and construction).
1989-94 OECD, 2012 GDP in current prices, total industry (incl. mining, manufacturing, en-
ergy, and construction).
1995-2011 OECD, 2012 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
Finland 1860-2001 Smits, Woltjer, and Ma 2009 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
2002-10 OECD, 2012 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
France 1850-1913 Smits, Woltjer, and Ma 2009 GDP in current prices, total industry (incl. mining, manufacturing, en-
ergy, and construction).
1920-38 Smits, Woltjer, and Ma 2009 GDP in current prices, total industry (incl. mining, manufacturing, en-
ergy, and construction).
1950-60 United Nations, Statistical Office
1963, p. 270
GDP in current prices, manufacturing (incl. also fishing and the quarring
of building materials).
1961-9 United Nations, Statistical Office
1972
GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1970-98 Groningen Growth and Develop-
ment Centre 2008
GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1999-2009 OECD, 2012 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
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2010 OECD, 2012 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
Germany 1850-1949 Hoffmann 1965 NDP at factor costs in constant 1913 prices, Industry and handcraft
(incl. no mining, but possibly energy and construction); 1914-24 and
1939-49: linear trends.
1950-90 Groningen Growth and Develop-
ment Centre 2008
GDP at constant prices (base year = 1991); manufacturing; West Ger-
many.
1991-2011 Statistisches Bundesamt der Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland 2012
GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
Italy 1861-69 Baffigi 2011 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1970-2010 OECD, 2012 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
Japan 1885-1940 Timmer and de Vries 2007, p. 283 NDP in current prices, mining and manufacturing.
1941-54 Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1973 NDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1955-98 Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communication of Japan 2012
GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1999-2008 Japan Cabinet Office 2010 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
2009-2010 OECD, 2012 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
Netherlands 1850-1912 Groningen Growth and Develop-
ment Centre 2008
GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1913-39 Smits and Van der Bie 2001, pp. 90-
3
GDP in current prices, manufacturing, data for the ceramic, glass, and
diamonds sectors has been computed based on data from Smits, Hor-
lings, and van Zanden (2000).
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1948-55 United Nations, Statistical Office
1963
GDP in current prices, manufacturing, 1949: linear trend.
1956-62 United Nations, Statistical Office
1966
GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1963-68 United Nations, Statistical Office
1977
GDP in current prices, manufacturing. 1964 and 1966: linear trend.
1969-2010 OECD, 2012 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
South Korea 1911-40 Smits, Woltjer, and Ma 2009 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1953-2011 Bank of Korea 2012 Manufacturing as a percentage share of GDP.
Spain 1850-1954 Smits, Woltjer, and Ma 2009 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1955-9 United Nations, Statistical Office
1966
GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1960-9 United Nations, Statistical Office
1972
GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1970-94 Groningen Growth and Develop-
ment Centre 2008
GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1995-2009 OECD, 2012 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
Sweden 1850-1969 Smits, Woltjer, and Ma 2009 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1970-92 Groningen Growth and Develop-
ment Centre 2008
GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
1993-2010 OECD, 2012 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
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U.K. 1840-1919 Mitchell 2003a GDP in current prices, total industry.
1920-59 Mitchell 1988 GDP in current prices, total industry.
1960-2010 OECD, 2012 GDP in current prices, total industry.
U.S. 1869-89 Smits, Woltjer, and Ma 2009 GNP in current prices, manufacturing, 1870-8 and 1880-8: linear trend.
1890-8 Linear trend.
1899-1937 Martin 1939 GNP in current prices, manufacturing.
1938-46 Linear trend.
1947-97 Groningen Growth and Develop-
ment Centre 2008
GNP in current prices, manufacturing.
1998-2010 OECD, 2012 GDP in current prices, manufacturing.
Table 3.29: Data sources for world GDP.
Time Period Unit Source Notes
1820-2008 Million 1990 International Maddison 2010 Description of data in Maddison, 2010.
Geary-Khamis dollars
2009-10 Million 1990 International The Conference Board 2012 Computed from growth rates of
Geary-Khamis dollars real GDP (PPP adjusted).
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Table 3.30: Data sources for the usage of aluminum.
Country Time Source Notes
Belgium 1930-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined aluminum; including Luxembourg.
Finland 1946-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined aluminum.
France 1893-9 Metallgesellschaft 1905, p. 30 Computed from import, export, and production data for aluminum.
1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined aluminum.
Germany 1892-5 Metallgesellschaft 1905, p. 30 Usage equals refined aluminum production; no imports and exports according
to Metallgesellschaft; production includes Austria-Hungary and Switzerland as
it is based on data of the Aluminium Industrie AG with production facilities in
Neuhausen (Switzerland), Rheinfelden (Germany), and Lend-Gastein (Austria).
1895-9 Metallgesellschaft 1905, p. 30 Computed from German exports and imports of refined aluminum and refined
aluminum production for Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, and Germany, as it
is based on data of the Aluminium Industrie AG with production facilities in
Neuhausen (Switzerland), Rheinfelden (Germany), and Lend-Gastein (Austria).
1900-9 Metallgesellschaft 1910, p. 16 Aluminum; estimates by Metallgesellschaft.
1910-2 Metallgesellschaft 1913, p. 16 Aluminum.
1913 Metallgesellschaft 1927, p. 4 Aluminum.
1914-9 Metallgesellschaft 1922, p. 4 Aluminum.
1920-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined aluminum. 1949-90: West Germany.
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Italy 1908-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined aluminum.
Japan 1911-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined aluminum.
Netherlands 1946-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined aluminum.
South Korea 1962-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined aluminum. 1964: linear trend.
Spain 1938-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined aluminum.
Sweden 1929-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined aluminum.
U.K. 1890-1 Metallgesellschaft 1899, p. 32 Usage equal to production of aluminum. No data on imports and exports avail-
able. I assume no considerable amounts of imports and exports.
1892-9 Metallgesellschaft 1905, p. 30 Usage equal to production of aluminum. No data on imports and exports avail-
able. I assume no considerable amounts of imports and exports. 1895: lin. trend.
1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined aluminum.
U.S. 1890-1 Metallgesellschaft 1899, p. 32 Computed from imports and domestic production of aluminum. No export data
available.
1892-9 Metallgesellschaft 1905, p. 30 Computed from imports and domestic production of aluminum. Export data only
in U.S.-$ terms. According to this data, quantities seem to be not considerable.
1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined aluminum.
Note: Parts of the data described in the Table above and in Tables 3.31, 3.33, 3.34 are based on a revised and extended version of data used in figures in
Stu¨rmer and von Hagen (2012b).
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Table 3.31: Data sources for the usage of copper.
Country Time Source Notes
Belgium 1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined copper.
Finland 1941-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined copper.
France 1881-4 Metallgesellschaft 1899, p. 53 Unwrought copper including changes in apparent stocks.
1885-1902 Metallgesellschaft 1905, p. 51 Unwrought copper including changes in apparent stocks.
1903-12 Metallgesellschaft 1913, p. 50 Unwrought copper including changes in apparent stocks.
1913-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined copper.
Germany 1850-64 Bienengra¨ber 1868, pp. 303-4, Schmitz
1979, p. 63
Computed from imports and exports of unwrought copper and brass (Bienengra¨ber,
1868), and the production of primary copper (Schmitz, 1979).
1865-6 Schmitz 1979, p. 63 Exports and imports: linear trends; computed from imports and exports and the pro-
duction of primary copper (Schmitz, 1979).
1867 Hirth 1869, p. 122, Schmitz 1979, p. 63 Computed from imports and exports of primary and secondary copper (Hirth, 1869),
and the production of primary copper (Schmitz, 1979).
1868-71 Hirth 1871, p. 560 and 670, Schmitz 1979,
p. 63
Computed from imports and exports of primary and secondary copper (Hirth, 1871),
and the production of primary copper (Schmitz, 1979); imports in 1871: linear trend;
exports in 1870-1: linear trend.
1872-5 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt 1890, p. 144 Computed from imports and exports of primary and secondary copper, and the produc-
tion of primary copper of the German Reich, excluding Hamburg.
´ 1876-80 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt 1890, p. 131 Computed from imports and exports of primary and secondary copper, and the produc-
tion of primary copper of the German Reich, excluding Hamburg. Hamburg joined the
German customs area in 1881, but maintained a free trade zone. Copper production in
Hamburg started in 1878 with a relatively small amount of 40t p.a.
1881-4 Metallgesellschaft 1899, p. 49 Computed from imports, exports, and the production of unwrought copper of the German
Reich, excluding Hamburg.
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1885-94 Metallgesellschaft 1913, p. 30 Computed from imports, exports, and the production of unwrought copper of the German
Reich, excluding Hamburg.
1895-9 Metallgesellschaft 1913, p. 45 Computed from imports, exports, and the production of unwrought copper of the German
Reich, excluding Hamburg.
1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined copper.
Italy 1881-4 Metallgesellschaft 1899, p. 55 Unwrought copper and copper alloys.
1885-1902 Metallgesellschaft 1905, p. 53 Unwrought copper and copper alloys.
1903-11 Metallgesellschaft 1913, p. 54 Unwrought copper.
1912-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined copper.
Japan 1885-8 House of Commons 1892b, pp. 128-9,
Mitchell 1998, p. 387
Computed from imports, exports (House of Commons, 1901), and the mine production
of copper (Mitchell, 1998). 1886: linear trend.
1889-91 House of Commons 1901, pp. 156-7,
Mitchell 1998, p. 387
Computed from imports, exports (House of Commons, 1901), and the mine production
of copper (Mitchell, 1998).
1892-1900 House of Commons 1901, pp. 156-7, House
of Commons 1914, p. 485
Computed from imports, exports (House of Commons, 1901), and the production of
copper (House of Commons, 1914); Exports 1900: linear trend.
1901-10 House of Commons 1914, pp. 238-9, BGR,
2012b
Computed from imports and exports of unwrought copper and the domestic production
of refined copper.
1911-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined copper.
Netherlands 1864-9 House of Commons 1874, pp. 40-5 Computed from imports and exports of unwrought copper; no domestic production.
1870-80 House of Commons 1881, pp. 62-4 Computed from imports and exports of unwrought copper; no domestic production; no
reasonable data in 1872.
1881-90 House of Commons 1892b, pp. 82-5 Computed from imports and exports of unwrought copper; no domestic production; no
reasonable data in 1882.
1891-9 House of Commons 1901, pp. 92-5 Computed from imports and exports of unwrought copper; no domestic production.
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1900 Linear trend.
1901-12 House of Commons 1914, pp. 136-9 Computed from imports and exports of unwrought copper; no domestic production.
1913 House of Commons 1915, pp. 32-4 Computed from imports and exports of unwrought copper; no domestic production;
quantities during the eleven months ended in November.
1914-6 House of Commons 1917, pp. 26-8 Computed from imports and exports of unwrought copper; no domestic production.
1918-20 House of Commons 1921, p. 38 Computed from imports and exports of unwrought copper; no domestic production.
1921 House of Commons 1922, p. 34 Computed from imports and exports of unwrought copper; no domestic production.
1924-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined copper.
South Korea 1964-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined copper.
Spain 1922-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined copper.
Sweden 1922-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined copper.
U.K. 1850 House of Commons 1852, pp. 87-9, Schmitz
1979, p. 209
Computed from imports of unwrought and partly wrought copper, exports of unwrought
copper, and the domestic smelter production.
1851 House of Commons 1853, pp. 99-100,
Schmitz 1979, p. 209
Computed from imports of unwrought and partly wrought copper, exports of unwrought
copper, and the domestic smelter production.
1852 House of Commons 1854c, pp. 101-2,
Schmitz 1979, p. 209
Computed from imports of unwrought and partly wrought copper, exports of unwrought
copper, and the domestic smelter production.
1853 House of Commons 1855, pp. 2-3, Schmitz
1979, p. 209
Computed from imports of unwrought and partly wrought copper, exports of unwrought
copper, and the domestic smelter production.
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1854-80 House of Commons 1882, pp. 110-21,
Schmitz 1979, p. 209
Computed from imports of unwrought and partly wrought copper, exports of unwrought
copper, and the domestic smelter production. Production data from 1877-80: House of
Commons (1884a, p. 44), copper produced (computed by source from copper ores and
precipitat from mines in the UK, colonial and foreign ores imported, copper precipitate
and regulus imported and burnt ores from imported cupreous pyrites, deducting British
copper ores exported to foreign countries).
1881 House of Commons 1885a, p. 23, House of
Commons 1884a, p. 44
Computed from imports of unwrought and partly wrought copper, exports of unwrought
copper, and the domestic copper production (computed by House of Commons (1884a)
from copper ores and precipitat from mines in the UK, colonial and foreign ores imported,
copper precipitate and regulus imported and burnt ores from imported cupreous pyrites,
deducting British copper ores exported to foreign countries).
1882 House of Commons 1884a, pp. 41-4 Computed from imports of unwrought and partly wrought copper, exports of unwrought
copper, and domestic copper production (computed by source from copper ores and
precipitat from mines in the UK, colonial and foreign ores imported, copper precipitate
and regulus imported and burnt ores from imported cupreous pyrites, deducting British
copper ores exported to foreign countries).
1883 House of Commons 1884b, pp. 43-5, House
of Commons 1885b, p. 42
do.
1884 House of Commons 1885b, pp. 39-41 do.
1885 House of Commons 1886, pp. 39-41 do.
1885 House of Commons 1886, pp. 39-41 do.
1886 House of Commons 1887, pp. 45-7, House
of Commons 1888, p. 33
do.
1887 House of Commons 1888, pp. 28-33 do.
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1888-9 House of Commons 1891a, pp. 30-2 do.
1890 House of Commons 1891b, pp. 32-5 do.
1891 House of Commons 1892a, pp. 34-7 do.
1892-3 House of Commons 1894, pp. 42-6 do.
1894-5 House of Commons 1896, pp. 43-7 do.
1896-7 House of Commons 1898, pp. 187-90 do.
1898-9 House of Commons 1900, pp. 189-92 do.
1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined copper.
U.S. 1847-9 House of Commons 1854b, p. 2, Carter
et al. 2006
Computed from imports of unwrought copper from the U.K., and smelter production
from domestic ores. No imports or exports from other countries declared.
1850-5 House of Commons 1856, p. 351, Carter
et al. 2006
do.
1856-62 Secretary of the Treasury 1864, pp. 44-8,
Carter et al. 2006
Computed from imports of copper from the U.K., exports of copper to different countries
and smelter production from domestic ores. No imports from other countries declared.
1863 House of Commons 1866, p. 357, Carter
et al. 2006
Computed from imports of pig copper and smelter production from domestic ores. No
exports declared.
1864-8 Weed 1916, p. 1315, House of Commons
1868, p. 377, Carter et al. 2006
Computed from imports of pig copper, exports of refined copper, and smelter production
from domestic ores. Imports 1866-8: linear trend.
1869-78 U.S. Bureau of Statistics 1879, p. 73 & 92,
Carter et al. 2006
Computed from imports of copper pigs, bars, ingots, old, and other unmanufactured,
exports of pigs, bars, sheets and old, and smelter production from domestic ores. Export
and import data: years ended June 30th.
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1879-81 U.S. Bureau of Statistics 1889, p. 87 & 102,
Carter et al. 2006
Computed from imports of copper pigs, bars, ingots, old, and other unmanufactured,
exports of ingots, bars, sheets and old, and smelter production from domestic ores.
Export and import data: years ended June 30th.
1882-8 U.S. Bureau of Statistics 1889, p. 87 & 102
Schmitz 1979, p. 210
Computed from imports of copper pigs, bars, ingots, old, and other unmanufactured,
exports of ingots, bars, and old, and domestic smelter production. Export and import
data: years ended June 30th.
1889-98 U.S. Bureau of Statistics 1899, p. 196 &
168, Schmitz 1979, p. 212
Computed from imports of copper pigs, bars, ingots, old, and other unmanufactured,
exports of pigs, ingots, bars, and old, and domestic smelter production. Export and
import data: years ended June 30th.
1899 U.S. Bureau of Statistics 1909, p. 437 &
406, Schmitz 1979, p. 212
Computed from imports of copper pigs, bars, ingots, plats, and old, exports of pigs,
ingots, plats, and old, and domestic smelter production. Export and import data: years
ended June 30th.
1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined copper.
Table 3.32: Data sources for the usage of refined lead.
Country Time Source Notes
Belgium 1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Including Luxembourg.
Finland 1929-2010 BGR, 2012a
France 1900-2010 BGR, 2012a
Germany 1900-2010 BGR, 2012a
Italy 1900-2010 BGR, 2012a
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Japan 1900-2010 BGR, 2012a
Netherlands 1906-2010 BGR, 2012a
South Korea 1967-2010 BGR, 2012a
Spain 1909-2010 BGR, 2012a
Sweden 1927-2010 BGR, 2012a
U.K. 1900-2010 BGR, 2012a
U.S. 1900-2010 BGR, 2012a
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Table 3.33: Data sources for the usage of tin.
Country Time Source Notes
Belgium 1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined tin, including Luxembourg.
Finland No data available.
France 1889-96 Metallgesellschaft 1899, p. 68 Unwrought tin.
1897-1902 Metallgesellschaft 1907, p. 83 Unwrought tin.
1903-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined tin.
Germany 1850-64 Bienengra¨ber 1868, pp. 337-8, Neumann
1904, pp. 251-3
Computed from imports and exports of tin in bars, blocks, and old tin, and the production
of tin.
1865-6 Ko¨niglich Preussisches Statistisches Bu-
reau 1868, p. 211, Neumann 1904, pp. 251-
3
Computed from imports and exports of tin in bars, blocks, and old tin, and the production
of tin.
1867 Hirth 1869, p. 130, Neumann 1904,
pp. 251-3
Computed from imports and exports of tin in bars and blocks, and the production of tin.
Exports: linear trend.
1868-9 Hirth 1871, p. 567, Neumann 1904,
pp. 251-3
Computed from imports and exports of tin in blocks etc, and the production of tin.
1870-1 Neumann 1904, pp. 251-3 Computed from imports and exports of tin in blocks etc, and the production of tin.
Exports and Imports: linear trends.
1872-83 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt 1885, p. 144 Tin.
1884-5 Metallgesellschaft 1899, p. 66 Unwrought tin.
1886-1902 Metallgesellschaft 1905, p. 64 Unwrought tin.
1903-5 Metallgesellschaft 1913, p. 81 Unwrought tin.
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1906-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined tin, 1949-90: West-Germany.
Italy 1889-96 Metallgesellschaft 1899, p. 27 Unwrought tin.
1897-1902 Metallgesellschaft 1907, p. 84 Unwrought tin.
1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined tin.
Japan 1902-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined tin.
Netherlands 1904-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined tin.
South Korea 1969-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined tin.
Spain 1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined tin.
Sweden 1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined tin.
U.K. 1850-96 Mitchell 1988, pp. 313-21, Schmitz 1979,
pp. 164-8, House of Commons 1884a,
p. 120
Computed from imports and exports (including re-exports) of unmanufactured tin and
the production of metallic tin (equiv. to mine production).
1897-9 Metallgesellschaft 1907, p. 81 Use of unwrougth tin including changes in apparent stocks.
1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined tin.
U.S. 1853-8 House of Commons 1859, p. 29 Tin in pigs and bars; consumption equal to imports as there seems to be no production
and exports at the time. Imports: Crude estimates based on the value of imports; year
ended 30th June.
1859-60 Linear trend.
1861-2 House of Commons 1864, p. 341 Tin in pigs, blocks and bars; consumption equal to imports as there seems to be no
production and exports at the time; year ended 30th June.
1863 House of Commons 1866, p. 358 Tin in blocks and pigs; consumption equal to imports as there seems to be no production
and exports at the time, supposed error in data source corrected; year ended 30th June.
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1864-5 House of Commons 1868, p. 378 Tin in blocks and pigs; consumption equal to imports as there seems to be no production
and exports at the time, 1864: obvious error in data source corrected; year ended 30th
June.
1866-7 House of Commons 1870, p. 368 Tin in bars, blocks, or pigs; consumption equal to imports as there seems to be no
production and exports at the time; year ended 30th June.
1868 National Bureau of Economic Research
2013
Tin; consumption equal to imports as there seems to be no production and exports at
the time; year ended 30th June.
1869-78 U.S. Bureau of Statistics 1879, pp. 71 and
77
Tin in bars, blocks, pigs, grain, or granulated; consumption equal to imports as there
seems to be no production and exports at the time; year ended June 30th.
1879-88 U.S. Bureau of Statistics 1889, p. 85 Tin in bars, blocks, pigs, grain, or granulated; consumption equal to imports as there
seems to be no production and exports at the time; year ended June 30th.
1889-96 Metallgesellschaft 1899, p. 69 Use of unwrougth tin including changes in apparent stocks.
1897-9 Metallgesellschaft 1907, p. 81 Use of unwrougth tin including changes in apparent stocks.
1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined tin.
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Table 3.34: Data sources for the usage of zinc.
Country Time Source Notes
Belgium 1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined zinc; including Luxembourg.
Finland 1946-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined zinc.
France 1903-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined zinc.
Germany 1850-9 Bienengra¨ber 1868, p. 310, Neumann 1904,
p. 314
Computed from imports and exports of unwrought zin and the production of zinc.
1860-78 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt 1880, p. 136 Unwrought zinc.
1879-83 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt 1885, p. 144 Unwrought zinc.
1884-8 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt 1890, p. 131 Unwrought zinc.
1889-96 Metallgesellschaft 1905, p. 56 Unwrought zinc.
1897-9 Metallgesellschaft 1913, p. 65 Unwrought zinc, no scrap.
1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined zinc; 1945-90: West Germany.
Italy 1889-94 Metallgesellschaft 1898, p. 57 Unwrought zinc.
1895-1902 Metallgesellschaft 1905, p. 61 Unwrought zinc.
1903-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined zinc.
Japan 1911-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined zinc.
Netherlands 1889-90 Metallgesellschaft 1897, p. 31 Unwrought zinc; estimate by Metallgesellschaft.
1891-9 Metallgesellschaft 1901, p. 27 Unwrought zinc; estimate by Metallgesellschaft.
1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined zinc.
South Korea 1962-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined zinc.
Spain 1900-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined zinc.
210
Sweden 1911-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined zinc.
U.K. 1840-9 Mitchell 1988, pp. 312-23 Computed from imports and exports of unmanufactured zinc. No domestic zinc produc-
tion according to Neumann (1904) and Schmitz (1979) before 1855.
1850-1 House of Commons 1853, p. 108, Mitchell
1988, pp. 320-3, Neumann 1904, p. 314
Computed from imports of zinc and spelter, and exports of unmanufactured zinc. No
domestic zinc production according to Neumann (1904) and Schmitz (1979) before 1855.
1852-4 Mitchell 1988, pp. 312-7 Computed from imports and exports of unmanufactured zinc. No domestic zinc produc-
tion according to Neumann (1904) and Schmitz (1979) before 1855.
1855-9 House of Commons 1882, pp. 17-21,
Mitchell 1988, pp. 320-3, Neumann 1904,
p. 314
Computed from imports of zinc or spelter, crude, and in cakes, exports of unmanufactured
zinc, and the domestic mine production.
1860-1 House of Commons 1882, pp. 17-21,
Mitchell 1988, pp. 320-3, Schmitz 1979,
p. 184
Computed from imports of zinc or spelter, crude, and in cakes, exports of unmanufactured
zinc, and the domestic mine production.
1862-9 House of Commons 1882, pp. 17-21,
Schmitz 1979, p. 184
Computed from imports and exports of zinc or spelter, crude, and in cakes, and the
domestic mine production.
1870-6 House of Commons 1882, pp. 17-21, BGR,
2012b
Computed from imports and exports of zinc or spelter, crude, and in cakes, and the
domestic smelter production; 1871: linear trend.
1877-9 House of Commons 1882, pp. 17-21,
Schmitz 1979, p. 184
Computed from imports and exports of zinc or spelter, crude, and in cakes, and the
domestic mine production.
1880 House of Commons 1882, pp. 17-21, Met-
allgesellschaft 1898, p. 16
Computed from imports and exports of zinc or spelter, crude, and in cakes, and the
domestic unwrought zinc production.
1881-3 House of Commons 1885a, p. 6 and p. 14,
Metallgesellschaft 1898, p. 16
Computed from imports and exports of zinc or spelter, crude, and in cakes, and the
domestic unwrought zinc production.
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1884-8 Mitchell 1988, pp. 312-23, Metallge-
sellschaft 1898, p. 16
Computed from imports and exports of unmanufactured zinc, and the domestic un-
wrought zinc production.
1889-94 Metallgesellschaft 1899, p. 60 Unwrought zinc; no changes in apparent stocks included.
1895-1901 Metallgesellschaft 1905, p. 58 Unwrought zinc; no changes in apparent stocks included.
1902-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined zinc.
U.S. 1849-51 House of Commons 1853, p. 109 Usage equal to imports of British zinc or spelter. No production according to Mitchell
(1988, p. 366) and Schmitz (1979, p. 184). No export data available. I suppose there
have not been considerable amounts of exports.
1852-3 House of Commons 1854a, p. 9 Usage equal to imports of British zinc or spelter. No production according to Mitchell
(1988, p. 366) and Schmitz (1979, p. 184). No export data available. I suppose there
have not been considerable amounts of exports. Imports 1852: linear trend.
1854-8 House of Commons 1855, p. 9 Usage equal to imports of British zinc or spelter. No production according to Mitchell
(1988, p. 366) and Schmitz (1979, p. 184). No export data available. I suppose there
have not been considerable amounts of exports. Imports 1855-8: linear trend.
1859 House of Commons 1862, p. 277, Jolly
1992, p. 20
Computed from imports of zinc and spelter and the domestic production of zinc. No
export data available. I suppose there have not been considerable amounts of exports.
1860-2 House of Commons 1862, p. 277, BGR,
2012b
Computed from imports of zinc and spelter and the domestic refined production of zinc.
No export data available. I suppose there have not been considerable amounts of exports.
Imports 1861-2: linear trend.
1863 House of Commons 1866, p. 358, BGR,
2012b
Computed from imports of zinc in blocks and sheets and the domestic refined production
of zinc. No export data available. I suppose there have not been considerable amounts
of exports.
1864-6 House of Commons 1868, p. 378, Carter
et al. 2006, BGR, 2012b
Computed from imports of zinc in blocks and sheets, exports of refined zinc in blocks,
pigs, and slabs, and the domestic refined production of zinc. Imports 1866: linear trend.
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1867-79 Carter et al. 2006, BGR, 2012b Computed from imports and exports of refined zinc in blocks, pigs, and slabs, and the
domestic refined production of zinc.
1880-8 Carter et al. 2006, Metallgesellschaft 1898,
p. 16
Computed from imports and exports of refined zinc in blocks, pigs, and slabs, and the
domestic production of unwrought zinc.
1889-94 Metallgesellschaft 1899, p. 60 Unwrought zinc.
1895-1904 Metallgesellschaft 1905, p. 63 Unwrought zinc.
1905-2010 BGR, 2012a Refined zinc.
Table 3.35: Data sources for the world primary production of the mineral commodities.
Mineral Time Unit Sources Notes
commodity
Aluminum 1854-62 mt Neumann 1904, p. 395 Primary aluminum production; 1856-8 and 1860-1: linear trend.
1863-1976 mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 197-208 Primary refined production; before 1890 most aluminum has been pro-
duced by the Deville process.
1977-2009 mt BGR, 2012b Primary refined production
Copper 1820-78 mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 64-9 Metal content of mined ores.
1879-82 mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 209-13 Smelter production from primary materials.
1883-1902 mt Metallgesellschaft 1904 Unwrought copper.
1903-12 mt Metallgesellschaft 1913 Unwrought copper.
1913-28 mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 209-13 Smelter production from primary materials.
1929-59 mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 213-25 Primary refined production.
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1960-2005 mt International Copper Study
Group 2010b
Refined production from primary and secondary materials.
2006-10 mt International Copper Study
Group 2012b
Refined production from primary and secondary materials.
Lead 1800-2009 mt BGR, 2012b Metal content of mine production; missing data for Russia (1841-4, 1846-
9, 1851-4, 1856-9), for Spain (1846-50, 1853-7), and for the United King-
dom (1839-40, 1842-4) has been filled by using geometric trends.
Tin 1791-1883 mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 162-8 Metal content of mine production; 1800: break in time series due to
missing Malayan data.
1884-1976 mt Schmitz 1979, p. 247 Primary refined tin production.
1977-2010 mt U.S. Geological Survey 2012b Metal content of mine and mill production.
Zinc 1820-2 mt Neumann 1904, p. 313 Unwrought zinc production.
1823-79 mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 160-6 Mine production.
1880-94 mt Metallgesellschaft 1889,
pp. 15-6
Unwrought zinc.
1895-9 mt Metallgesellschaft 1901, p. 25, Unwrought zinc.
1900-2007 mt U.S. Geological Survey 2012c 1900-12, 1914-17, and 1929-42: Metal cont. of smelter production; 1913,
1918-28, and 1943-2007: Metal cont. of mine production.
Table 3.36: Data sources for the world refined production of the mineral commodities.
Mineral Time Unit Sources Notes
commodity
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Copper 1820-78 mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 64-9 Metal content of mined ores.
1879-1928 mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 209-13 Smelter production (primary but may also include secondary materials
according to a personal communication with Doris Homberg-Heumann
of the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources).
1929-59 mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 213-25 Refined production; according to a personal communication with Doris
Homberg-Heumann from the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Nat-
ural Resource the data includes both primary and secondary sources.
This is also the case when the data is compared with data from the
International Copper Study Group (2010b) from 1960s onwards.
1960-2005 mt International Copper Study
Group 2010b
Refined production from primary and secondary materials.
2006-10 mt International Copper Study
Group 2012b
Refined production from primary and secondary materials.
Lead 1840-60 mt Neumann 1904, pp. 149-51 Metal content of mine production; missing data for Russia (1841-4, 1846-
9, 1851-4, 1856-9), for Spain (1846-50, 1853-7), and for the United King-
dom (1839-40, 1842-4) has been filled by using geometric trends.
1861-2010 mt BGR, 2012b Metal content of refined production from primary and secondary mate-
rials; total production by smelters or refineries of refined lead, including
the lead content of antimonial lead, ores, concentrates, lead bullion, lead
alloys, mattes, residues, slag, or scrap. Pig lead and lead alloys recovered
from secondary materials by remelting alone without undergoing further
treatment before reuse are excluded. (See International Lead and Zinc
Study Group (2011))
Tin 1821-83 mt Neumann 1904, pp. 251-3 Tin production.
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1884-2010 mt BGR, 2012b Primary smelter production.
Zinc 1850-79 mt Schmitz 1979, pp. 160-6 Mine production.
1880-94 mt Metallgesellschaft 1889,
pp. 15-6
Unwrought zinc.
1895-9 mt Metallgesellschaft 1901, p. 25, Unwrought zinc.
1900-2010 mt BGR, 2012b Total production by smelters or refineries of zinc in marketable form
or used directly for alloying regardless of the type of source material.
Remelted zinc and zinc dust are excluded. (See International Lead and
Zinc Study Group (2011))
Oil 1861-1964 mt Mitchell 2007, Russia:
Alekperov 2011
Crude petroleum (not from oil shales); Russia 1893-4: geometric trend.
1965-2010 mt British Petroleum 2011 Includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and NGLs (the liquid content of
natural gas where this is recovered separately). Excludes liquid fuels
from other sources such as biomass and coal derivatives.
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